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Since President Barack Obama was sworn into office a little 
over a year ago, “change” is one of  many words to describe the 
current political climate. Is America more divided after the tortu-
ous healthcare wrangle? Or is America more effusively expressing 
its diverse political views? Whether it is the conspicuous rise of  the 
Birther Movement or outraged citizens storming the Capitol armed 
with epithets, it is nearly impossible to tell which conditions make up 
today’s political landscape other than just plain mad. Change is hard, 
and apparently, change is angry. 
That is not to say that Americans do not have good reason to be 
angry. Congress seems to be unable to solve urgent problems as in-
dividuals, communities, and other levels of  government suffer from 
joblessness, rising costs, and fewer resources. Anger is only at the 
surface of  America’s deep fear and anxiety over an uncertain future. 
But this is change in its rawest form—the good, the bad, and the 
ugly. This spring volume features contributions on healthcare re-
form’s underbelly and potential homeownership opportunity roll-
backs; however, it also features essays on LGBT advocates’ success 
in joining the Supreme Court bar, preparation of  a new generation 
of  problem-solving lawyers, and creative solutions that bring atten-
tion to the broken criminal justice system. If  the current political 
landscape demonstrates any lesson, it is that change does not equate 
progress. Sometimes even, as Bridgette Baldwin convincingly argues 
about welfare stigmatization, things can be more of  the same. It de-
pends from which vantage point one looks. 
The Modern American is “modernizing” during our sixth year, yet our 
commitment to offering robust dialogue on diverse issues remains 
as firm as ever. Evocative dialogue can contain a lot of  value—it 
can be more than irate slurs hurled at elected officials. Real decisions 
affect real people in real ways which is essential to acknowledge in a 
discussion about political change. Still, we must be fair-minded as we 
engage with one another. 
The Modern American continues to bring incisiveness out from political 
storms on pressing issues within this volume and those to come. We 
encourage The Modern American readers to help us in our mission to 
provide a constructive platform for these conversations by offering 
us feedback during our Strategic Plan comment period (open until 
May 31). More information about the Strategic Plan can be found on 
the publication back cover. Here, at The Modern American, we believe, 
“Yes, we still can.” 
                                                          Sincerely Yours, 
    The Executive Board
    The Modern American 
Letter from the Executive Board
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STRATIFICATION OF THE WELFARE POOR:
INTERSECTIONS OF GENDER, RACE, & “WORTHINESS”
IN POVERTY DISCOURSE AND POLICY
By: Bridgette Baldwin 1
On average, we black women have bigger, better problems 
than any other women alive. We bear the burden of  being 
seen as pretenders to the thrones of  both femininity and 
masculinity, endlessly mocked by the ambiguously gendered 
crown-of-thorns imagery of  ‘queen’ Madame Queen, snap 
queen, welfare queen, quota queen, Queenie Queen, Queen 
Queen Queen. We black women are figured more as stand-ins 
for men, sort of  like reverse drag queens: women pretending 
to be women but more male than men—bare-breasted, sweat-
glistened, plow-pulling, sole supporters of  their families.
                -  Patricia Williams 2
INTRODUCTION
Welfare policy in theory aims to compensate those in 
need, usually those existing at or below a fluctuating poverty 
line. The policy behind welfare has always been devised. 
However, who is designated as poor and when that poverty is 
deserving of  compensation has never been fully determined 
by economic conditions, but most crucially by subjective 
interpretation of  “worthiness.” As a perfect example, in the 
1980s, black women across the country were exposed, uplifted 
and appreciated as the “queens” of  American poverty.  At the 
behest of  this black “queen’s” inauguration was the future 40th 
President and then Governor of  California, Ronald Reagan.3
In his highlighting of  welfare programs, Reagan hailed black 
women as the ultimate “welfare queens.”4 You have heard the 
story, with minute details which differ from region to region: the 
Black “welfare queen”5 had a generally lavish lifestyle driving 
around in her nice new Cadillac never really going anywhere in 
particular, unless off  to pick up her welfare checks (which by 
the way she had gotten rich on) or to dine on steak and lobster. 
However, she usually stayed at home watching soap operas like 
“Days of  our Lives,” generating more income by producing 
baby after baby. She was cunning yet shiftless, clever in her 
manipulation of  the system yet uneducated, and active in her 
endeavor to con the system yet lazy in her work ethic.  All hail 
the “welfare queen.”
This representation of  black women permeated the 
discourse of  welfare reform in the 1980s and later served as 
an important propaganda image in the social policy switch 
from welfare to workfare.6 We needed a reason to reduce 
resources to the poor and what better way than to use the 
notoriously lazy black woman as a scapegoat.  She was the 
personal manifestation of  a lazy well-fed government that 
had produced no profits and was the reason for the country’s 
economic decline.  Despite the containment of  many black 
women within the economic status of  the working poor, black 
women were painted as the picture of  the “welfare queen,” 
designated as undeserving and unworthy of  any social welfare 
benefits and as the poster child for the neo-conservative small 
government, big business movement.
If  we move backward to the 1880s at the start of  
welfare policies in the post Reconstruction Era, we see a 
completely different standard of  compensatory worthiness, 
but one with almost the exact same policy outcome.  Again 
black women’s identity was not purely defined by a standard 
of  economic poverty but predicated on notions of  moral 
fitness and even conceptions of  employability.  In this era, for 
almost the opposite reason, black women were central to the 
discussion and marginalized from the help of  social welfare.7
However, instead of  being heralded as the lazy “welfare 
queen,” they were marked as despicable, employable workers 
because of  their consistent labor during slavery.8  Unlike 
white women, who were part of  a rising white middle-class 
that fostered female respectability by relegating women to 
the domestic sphere and protecting them from public labor, 
black women were seen as perfect for work and for this reason 
not eligible for compensation for the very real poverty they 
faced while working.9  Under the patriarchal domestic code, 
“proper” women stayed home and took care of  their husbands 
and children, and if  the husband died the state would step in to 
fill “his” void.10  Hard-working husbands could earn sufficient 
money to support their families.11  Fittingly, this allowed society 
to deny black mothers the same protection as “proper” mothers 
who worked in their own homes.  Because black women were 
required to work outside the home, they were excluded from 
poverty compensation.  Moreover, because black women 
usually worked in white women’s homes they provided the 
labor to ensure white female respectability.  
This history of  economic “worthiness,” this revelation, 
is significant for welfare policy discourse.  When black people 
were stolen from Africa and sold into slavery, the plantation 
system rarely discriminated between man, woman, old, young, 
weak or poor.12  So in that sense the post-slavery argument 
is consistent; working-class black women have continually 
been “working mothers” without the protected status of  
respectable motherhood.  Black women have been expected to 
work.  Yet the image of  black women has been distorted over 
the 100 years since the Reconstruction to reinforce normative 
conclusions that they are unworthy of  welfare.  During the 
formative stages of  welfare policy-making in the 1880s, black 
women were thought undeserving of  welfare because they 
were considered inherently employable.  By the 1980s, black 
women were uniformly deemed unworthy of  welfare because 
they were “welfare queens,” lazy by nature and unwilling 
participants in the labor force.  What we rarely think about 
is the permanent centrality of  black female images to welfare 
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discourse.  “She” is consistently deemed to be the negation, 
the opposite of  compensatory worthiness within the poor 
for contradictory reasons.  Importantly, charting the changes 
in the meaning of  black women’s relationship to worthiness 
and poverty compensation is not a history of  their poverty 
but diagrams the evolution of  the rapid transformation and 
decline of  social welfare programs in the United States through 
a misrepresentation of  the black female image.     
A social and historical examination of  black women’s 
representation within welfare policy and discourse reveals 
that social constructions of  race and gender have consistently 
informed welfare reform policies that rationalize inequitable 
distributions and unrealistic visions of  
the social world.  This paper analyzes the 
historical, cultural and legal treatments 
and representations of  poor black women 
from Progressive Era philanthropic aid to 
early “work-to-welfare” reform protocol. 
When black women serve as the case 
study for a larger examination of  social 
policy issues we see that welfare was rarely meant to remedy 
the structural crunch of  poverty.  Working class black women 
have been at the center of  the construction of  the poor and 
serve as the designation to determine which people deserve 
to be compensated for being poor.13  This paper discusses 
both the ramifications and rationale of  why the government 
never designated black women as “deserving” poor and the 
implications of  constructed images in the post-reconstruction 
period, the New Deal Era, the 1960s AFDC agenda, and 1980s 
welfare to work reform.
               PROGRESSIVE ERA
The Progressive Era historically has been popularly 
understood as a movement of  positive social reform and the 
rise of  the feminist movement.14  However, the changing socio-
economic landscape of  turn of  the century depression, post-
slave economy, and rapid urban-industrialization left many 
people exposed to the underside of  capitalist progress.15  From 
this reality emerged a collection of  middle class reformers 
concerned with conceptualizing a more humane relationship 
between industry and the increasingly poor and largely 
(im)migrant communities.  
The rise of  Progressive Era women reformers stood 
at the center of  this formation.  These reformers concentrated 
on improving the conditions of  women who were being pushed 
into the industrial labor force because of  poverty resulting 
from death, divorce or insufficient employment of  their male 
providers. The major thrust of  politics and policy urged by 
these reformers was the protection of  women from the travails 
of  a rapidly changing world and the brutal labor market. 
Progressive Era women reformers stressed reorganization 
of  the family and were instrumental in the establishment of  
the first social welfare program for women: the “Mothers’ 
Pensions.”16    However, if  we place black women at the center 
of  the discussion in this era, the Progressive Movement’s image 
of  “mother,” which relegated her to the domestic sphere, was 
solely dependent on the labor of  black women in the homes 
of  white “mothers.”   The construction of  social welfare policy 
that required women to work in their own home excluded 
black women and exposed the foundations of  public welfare 
policy as inherently racialized and white.17 The advocates for 
Mother’s Pension constructed the family along white middle 
class standards and norms.  Entitlement to certain social 
benefits was predicated on losing a male provider and offered 
protections only to women who labored in the home.  These 
constructions ran counter to the reality of  black family life 
and the labor demands placed on black 
women in particular.
The political, economic 
and social opportunities provided 
by industrial capitalism during the 
Progressive Era were stratified along 
racial lines.  The clarion call for progress 
during this period seemed ironic at best 
when considering that this period was also the ostensible 
nadir of  race relations.  Black men and women suffered due 
to persistent acts of  racial violence and discrimination at the 
hands of  poor whites, particularly in the South.18  Further, 
social welfare reform efforts subjected private relationships 
within black families to public scrutiny as a pre-condition for 
alleviating poverty conditions.19  This is not to suggest that 
sexual and racial equalities were not part of  the Progressive 
agenda; they just were just secondary concerns.  Structural 
dynamics and changes to the meanings of  gender identity 
made it difficult for black women to meet ideas of  what it 
meant to be a respectable or a decent mother.20  White women 
tried to improve their lives and the lives of  their families 
but created and endorsed policies that ignored the particular 
role black women played as the matriarch of  their particular 
familial experiences.  As historian Eileen Boris argues, “though 
reformers defined motherhood as a positively valued nurturing 
activity…women of  color... had to labor for others and could 
not fulfill the dictates of  ‘true womanhood.’”21 
A woman’s eligibility for Mother’s Pensions was 
determined by her moral standing in the community.22
Progressive reformers were dedicated to serving those who 
they deemed to have proper morals and worthy character and 
who deserved assistance due to temporary hardship.23  Poor 
working mothers were deemed undeserving poor.  While many 
European immigrants could also be excluded by these general 
guidelines, black women were haunted by images of  their slave 
past.  Black women had always been part of  the labor market 
and never protected by the laws of  marriage and hence were 
branded as inherently undeserving and suspected of  vice, 
immorality and intemperance in ways that working class white 
ethical women were not.24  Mothers had to be fit and proper 
and this definition was left to the discretion of  local overseers 
of  the relief.  Initial Mother’s Pensions regulations required in 
many states that a woman be a widow and enforced strict yet 
. . . welfare was rarely meant 
to remedy the structural 
crunch of  poverty.
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ambiguous behavioral standards.25  What really came out of  
the Mothers’ Pensions was that those white women deemed 
deserving were helped.  Black women were encouraged to 
organize for their pensions separately, but this was an unrealistic 
request considering the lack of  political and economic power 
in the hands of  the black community.26  Nonetheless, the 
National Association of  Colored Women (NACW) organized 
to create better social conditions for black women.  Unlike the 
platforms that endorsed Mothers’ Pensions for white women, 
this organization encouraged women to work to improve 
the economic conditions of  the family 
and the national reputation of  black 
womanhood.27
  Lack of  economic and political 
strength was not the only shortcoming 
black women faced; they also had to deal 
with the legalized conditions of  racism. 
The highly celebrated achievements 
of  the Progressive Movement co-existed with the Jim Crow 
Era in the South and its more covert operation in northern
cities. In fact, Jim Crow Laws were on the books as early as the 
1890s and the policies ran the gamut from more benign legal 
sanctions on public housing, employment and recreation to the 
more pernicious forms of  racial violence including rapes and 
lynchings. 28  The Plessy v. Ferguson29 doctrine of  “separate but 
equal” became the formalized manifestation of  longstanding 
white anxieties about black progress. Even in the more liberal 
North, the segregation of  settlement houses and social 
programs along the lines of  race denied that white supremacy 
was the “peculiar institution” of  the South.  The most public 
and spectacular exhibitions of  how former slaves were not 
treated as citizens were the charred bodies and punctured souls 
that lynching parties left on display.  According to historian 
Jacqueline A. Rouse, the legalized sanctioning of  lynching 
during the Jim Crow Era promoted white supremacy and 
maintained subordination and intimidation of  black people.30
Under the specter of  Jim Crow, most turn of  the century 
social reform was born.  This is not to deny the sympathetic 
supporters and charitable settlement houses set up to assist 
poor black families in the North, but in the larger scheme of  
things these supporters were far and few between, specifically 
in southern communities.  Most of  the policy-makers were, 
after all, faithful to a racist ideology that supported racial 
violence, unequal political and legal systems, and inferior social 
services.  Out of  the bondage of  slavery most black families 
were relegated to agricultural and, for women, domestic labor 
to survive. Racism further hindered the advancement of  black 
people and kept them working in menial jobs.31 Social welfare 
policies in particular ignored the role of  the black mother and 
the stratification of  labor in the black family.  
Black families lived in a world with considerably 
restricted opportunities and blatant discrimination.  During this 
time period black women were not protected by the Mothers’ 
Pensions and the social welfare benefits because they were 
considered employable women and they had to support their 
families.  Most black family members worked as agricultural 
wage laborers and sharecroppers in the south and low skilled 
craft workers or domestics in the north.   In addition, black 
men who were hired out into positions which were considered 
more professional, were not hired for long and therefore black 
women had to make consistent and substantial contributions 
to their families.32  Here, the “undeserving” angle showed its 
face quite often in the domestic work performed by black 
women.  With the strong expectation of  female domesticity, 
black women were summarily excluded from the benefits 
of  the Mothers’ Pensions because 
they had always worked and were seen 
as able to work.33  As an example, the 
Sheppard-Towner Act,34 also known 
as the maternity bill, provided federal 
funds to states for health and welfare of  
mothers and infants during maternity.35
States were given unfettered discretion 
as to how they distributed funds.36  Since racialized notions 
of  motherhood heavily informed this discretion, black women 
did not receive the same funds as their white counterparts.37
Hence, the umbrella protections afforded to white women 
were not afforded to black women.  So-called “progress” in 
this era was stratified along racial lines.  While the ensuing 
Great Depression could have instigated an egalitarian level of  
compensation because everyone was poor, we find that the 
distribution of  federal money still continued along racial lines. 
       NEW DEAL OR RAW DEAL
With the worst stock market crash in history and the 
Great Depression descending upon the states, thousands of  
people flooded soup kitchens in urban and rural communities 
across the nation.   Black people, who were already living 
in poverty, suffered even greater losses from the economic 
depression.  The agricultural collapse in the southern states 
led to the near destruction of  the tenant farming system and 
severe unemployment for many black families that still toiled 
on southern land as others had made decisions to leave the 
South a few years prior.  At the same time, black women in 
the North also began to lose their jobs in exorbitant numbers 
and were replaced by white women domestics as they were left 
unshielded by the plight of  the Great Depression.38   In 1932, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt promised to provide economic 
security for all Americans with the “New Deal.”39   The 
unprecedented economic policy decisions during Roosevelt’s 
“Frst 100 Days” brought about new agencies and programs. 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal projected to implement 
ideas from the Progressive Era and consolidate them into a 
federally sponsored program.  Still, the new American welfare 
state intentionally excluded black families, particularly black 
women, from access to social welfare benefits under New Deal 
legislation.40  
With the rise in the immigrant population, the political 
controllers were all too delighted to bypass the economic and 
The new American welfare state 
intentionally excluded black families, 
particularly black women, from access 
to social welfare benefits
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racial problems of  black families.  According to historian 
Michael Brown, there was no need to deal with the “Negro 
problem” because it was presumed that the New Deal politics 
would lessen racism by raising the standard of  living for all 
people through social reform.41  However, under the New Deal 
administration, social welfare organizations did little to change 
the quality of  life for black people.42  Although Roosevelt 
is credited with changing the economic prosperity of  the 
country with various acts and disbursements of  money to state 
polities, it comes at no surprise that there was an increasing 
and detrimental pattern of  inequitable distribution of  funds 
to the black poor.43  Roosevelt extended social benefits to 
whites, while discriminatory practices implemented by state 
agents constructively denied those same benfits to blacks.44
Unfortunately, black families continued to suffer and were not 
equally included in Roosevelt’s New Deal for all Americans.45
  Ironically, programs under New Deal legislation 
began to systematically push black men into unemployment.46
For example, the National Recovery Administration (NRA)47
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of  193348 were 
considered to be pivotal in the early stages of  “New Deal” 
policy making.49  One of  the NRA’s major “color-blind” policies 
was to implement equitable wage standards across all races.50
However, there was a significant disparity in racialized wage 
earnings for black workers especially in southern regions.51
The NRA and the federal government endorsed longstanding 
regional practices by refusing to enforce national standards of  
industry and labor.  There was little done to control state-to-
state disparities and deviations of  salaries to black workers. 
In addition, some southern employers refused to pay black 
workers as much as white workers on the view that black labor 
was significantly less efficient than white labor.52  Further, 
when employers in southern states were forced to pay whites 
and blacks equally, they threatened to fire all black employees 
and replace them with more efficient white employees.53
Obviously still offended by the government appropriation of  
their commodified labor,54 southerners 
were determined to keep black labor 
cheap.55 
Black women fared no better. 
Although many black women already 
labored in the market, an increasing 
number of  black women became the sole 
breadwinners for their families.  Because 
of  the scarcity of  jobs during the Great Depression, black 
women were exploited by their domestic employers and were 
paid very little per week to support their families.56   In many 
states, black women were paid the lowest salaries outside of  
and below NRA’s federal standards.57  In addition, the NRA 
refused to include domestic work, agricultural work or common 
laborers among those who should receive the minimum wage.58 
In the South in particular, black women represented 60 % 
59of  the domestic workers corps, and roughly 40 %60 of  the 
agricultural labor was Black.  Refusal to include occupations 
that were dominated by black labor under NRA precluded 
black families from earning wages at any significant rate above 
poverty.61
State-subsidized machinery benefited white 
landowners by increasing productivity while eliminating the 
need for black tenant farmers.62  Thus, agricultural innovations 
caused the displacement of  more black families.  Even where 
black workers remained on white farms, lax enforcement of  
AAA policies requiring landowners to channel a portion of  
government crop reduction pay to tenants guaranteed that 
black tenants were deprived of  their share.
The Social Security Act (SSA), which included both 
old age insurance and public relief, was another example 
of  race-based policy implementation.63  Seemingly color-
blind policies continued to intentionally deny black families 
access to benefits.64 The SSA specifically excluded domestic 
and agricultural workers from receiving benefits upon the 
loss of  a breadwinner.65  As mentioned previously, these 
areas of  employment were predominately occupied by black 
workers.66   The Works Progress Administration (WPA), which 
concentrated on employment rather than relief, also instituted 
color-blind policies.  However, without the enforcement by 
the federal government of  non-discriminatory practices, black 
workers were intentionally excluded from access to public jobs 
in everyday practices.67  Between 1936 and 1942, black workers 
were hired for roughly only 15 % of  the jobs offered under 
the WPA.68  Due to the intentional exclusion of  black men 
from the labor market, black families began to lose their male 
breadwinners.  Most black women were in the labor market, 
but women who had never worked were also being forced to 
earn the family wage or apply for public relief.  Although New 
Deal policies endorsed giving welfare benefits to women who 
headed households, most public relief, which was controlled 
by local governments, was also predicated on the former 
domesticity of  the women.  Because of  the legacy of  racism 
and the concentration of  black families below the poverty 
line, many black women had always been in the labor market 
well before the New Deal.  Therefore, 
black women continued to be excluded 
from public relief, social benefits, social 
security and other forms of  welfare 
because their status as “employable” 
made them again, undeserving of  
government help.
 The program that could have had 
the most impact on public relief  for black women was the 
Aid to Dependent Children Act (ADC).  ADC was merely an 
extension of  Mother’s Pensions69 and similarly guided by ideas 
of  the so-called deserving poor. Access to the program was still 
determined by an ambiguous “suitable home” standard which 
excluded most needy black families.70  Further, federal agencies 
under political pressure from southern states allowed local 
governments to determine the specific criteria for eligibility. 
Most southern states were dependent on cheap black labor and 
very reluctant to create policies that gave black workers access 
to federal relief.71  Although later ruled unconstitutional,72
Access to the program was still 
determined by an ambiguous 
“suitable home” standard which 
excluded most needy black families.
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minimum residency requirements mandated by local 
governments also excluded most black migrant workers.73
Further, many southern states conditioned access to public 
relief  to mothers who had never worked in the labor market, 
which would exclude most black mothers.  Southern states 
reasoned that black mothers had always worked and asked 
why anything should change because 
of  this new program.74  Such restrictive 
measures left families, and particularly 
black mothers, in a state of  significant 
poverty and despair.75
Access to benefits under 
new nationalized welfare policies was 
structurally distinguished by race and 
gender, attaching welfare benefits to socially constructed notions 
of  what qualifies as a traditional family organization.  Family 
(dis)organization determined what relationship, if  any, a family 
could have to the American welfare state.76  Because of  various 
acts that caused displacement among black families during the 
Great Depression, there was a high proportion of  female-
headed households.77  In the North, a reported 30 % of  black 
families were headed by single, divorced or widowed women.78 
The ease with which New Deal policies excluded much of  the 
black male labor force from social insurance created a legal 
barrier that was greater for black women than for similarly-
situated white women.  For instance, rising out of  poverty was 
more difficult for black women than their white counterparts 
because New Deal policies extended to similarly-situated white 
women where the husband was unemployed or dead.  This is 
especially true where black men suffered from unemployability. 
Welfare policies distinguished among households based on 
how they became female-headed—whether by death, divorce, 
abandonment, or single motherhood, for example—so black 
families and images of  black womanhood became the focus 
of  public scrutiny and outcry.79  New Deal programs therefore 
failed to protect black women in two ways: as capable mothers 
and as capable workers.80
As black communities were further consolidated 
into urban ghettos after World War II, black female-headed 
households would finally come under the umbrella of  state 
aid.  However, these very inclusions were predicated on the 
fortifications of  false theories about black family deviance and 
dependency in female-headed homes in particular.81  Ideas 
derived from the infamous Moynihan Report82 and the urban 
application of  the “culture of  poverty” theory would hide an 
entire history of  white working class social mobility that had 
been predicated on state and private aid.  The misrepresentation 
of  black deviance and the masking of  white dependency 
signaled the beginning of  the end for welfare in America.
     AID TO SOME FAMILIES WITH 
         DEPENDENT CHILDREN
 The postwar 1950s and 60s witnessed racial clashes 
and increasing ghetto unrest.  State and local government-
assisted programs under-served the black community and 
solidified the place of  black families at the bottom of  a racist 
regime.  Black families continued to be moved to substandard 
housing complexes and were relegated to the worst health care 
facilities in the country.  The result of  the end of  World War 
II led to immense poverty due in large part to displacement 
of  women and black workers when 
white soldiers returned.  Changes in the 
structure of  the so-called nuclear family 
became evident particularly in poorer 
communities.  For example, in 1950 
approximately a quarter of  the population 
of  black mothers were separated, 
divorced or widowed.83  Children living 
in one-parent households in the black community rose from 
roughly 22 % to 32 % in ten years.84   Although the rise in single 
parent income could represent the increase in the number of  
black mothers on AFDC, this rationalization ignores the reality 
of  the social, economic and political plight of  black families. 
Several presidential administrations have tampered with the 
American welfare state.  Unfortunately, the impact of  this 
haphazard effort at reform has been very detrimental to single-
parent households headed by black women.  In particular, the 
expansion of  the American welfare state to include single black 
mothers created a cultural backlash motivated by racism and 
sexism and opened the door to what President Clinton called 
“the end of  welfare as we know it.”85
  The previously mentioned Aid to Dependent Children 
Act (ADC)86 originated in the Social Security Act of  1935 but 
has its historic foundation in the Progressive Era as a remnant 
of  Mothers’ Pensions.87  Similar to Mothers’ Pensions, ADC 
was originally intended to continue to allow deserving mothers 
to stay at home with their children while receiving public 
assistance.  Most ADC programs provided benefits to families 
who lost a male breadwinner due to death, abandonment or 
unemployment.  Conceptually, the structural problem with the 
early foundations for this program was the continual role of  
an ambiguously defined notion of  worthiness.  Because black 
women were deemed inherently undeserving, they were subjected 
to benign neglect by state and national governments.88
In 1950, a series of  changes to ADC occurred, including 
a name change to Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC).89   Like its predecessor, AFDC continued to offer 
cash assistance to the deserving poor.  State and local governments 
controlled the administration and eligibility requirements for 
relief.  Particularly in southern states, restrictive eligibility 
requirements continued to exclude black mothers from relief. 
For example, the infamous “man in the house” rule allowed 
states to remove benefits from black mothers who had a male 
(not son) living in the home.90  Likewise, the “employable” 
standard required all black mothers to work unless they were 
handicapped or sick.91  
After a series of  liberal amendments in the 1960s, 
the number of  AFDC beneficiaries began to increase 
dramatically and more poor single black mothers gained access 
Because black women were
 deemed inherently undeserving, they 
were subjected to benign neglect by state 
and national governments.
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to the program’s benefits.92  From 1960 to 1970 there were 
approximately 5 million people receiving public assistance, five 
times more people than were on the welfare rolls between 1950 
and 1960.93  With increasing caseloads and changes in the racial 
composition of  recipients, AFDC came under severe political 
attack followed by a profound resentment of  this program and 
the poor. 94    The many reasons for this backlash include the 
simple fact of  the increased legions of  poor citizens receiving 
public relief  from taxpayers.95  
Another reason for the immense backlash, particularly 
against black mothers, was the notorious report authored by 
the Assistant Labor Secretary (and future Senator) Daniel 
Moynihan.  Moynihan suggested that the economic conditions 
of  the black family resulted from their deviation from American 
family norms.96  The reason for the terrible plight of  the black 
family was that most black males had a significantly high 
rate of  unemployment and therefore could not be adequate 
breadwinners for their families.97  This in turn produced a 
significant surge in unsupported illegitimate children among 
black families, an increase in female-headed households and a 
cultural dependency on welfare by black women and children.98 
So, not only was the taxpayer’s money being used to support a 
huge population, it was being used to support a huge “Negro” 
population.  Moynihan’s report grossly mischaracterized 
black families in general and black mothers in particular.  All 
demographic metrics upon which Moynihan relied ignored 
the historical legacy of  systemic and intergenerational racism 
that produced the high unemployment rates observed today. 
State and societal discrimination, not inherent deficiencies, is a 
driving contributor to black poverty.  Thus, Moynihan justifies 
state indifference to poverty by ignoring historical context and 
places blame squarely upon the poor for their poverty.
Lastly, the emerging “culture of  poverty” theory, 
combined with the pre-existing Moynihan Report, explicitly 
racialized and gendered the category of  poverty as black and 
female. The “culture of  poverty” theory posited that economic 
inequality was not an issue of  larger 
social forces but a product of  deviant 
cultural behaviors antithetical to delayed 
gratification, economic modesty and 
productive labor; while the characteristics 
of  economic dependency would be 
passed on through the generations.99 
Unfortunately, this theory became largely 
associated with black female-headed households.  This in turn 
reinforced a pre-existing suspicion of  the black community. 
Welfare, once associated with deserving white women, became 
despised as a relief  program for allegedly lazy, poor black 
women.
As a product of  these political and academic 
investigations, voices shouted to dismantle the American 
welfare state and lynch the “welfare queen.”100 Simultaneously, 
state aid was beginning to be stripped away from black 
communities and redistributed to white suburban communities. 
Industrial factories were encouraged to leave urban centers for 
lower property taxes.  This pulled the rug out from under the 
socio-economic infrastructure of  central cities and instigated 
the rise of  what we now call “the ghetto.”  Mythical binary 
oppositions of  group dependence versus individual will and 
suburbanization versus ghettoization obscured the history of  
state funding for other immigrant and regional communities in 
their transition from ethnic European to white. 101  
  The commitment to engage in the “War on Poverty” 
during the Johnson administration had lost its zeal by the time 
California’s Hollywood screen star turned governor took office. 
The Reagan Administration’s use of  the “welfare queen” image 
fabricated and reinforced images of criminal and sexually 
promiscuous black women.102  This successful misinformation 
campaign framed the national welfare conversation, and the 
public began to oppose welfare programs, fearing that high 
assistance payments reinforced the cycle of  poverty and 
ensured long-term dependency.  The Reagan Administration 
promulgated policies based on these welfare fabrications by 
significantly cutting benefits, under-funding childcare and job-
training facilities, and creating legal barriers for poor women to 
gain access to public assistance.103  Unfortunately, the effects of  
these policies outlasted the Reagan era. Reagan simply paved 
the path for the decadent decline of  federal cash assistance for 
the poor and the push of  under-skilled and under-supported 
black women into a labor market that did not even exist (no 
jobs or benefits).
A WOMAN’S WORK IS NEVER DONE
Although Reagan succeeded in creating a negative 
image of  welfare and limited the coverage for both working 
and non-working poor, some cash assistance was still available 
before the 1990s welfare reform agenda.  By 1987, Congress 
was ready to take up the issue of  welfare reform and passed 
the Family Support Act (FSA) the next year.   The FSA aimed 
to assist middle-class white mothers with young children 
who were entering the labor force. 
This focus gave states the flexibility 
to require those poor mothers who 
were receiving benefits to also work.104
Despite the Reagan Administration’s 
significant cuts and stringent guidelines, 
the number of  poor people on AFDC 
climbed 30 % between 1989 and 
1994, with a significant rise in the single black household 
demographic.105  Ironically, it was during the ostensibly more 
liberal Clinton Administration that policies of  welfare would 
be central to discussions about governmental reforms and 
cutbacks.  Despite images of  a hip saxophone-playing Clinton, 
the so-called “first black president,” Clinton’s policies proved 
that he was no stranger to welfare reform106 and no friend to 
poor black women.  Clinton put welfare back on the agenda by 
deploying slogans such as “ending welfare as we know it” and 
“making work pay.”107  The focus of  these debates, pulled from 
the Moynihan Report discourse, quickly turned to eliminating 
the emerging “culture of  poverty” 
theory . . . explicitly racialized 
and gendered the category of  poverty 
as black and female
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welfare and stopping the reported cycle of  dependency among 
the poor that was fueled by illegitimate births.  At the same 
time, the birth rate for unwed black mothers was 70 %.108  False 
images of  single black female-headed households galvanized a 
political backlash, and black women became the symbol for 
eliminating public assistance and “ending welfare as we know 
it.” 
Following Reagan’s lead, media images continued to 
condemn black mothers as lazy “welfare queens” when they 
stayed home with their children, while simultaneously praising 
white mothers as good “soccer moms” for staying home 
with their children.109   As political scientist Holloway Sparks 
correctly notes, “[t]he portrayal of  poor women of  color—
and particularly African American women—as abusers of  the 
system, immoral… and [dependent] essentially destroyed their 
ability to appear as legitimate and authoritative participants in 
the democratic deliberations about welfare.”110 By portraying 
public assistance as solely benefiting undeserving black 
mothers, this scrutiny reinforced public policies relating to 
welfare reform, emphasized race and class-based stereotypes 
related to women and work, and maintained traditional black-
white dichotomies.111    
Public  policy makers stressed eliminating welfare 
because it  reportedly  promoted  inter-generational 
dependency.112  This policy painted a picture of  welfare 
recipients who were poor, black, and female.  Strikingly, lack of  
employment opportunities, racism, or any other form of  social 
inequity did not enter into the discourse as possible variables 
for poor, black women’s place on welfare.113  But laziness, 
irresponsibility, and lack of  a “strong work ethic” were assigned 
as reasons that kept black women on the roll.114  Recall that, a 
little over 100 years earlier, the image of  poor black women was 
not one of  laziness but of  women who had always worked and 
therefore could always work.  But, when faced with the idea 
that the once lily white face of  welfare was becoming black, 
the discourse to eliminate welfare quickly turned to negative 
images of  black mothers as lazy and dependent.    Missing from 
the discourse is any acknowledgement of  the fact that, when 
they decided to enter the workforce, white women were well-
equipped for a society that had progressed from a primarily 
industrial era to an information technology era.  Business 
management, computer literacy, administrative assistance, and 
other types of  skills and education were available to white 
women.  Such training was unattainable by the working black 
poor during the industrial era but was needed as economic 
relations began to transform.  Lacking transitional skills, black 
families were forced onto welfare and were seen as resistant 
to work, as opposed to unable to attain work or qualifying 
skills.115
Against this backdrop, the Clinton Administration 
signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Act (welfare reform), which abolished the federal guarantee 
of  welfare cash to poor families with dependent children in 
1996.116 The federal government also created the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families Act (TANF),117 which placed 
deadlines on how long a family could receive public assistance.118
This program came out of  the need for the government to 
reduce the amount of  cash assistance to black poor mothers 
and, according to political scientist Richard Fording, it 
“represent[ed] a more punitive and restrictive approach to 
public assistance.”119  However, the agenda under Clinton was 
more covert in its target of  black women than was Reagan’s 
“welfare queen” agenda, by focusing on studies and reported 
“statistical” data that showed that black children lived in more 
single-headed households and by using color-blind terms such 
as illegitimacy instead of  “black welfare queen” images.120  At 
the same time, senators and representatives further portrayed 
images of  the undeserving welfare mothers as cheaters of  
the system, robbing taxpayers of  their money, child abusers, 
drug addicts and the cause of  poverty.121  Welfare mothers 
were also seen as amoral characters because they refused to 
get married and be supported by the male breadwinner.122
It is under these images that the welfare debate galvanized 
a hostile environment aimed at poor black mothers.  These 
policies were shaped by views of  black women because, at 
this point, when the term “welfare recipient” was discussed, 
a caricatured image of  deviant black womanhood was firmly 
etched in the national imagination.123 Therefore, welfare policy 
reflected a sentiment that black mothers needed “tough love”
and that eliminating welfare was the only way to discipline 
and instruct their behavior because they would continue to 
depend on welfare if  left to themselves.  Welfare reform, and 
TANF in particular, paternalistically imposed discipline and 
accountability that came in the form of  state-imposed time 
limits, which eliminated benefits to black mothers after a 
certain date.124
               
                   CONCLUSION
It would be inconceivable to believe that a society that 
stratifies basic living conditions along racial lines would not 
stratify access to public assistance along those very lines. Indeed, 
from Progressive Era philanthropic aid to early work-to-welfare 
reform, misrepresentations of  black women have resulted in 
their disparate treatment.  During the Progressive Era, poor 
black women were undeserving because entitlement to certain 
social benefits was predicated on losing a male provider and 
offered protections only to women who labored in the home. 
Further, only mothers who were considered of  a “worthy” 
character, were suffering from temporary hardship, and were 
“deserving” mothers would be eligible for aid.125  Progressive 
reformers deemed poor black working mothers as undeserving 
poor, thus denying them aid.  During the New Deal era, black 
women continued to be excluded from benefits.  Access to 
benefits under the new American welfare state depended on how 
society defined the traditional family organization, and these 
definitions were structurally distinguished by race and gender. 
The idea that the American family included the breadwinning 
father, the stay home mother, and numerous children guided 
most welfare policy designs.126  This social construction of  
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the family ran counter to the realities of  black families and 
the labor demands on black women in particular. During the 
transformation of  ADC to AFDC, the number of  poor single 
black mothers on welfare increased.  Significant shifts in policy 
suggested that black women were now undeserving because of  
a distinct deviant cultural behavior that encouraged immediate 
gratification, irresponsible financial management, and a refusal 
to engage in productive labor.  Simply put, black women are 
constructed as lazy, dependent “welfare queens.”  Based on 
these representations from the welfare reform agenda of  the 
1880s to the 1990s, a political backlash galvanized against 
black women, who became the symbol for eliminating public 
assistance and “ending welfare as we know it.”  Scholars have 
predicted that policies adopted by states under TANF with 
regard to poor, black mothers will continue to be tough and 
result in punitive rules and conditions.127  Finally, we cannot 
continue to construct welfare policy that focuses more on the 
misrepresentations of  black women than on the structural 
inequalities that affect everyone.  If  we continue in this 
manner, there will forever be an unbreachable chasm between 
the socio-economic realities of  all Americans and the terms on 
which we decide to further marginalize those very Americans 
for being poor.  
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ACHIEVING JUSTICE THROUGH REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
RESTRUCTURING SYSTEMS OF LAW AND POWER FOR SOCIAL CHANGE
By: Ashly Hinmon 1
A dynamic equilibrium of  power exists between law 
and social movements.  Our role in social-change lawyering 
is not only to focus on the law itself, but also to understand 
and transform the frameworks that create and maintain 
balanced systems of  law in our society.  Lani Gunier, the first 
woman of  color to be appointed to a tenured professorship 
at Harvard Law School, and Gerald Torres, a leading figure in 
critical race theory and professor of  law at the University of  
Texas, gave a joint keynote address on restructuring systems of  
law and power for social change at the Rebellious Lawyering 
Conference (RebLaw), held at Yale Law 
School in February 2010.  Under the 
broad rubric of  social change, Gunier 
and Torres examined the transformation 
of  deeply entrenched traditions that 
perpetuate injustice in our society. 
Racism, for example, impacts the legal 
system on many identifiable levels but is 
nonetheless difficult to eradicate because it is bound up within 
society’s mechanisms of  power. 
Gunier likens the interaction between society’s 
traditions and the law to a game, and asserts that within every 
game there are three dimensions of  power.  The first dimension 
is visible conflict–the players manipulate rules in order to win. 
The second dimension involves the identity of  the game’s 
designers, or the ability of  those in power, to shape the rules 
in a way that benefits the rule-makers.  The third dimension 
involves an examination of  the meta-narrative–the story we, as 
a society, tell to explain why winners deserve to win and why 
losers deserve to lose. 
Gunier and Torres argue that social-change attorneys 
often focus on the second dimension of  power and seek to 
rewrite the rules in a way that yields more just results.  The law, 
as a societal institution, both allocates power and disciplines 
power-holders.  Gunier and Torres, however, advocate for 
an increased awareness of  and engagement with the third 
dimension of  power–the meta-narrative of  law and justice, 
which functions both to justify the outcomes of  the law and to 
keep the design of  our system hidden.  According to Gunier 
and Torres, social-change lawyering can most readily transform 
the hidden roots of  injustice not only by shifting the rules, but 
also by shifting cultural understandings of  justice. 
To do this, we must engage on the micro-level. After 
identifying sources of  power, we must increase the democratic 
potential of  specific marginalized groups, in order to enhance 
their capacity to take control of  their own identity and 
power.  Gunier and Torres also emphasize the importance of  
horizontal relationships and developing “constituencies of  
accountability” across group lines. 
At the conference, these themes were developed 
through twenty-four panels and workshops on rebellious 
lawyering.  Some sessions focused specifically on changing the 
rules of  the game through litigation or legislation.  For example, 
one panel, “Domestic Remedies for Human Rights Violations 
Abroad: The Future of  Alien Tort Statute Legislation,” 
brought together leading Alien Tort Statute (ATS) litigators 
to discuss how human rights advocates utilize the ATS as a 
domestic remedy for international human rights violations. 
The panelists discussed a recent victory in which Nigerian 
activists were awarded $15.5 million in compensation in a 
suit charging Shell Oil with complicity 
in torture and killings, as well as a 
current case in which eleven Indonesian 
citizens are suing ExxonMobil in D.C. 
Circuit Court for kidnapping, torture, 
and murder.  The panelists discussed 
the challenges and benefits of  the ATS 
approach in promoting accountability 
for human rights violators. 
Later at the RebLaw Conference, Karen Goodrow, the 
Director of  the Connecticut Innocence Project, led a workshop 
titled “The Unreliability of  Forensics: Detecting Errors in 
Evidence.”  Goodrow works to overturn wrongful convictions 
through the use of  post-conviction DNA testing.  In 2006, 
the Innocence Project secured the release of  James Calvin 
Tillman, who served 18 ½ years in prison for crimes he did not 
commit.  As a result of  his case, the Connecticut Legislature 
passed a new statute in 2008 providing for compensation for 
the wrongfully convicted.  Goodrow is a strong advocate for 
the abolition of  “junk science” in forensic gathering, including 
such methods as dog tracking, bite mark analysis, and “pour 
patterns,” a type of  arson evidence that frequently leads to 
false-positive identifications. 
Melissa Sontag Broudo, a Consulting Attorney with the 
Sex Workers Project in New York City, led a lunch workshop 
entitled “Legislative Advocacy for Sex Workers: Vacating Prior 
Prostitution Convictions & No Condoms as Evidence.”  The 
Sex Workers Project uses human rights and harm-reduction 
approaches to protect and promote the rights of  individuals 
who engage in sex work, regardless of  whether they do so 
by choice, circumstance, or coercion.  Broudo discussed two 
crucial pieces of  legislation and how they can be used to help 
disadvantaged groups.  Namely, Broudo focused on New York 
State Assembly Bill A03856, a bill to stop police and prosecutors 
from using possession of  condoms as evidence that people 
are engaged or intending to engage in prostitution, and New 
York State Assembly Bill A07670, a bill to vacate prostitution 
convictions for trafficked people, which passed the assembly 
and is now awaiting action in the New York Senate. 
Other sessions at the conference focused on the meta-
Racism is nonetheless difficult to 
eradicate because it is bound up 
within society’s mechanisms of  
power.
THE MODERN AMERICAN16
narrative process of  rewriting the stories that society tells itself  
about what is “just.”  For example, a panel titled “Identity 
Construction and the Law: How Civic, Racial, Gender and 
Sexual Identity Operate and Converge in the Legal Arena” 
explored the interaction of  these four identities, among each 
other and with the law.  Each panelist analyzed how people 
formulate these identities, how some identities achieve 
dominance within a particular setting, group, or circumstance, 
and which legal theory illuminates the courts’, and by extension 
society’s, treatment of  these identities.  Imani Perry, a professor 
at Princeton University’s Center for African American studies, 
examined racism as a cultural practice transmitted through 
language, symbols, media, and other mechanisms of  cultural 
construction.  She emphasized the importance of  seeing each 
marginalized group in a more complex and nuanced way and 
encouraged a reading of  identity that allows each category 
to be embedded with distinctions.  For example, she noted 
that the construction of  patriarchy is not simply a category 
that divides men from women; patriarchy also constructs the 
category of  “the man” in a way that disadvantages many men 
who are not acting to reinforce the dominant paradigm of  
masculinity.  Professor Perry argued that, while many forms 
of  discrimination are deeply entrenched in the legal system, 
a paradigm shift to allow a holistic analysis of  oppressed 
groups would permit a more functional understanding of  how 
oppressed groups encounter the law and how the system can 
be restructured to produce more just and equitable results. 
Tony Varona, another “Identity Construction” panelist 
and a professor at the American University Washington College 
of  Law, discussed recent losses by the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender (LGBT) community in individual states 
and identified ways to make the gay rights community more 
encompassing and effective.  He focused on the importance 
of  restructuring the movement’s leadership to be more racially 
and culturally diverse and argued that the LGBT movement 
must create alliances with faith communities and religious 
institutions.  Professor Varona also encouraged more LGBT 
people of  color to come out of  the closet and challenge 
prevailing stereotypes within their communities–stereotypes, 
for example, that might label homosexuality as completely 
external to that community.  In light of  some states’ use of  
ballot initiatives to target gay rights, Professor Varona argued 
that it is even more important for the LGBT community to 
find effective ways of  engaging and transforming the dialogue 
to become as inclusive and encompassing as possible.  Only 
then would direct democracy systems be unable to manipulate 
the biases of  dominant groups in order to stall the progress of  
gay rights. 
The RebLaw Conference advanced the transformation 
of  our society by bringing together exemplary public-service 
lawyers and activists focused on a range of  social justice 
issues and by pushing participants toward greater engagement 
with exigent issues of  injustice and inequality.  It challenged 
participants to think locally and on specific issues, as well as to 
ask how to transform broad social structures that perpetuate 
injustice yet go unnoticed.  It rejected the notion that social 
change equals taking a few people from a marginalized group 
and inserting them into the top tiers of  society’s hierarchy. 
Instead, the Conference urged lawyers to be rebellious and to 
dismantle those social structures that reinforce hierarchy and 
injustice. 
1 Ashly Hinmon is a first year law student at the American University Washington College of  Law. She received her B.A. from Reed 
College, where she studied anthropology and gender. At the Washington College of  Law she is President-elect of  the Women’s Law 
Association and an editor for the Human Rights Brief. Before coming to law school she worked as a domestic violence advocate. This 
summer she will work with Legal Aid Services of  Oregon on their domestic violence project.
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SPECIALIZATION HAS THE POTENTIAL TO LEAD TO UNEVEN JUSTICE:
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN THE JUVENILE & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS
By: Allison Cleveland 1
Rather than focus on process and precedent, 
problem-solving justice focuses on the 
outcome. Problem solving courts are 
“specialized courts that seek to respond to 
persistent social, human, and legal problems, 
such as addiction, family dysfunction, 
domestic violence, mental illness, and quality-
of-life crime.” These courts adapt their 
processes to suit the sources of  the problems, 
which are driving the actions that bring the 
wrongdoer to court in the first place. The 
focus is on the individual, and the courts 
provide particularized responses designed 
to change that specific offender’s future 
behavior.
                          - Kathryn C. Sammons2
I. Introduction 
In October of  this year, I observed an initial hearing 
at the Boston Juvenile Court for a care and protection case 
involving four children, all less than five years of  age.3  The 
Massachusetts Department of  Children and Families (“DCF”) 
presented evidence that the mother used cocaine during her 
pregnancy with the youngest of  the four children–a newborn. 
This was the entirety of  the DCF case.  The other three children 
were present at the hearing and appeared to be very happy, 
energetic, and well-cared for.  Though the children’s mother 
and father did not live together, they still saw each other socially 
and coordinated child care.  Counsel for the mother argued 
that the DCF presented no nexus between the mother’s drug 
use and her ability to care for her older children. The older 
children, reasoned the mother’s counsel, should therefore 
remain in her care.  The judge reviewed documents submitted 
into evidence and came to the father’s criminal record.  Noting 
multiple restraining orders against the father for domestic 
abuse, the judge voiced concern about the mother’s failure to 
separate herself  from a man with such an extensive history of  
domestic abuse. Accordingly, the judge ordered DCF to take 
custody of  all four children.
Following the hearing, I spoke with another juvenile 
court judge.  I admitted my surprise that all four children were 
removed from their mother’s home based on their father’s 
violent history against women.  The judge was not surprised 
by the outcome and voiced his strong feeling that the outcome 
was correct.  He noted that, based on the firm language used 
by the Supreme Judicial Court in Custody of  Vaughn,4 juvenile 
court judges take no risks in situations involving domestic 
abuse. The court would rather remove a child from his or her 
partner violence is enough to remove children from the home. 
He underscored the harm that he believes can be done to a 
child by simply observing abuse and his belief  that mothers 
are not likely to escape the cycle of  intimate partner violence. 
In the ensuing weeks, I observed more cases in 
which children were removed from their families and placed 
into DCF custody based largely on the mother’s status as a 
domestic violence victim.  These decisions continued to strike 
me.  Would the outcome be different in other courts? Would 
the outcome differ, specifically, in courts that specialize in 
domestic violence cases?
This paper examines the ways in which judges in the 
juvenile and domestic violence courts have dealt with, and are 
likely to deal with, cases of  intimate partner violence where 
children live in the household. Specifically, this paper suggests 
that the divergent goals of  these two specialty courts likely 
result in uneven justice.  In juvenile courts, a judge’s focus is on 
the welfare of  the child. Consequently, children are more likely 
to be removed from an abused parent’s custody to protect the 
child’s physical safety.  In domestic violence courts, on the 
other hand, judges are likely to adopt a more favorable position 
toward domestic violence survivors, in that the abused party 
is seen less as a victim and more as a capable caretaker. This 
is especially true in jurisdictions where more services exist 
to help victims become self-sustaining, as custody in those 
jurisdictions appears more likely to be awarded to the non-
abusive parent as part of  the rehabilitation process. 
II. Specialization: The Domestic Violence 
             and Juvenile and Courts
Domestic Violence Courts 
 “Domestic violence courts,” as the name implies, are 
specialized courts that adjudicate cases involving domestic 
violence.  The Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) (Title 
IV of  the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of  1994)5 routed substantial funds into the nation’s court 
systems and other areas of  criminal justice to demand more 
accountability from domestic violence perpetrators and to 
provide help and safety to victims.6  Beginning in the 1990s, 
courts nationwide began to allocate special court sessions 
and other procedural resources for domestic violence cases.7
These “domestic violence courts” were deemed necessary, 
in part, to handle the growing number of  domestic violence 
cases as arrests for partner abuse became mandatory and 
as district attorneys faced increasing pressure to prosecute 
such crimes.8  There are currently more than 300 courts 
family than run the risk of  abuse.  As here, evidence of  intimate 
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with special procedures in place to handle domestic violence 
matters.9  The goals of  specialized domestic violence courts 
around the country have been relatively uniform and include 
protecting and empowering domestic violence survivors10 in 
addition to holding perpetrators accountable.11  Improving 
case management efficiency is also often cited as a goal.12
Domestic violence courts vary greatly in structure.13
Some domestic violence courts may hear only requests for civil 
restraining orders, while others may adjudicate all issues—such 
as restraining orders, criminal charges, and divorce and custody 
issues—for a single family when domestic violence is involved. 
The term “domestic violence court” can encompass anything 
from specialized intake processes to an actual separate court 
system dedicated to domestic violence cases.14  For example, 
in 1987, the Quincy District Court in Quincy, Massachusetts 
began its Domestic Violence Prevention Program, a procedural 
system designed to efficiently address domestic violence 
cases.  Although not a separate court, the program integrated 
a network of  judges, clerks, police officers, prosecutors, 
perpetrator’s intervention programs, and other agencies to 
streamline the system in which victims and perpetrators of  
domestic violence would have their problems addressed.15 In 
2001, Massachusetts instituted its first (and only) domestic 
violence court in Dorchester.16
Generally, domestic violence courts will, at a minimum, 
hold specialized sessions for restraining orders and other civil 
matters involving intimate partner violence. Special attention 
will also be afforded to victims. Elena Salzman describes what 
a victim can expect in the Quincy District Court:
When a woman comes to the Quincy 
District Court seeking a restraining 
order, her first contact will likely be 
with a domestic abuse clerk in the 
Restraining Orders Office. The Quincy 
Program innovators felt that the 
establishment of  a separate restraining 
orders office would be more conducive 
to providing the one-on-one assistance 
women need to fill out the proper 
paperwork. . . .  A woman entering the 
court is often confused, scared, and 
uncertain. The clerks help provide the 
security a woman needs to embark on 
the intimidating process of  requesting 
a restraining order. 
Many of  the domestic abuse clerks in 
Quincy are volunteer interns from law 
schools and social work programs at 
local universities. Their duties include 
disseminating: a sheet listing the 
critical information the woman should 
provide to the assisting clerk; 
a sheet detailing procedures on how 
to file a drug/alcohol petition; and 
an informational brochure entitled 
“Help and Protection for Families 
Experiencing Violence in the Home,” 
which includes a list of  emergency 
resources. 
After the initial intake procedure, 
domestic abuse clerks refer the woman 
to the daily briefing sessions hosted by 
the District Attorney’s Office. During 
these sessions, women not only receive 
information about referral services and 
their legal rights, but they also receive 
emotional support. After the briefing, 
a clerk accompanies a woman to the 
courtroom for her emergency hearing, 
which is usually conducted ex parte, 
without the batterer or his counsel 
present. Often the clerk will stand 
with the woman before the bench to 
provide moral support. 17
 
Domestic violence courts have received widespread 
praise for reducing case filings related to violence between 
intimate partners.18  Victims also appear to be generally satisfied 
with their court experiences and the adjudication process.19
However, specialized domestic violence courts are not without 
critics. Some argue that such courts are victim-oriented and 
focus so heavily on holding perpetrators accountable that 
there is a bias in favor of  alleged victims.20  The criminal 
defense bar has been especially concerned, complaining that 
“judicial education about family abuse and extended tenure 
on a calendar devoted to such cases creates a pro-victim, anti-
defense bias.”21  
I interviewed a local Boston defense attorney who 
represents alleged abusers.  She strongly echoed the sentiment 
that Dorchester Domestic Violence Court judges are “much 
harder” on defendants than their district court counterparts, 
often denying bail or setting bail much higher than defendants 
can afford.  In her opinion, this placed an unreasonable burden 
on defendants and resulted in differential treatment across 
courts.22  It is perhaps unsurprising that a local prosecutor in 
the Suffolk County Domestic Violence Unit held a different 
opinion.  Domestic violence courts, she reasoned, appropriately 
recognize the danger that perpetrators of  domestic violence 
pose to victims and to society-at-large.  In her view, the 
seriousness with which domestic violence crimes have been 
treated in these specialized courts is a model for the district 
courts to follow.23
Internal criticism also exists. Domestic violence judges 
themselves have cited increased workloads and emotional 
burnout as disadvantages of  specialization.24  Externally, some 
have expressed concern that domestic violence courts usurp 
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the power of  the legislature by enforcing court-made domestic 
violence policy.25   
Finally, confusion sometimes arises where district 
court domestic violence programs lack jurisdiction over 
certain matters, resulting in conflicting orders between courts. 
Massachusetts, for example, solved this problem by giving the 
Dorchester Domestic Violence Court jurisdiction over criminal 
and civil matters in domestic violence cases.26
Juvenile Courts
Juvenile courts are not new to the judicial system. 
Special courts to adjudicate child neglect and delinquency 
cases originated more than one hundred years ago, in Cook 
County, Illinois, and all states now have a juvenile court 
system.27  Juvenile courts have broad jurisdiction over matters 
involving children.  The special subject matter jurisdiction of  
any particular state’s juvenile court system is proscribed by state 
statute,28 and usually includes adjudicating child welfare cases 
(regarding child care and protection), delinquency cases, and 
issues involving children in need of  services.29 In all contexts, 
the mandate of  the juvenile court is to protect the best interests 
of  the subject child.30  
The juvenile court system is grounded in the philosophy 
that “when parents are unable to care for or discipline a child, 
it becomes the state’s duty to intervene on the child’s behalf. 
This is the  [concept] called parens patriae.”31 The ultimate 
goal of  the juvenile courts, therefore, is to protect the interests 
of  the child, even when the child’s interests conflict with the 
fundamental liberty interest of  parents in the care, custody 
and control of  their children.32  This emphasis on the child’s 
interest in remaining safe from harm  is especially important 
in the context of  intimate partner violence, where one parent, 
though “fit” in other ways, may be viewed as unable to protect 
the child.33
The Importance of  Specialized Knowledge in Domestic Violence Cases
Domestic violence cases can present special problems 
to judges.34  Because domestic violence is common and likely 
to be relevant to many legal actions,35 it is advisable that 
judges and court staff  receive specialized training.36  Because 
decisions about custody are among the most important 
decisions made in the judicial system,37 and there is a strong 
probability that domestic violence will be considered as a factor 
in those decisions, training in domestic violence is especially 
important for judges38 who make decisions regarding custody 
and visitation.39  Most states require the court to consider 
domestic violence issues when awarding custody and visitation 
rights.40  Without knowledge of  the particular dynamics of  
each situation involving intimate partner violence, judges 
may be misled by information received in court.  Victims of  
domestic violence often make poor witnesses.41  The trauma 
experienced by victims may manifest itself  as nervousness, 
timidity, and body language that may be perceived as suspect 
or deceptive by the judge.42  In addition “[w]ithout . . . 
understanding of  the dynamics of  intimate partner violence, 
a judge may question the ability of  an individual to tolerate 
such severe acts of  violence. . . . As a result, a judge may 
question the actual level of  violence or the victim’s motives 
if  she remained in the abusive relationship. . .”43  Abusers, 
on the other hand, are often confident and self-controlled, 
giving an appearance of  reliability and truthfulness in court.44
Despite appearances, abusers can be, and often are, “master 
manipulators.”45  Domestic violence includes “tactics [that] are 
more than physical violence and include a penumbra of  threats 
and actions to induce fear, humiliation, social isolation and 
resource deprivation. Batterers cast aspersions on the moral 
character, parenting and mental health of  battered women to 
discredit them with those who might intervene.”46  Moreover, 
although a batterer may appear calm and trustworthy on the 
stand, he likely still presents a danger to his victim, even when 
they no longer reside in the same home.  Indeed, the most 
dangerous period for an abused woman47 is immediately after 
separation, when her abuser may—in a panic—take desperate 
measures to regain control.48
 Victims may also not be seen in a favorable light when 
a judge evaluates the best interests of  the child for custody 
purposes.49  Best interest factors focus on the stability and 
security of  the child’s environment, putting domestic violence 
victims at a disadvantage.50 Victims are often dependent on 
their abusers for housing, income and other forms of  support.51
Consequently, separation from her batterer may leave a mother 
without immediate access to a job and financial resources.  As 
noted by Betsy McAlister Groves:
When a mother decides to leave 
her partner, the children’s situation 
may actually worsen.  Mothers (and 
children) are at continued or increased 
risk of  being harmed after they make 
the decision to leave the relationship.  
The batterer often reacts with anger, 
disbelief, and increased attempts to 
control the woman’s relationship.  
Many women we have seen in the 
Child Witness to Violence Project 
described escalating danger as their 
partners attempted, sometimes 
through desperate means, to find them 
and persuade them to return home. 52
Taken together, these patterns are not intuitive.  Special 
knowledge on the part of  judges and others in the criminal 
justice system is therefore needed to effectively address the 
special problems of  families affected by domestic violence.
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        III. The Domestic Violence Courts
As noted above, the domestic violence courts are 
victim-oriented. These courts protect and empower victims 
and hold abusers accountable for their violent behavior.53  In 
addition, because judges in domestic violence courts 
have specialized knowledge regarding domestic violence, they 
are much more likely to grasp the patterns and complexities 
involved where violence occurs in the home.54  This is not only 
because judges and other court officers hear domestic violence 
cases so frequently, but also because judges often receive 
specialized training and tend to engage in frequent dialogue 
regarding the functioning of  the courts, how parties are being 
served, and how the court system could do better.55
 As a result of  specialized knowledge, judges in 
domestic violence courts are likely to perceive victims as logical 
and capable people, rather than as “battered women” trapped 
in a “cycle of  violence.”  While the learned helplessness 
concept of  Battered Women’s Syndrome56 still pervades the 
general court system, judges in the domestic violence courts 
have greater exposure to the currently recognized variation in 
survivor personalities, capabilities, and resources. They are less 
likely to become caught up in the mental trap described by two 
legal scholars below:
Lawyers and judges subscribing to the 
‘Why doesn’t she just leave?’ theory 
too often ignore the battered woman’s 
experience-based determination that 
leaving may be more dangerous to 
her and the child than staying.  As a 
result, battered women seeking justice 
in a family law context may well face 
two unnerving consequences:  more 
abuse from the batterer and state 
coercive authority to remove her 
children against her will on grounds 
that a ‘traumatized’ person is less fit to 
care for her children than the parent 
who is responsible for the abuse.  The 
critical family law assumption clouds 
the legal system’s capacity to see that 
the victimized parent’s decision may 
have a secure foundation – that the 
victimized parent is indeed capable of  
complex thinking and acting, including 
performing subtle acts of  compliance, 
resistance, and direct action to further 
her own and her children’s safety and 
autonomy in the world in which she 
lives. 57
 In practice, it is certainly much easier to allow custody 
to remain with the logical, capable mother described above than 
with a helpless victim.  In this light, survivors are more likely to 
be seen as capable caretakers.  Domestic violence courts tend 
to adopt the “criminal law facet of  domestic violence,” which 
“recognizes that one intimate partner is a perpetrator and one 
is a victim . . . and seeks to hold the perpetrator accountable.” 58
In contrast, family law views conflict in terms of  two intimate 
partners who must find ways to cooperatively regulate their 
relationship and their family affairs.  Because the juvenile court 
focuses so intently on the child, it is reasonable to believe that 
juvenile court judges are more inclined toward the “family law” 
perspective.
                      IV.     The Juvenile Courts
As noted above, the goal of  any case in the juvenile 
court is to protect the best interests of  the child.  As one 
Boston juvenile court judge indicated,59 he and his fellow 
judges make the physical and emotional safety of  the 
child paramount. They act on the demands articulated in 
Vaughn,60 removing the child where it is possible that the 
child may suffer physical or emotional harm as a result of  
domestic violence in the home.61  
 Given the ways in which the juvenile court typically 
functions, it is not surprising that children would be removed 
from homes in which domestic violence occurs.  First, the 
juvenile court relies strongly on department of  social services 
expertise.62  The department is invariably a party in abuse and 
neglect cases, and will take a position on whether it believes the 
child should be removed from the home.  As one commentator 
notes, child welfare departments often have a checkered history 
in terms of  domestic violence cases,63 at least from the point 
of  view of  domestic violence victims.64  She describes these 
views as follows:65
[O]pponents claim that child protective 
involvement in cases of  childhood 
exposure to domestic violence typically 
has not served the best interests of  
children or their abused caregivers. 
Opponents argue that such intervention 
traditionally has been ineffective, 
discriminatory, and destructive, 
endangering the safety of  adult victims 
and their children, blaming battered 
women for their children’s exposure, 
and reflexively removing children 
from their abused parent’s custody. 
Finally, opponents argue that not all 
children exposed to domestic violence 
are harmed by their exposure, and thus 
intrusive government intervention 
and its negative concomitants will be 
extended to many families where such 
intervention is unnecessary.
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Domestic violence courts and juvenile courts, while both 
“speciality courts,” approach issues of  child custody and 
domestic violence from very different perspectives.  Juvenile 
courts, charged with protecting the child’s best interests, are 
likely to err on the side of  caution by removing children from 
homes in which domestic violence is evident.  These orders 
are based largely on social science data showing the emotional 
and psychological harm to children who witness violence in 
the home, and on a desire to safeguard the child from physical 
harm.  Domestic violence courts, on the other hand, are strongly 
victim-oriented and are more likely to provide services meant 
to facilitate continued custody with the non-offending parent. 
This approach more accurately reflects the social science 
understanding of  domestic violence phenomena, the strength 
and resilience of  survivors, and their competence as caregivers. 
More broadly, since the divergent perspectives of  these two 
specialty courts are likely to result in very different decisions 
regarding child custody in domestic violence situations, family 
integrity very much depends on the court in which each family 
finds itself.  
My own conversations with local attorneys support 
this view.  One victim advocate opined that the Massachusetts 
Department of  Children and Families (“DCF”) is extremely 
quick to take custody of  children whose mothers are abused 
following a report of  a domestic disturbance.66 A local defense 
attorney vigorously agreed, saying that “DCF seems to show 
up as soon as an incident is reported to the police.  Before a 
victim can even get a restraining order, her kids are in DCF 
custody.”67  Whether or not these accounts exaggerate, it is 
logical to assume that child welfare agencies, like 
the courts, err on the side of  caution to prevent physical 
harm to the child.  It is not unlikely that judges are heavily 
influenced by child welfare departments in court, particularly 
when the alternative is to risk putting a child in a dangerous 
environment.  Courts and child welfare agencies have a shared 
policy goal to protect the child,68 suggesting that judges defer 
to agency expertise where the legitimacy of  a child removal 
action is considered.  It is reasonable to assume that this would 
be particularly true where the alternative to removal is to leave 
a child at risk in a dangerous environment.
Scholar Lois Weithorn69 argues that courts have 
generally deferred to child welfare agency removal actions and 
have historically 
“blame[d] these women for any negative 
ramifications of  their abuse for their children; 
remove[d] children from their mothers’ 
custody when doing so [was] not necessary 
for the child’s protection; fail[ed] to hold 
the abuser accountable for his conduct; and 
fail[ed] to provide any services that contribute 
to the short-or long-term well-being of  the 
child or the nonabusive parent.”70
However, juvenile court judge concerns for the safety 
of  the child are based in fact.  For example, children in homes 
in which intimate partner violence occurs are at increased risk 
for physical harm.71  Between 30 % and 60 % of  children whose 
mothers are abused are likely to suffer abuse themselves.72   It 
is also true that children who witness domestic violence are 
more likely to develop emotional and psychological problems, 
show aggressive behavior, and are more likely to exhibit signs 
of  post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.73  It is unclear 
whether these effects occur as a result of  the child witnessing 
violence, from the abuser’s dysfunctional parenting patterns in 
general, or from a combination of  both.74   However, social 
science studies seem to support the proposition that these 
problems can be counteracted to a great extent by a stable and 
loving relationship with the non-abusive parent.75  If  the goal 
is to secure the best possible situation for each child, a pattern 
of  removing children from both parents, rather than just the 
abuser, seems counterproductive.76 
V.   Conclusion
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WILL THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS FUEL A RETURN TO RACIAL POLICIES
THAT DENY HOMEOWNERSHIP OPPORTUNITY AND WEALTH?
By: Marcia Johnson 1
Introduction
Property ownership in America 
has traditionally been linked to power and 
wealth.2  French political historian Alexis 
de Tocqueville observed, “[T]he love of  
property is keener in the United States 
than it is anywhere else, and Americans 
therefore display less inclination toward 
doctrines that threaten, in any way, the 
way property is owned.”3 Property-related 
wealth comes in many forms, including 
the right to control tangible assets such 
as land and buildings.4   Homeownership 
today remains the single greatest source 
of  wealth and symbol of  well-being for 
most Americans.5  
Owning a home facilitates access 
to numerous privileges and opportunities 
borne from government law and policy, 
including tax credits, increased credit 
options, and increased worth and wealth. 
Homeownership also increases the value 
of  communities, neighborhoods, and the 
homes themselves.  It allows for better 
educational opportunities, social mobility, 
and community stability.6  Therefore, it is 
particularly significant that government 
housing policies and practices have 
historically stifled the opportunity of  
African Americans to own and retain 
real property.  The consequences of  
these discriminatory policies continue to 
be dire.  
The ultimate aspiration of  
nearly every American family is to own 
a home.7  For many African American 
families this was still a near unattainable 
goal for more than one hundred years 
after the Emancipation Proclamation 
was signed.8  Government policies that 
excluded many African Americans from 
access to homeownership in the 1930s 
began changing in the late 1970s,  leading 
many to anticipate an increase in African 
American homeownership.9  However, 
in the years between the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) of  1977 and 
1995, the rate actually dropped 2.6%.10
Still, the CRA likely opened the door for 
post-1995 programs that provided easier 
access to credit, down payment assistance, 
and deferred mortgage payments. 
Indeed, more aggressive policies begun 
under Presidents Clinton’s administration 
provided greater opportunities,  resulting 
in a rate increase in African American 
homeownership from 42% in 1995 to 
47.4% by 2008.11  
Perhaps the greatest threat 
to the continued realization of  the 
American dream is the latest economic 
crisis rooted in the sub-prime mortgage 
collapse.12  Some blame the CRA of  
1977 for creating a market that they 
claim provided housing loans to non-
creditworthy borrowers – particularly 
African American families – in the low 
and moderate income range.13  However, 
this charge is without direct factual 
support as the post-CRA period saw a 
decline in homeownership for African 
Americans but a mild increase for White 
homeowners.14 Illegal and fraudulent 
practices in property appraisals and 
income reporting directed program 
benefits away from those the program 
was meant to aid.  
Nevertheless, of  the more 
than 3.6 million mortgage foreclosures 
projected to occur during the January 
2007 - December 2009 period, up to 
39% are sub-prime mortgages.15  Sub-
prime mortgages were far more popular 
with African American homebuyers than 
any other group, particularly from 1995-
to-2005.16  Although mortgage failures 
certainly pose an economic problem, 
it is not enough to have caused the 
collapse of  2008 or to support a return 
to housing policies that effectively deny 
homeownership opportunities to African 
American buyers.
Even recent government action 
to stunt such a return suggests that there 
were other sources of  the collapse, beside 
African American homeownership, or 
other sub-prime  mortgages.  For example, 
in 2008, the United States government 
approved a $750,000,000,000 bail-
out of  financial institutions ostensibly 
due to the collapse in the sub-prime 
markets.17  Had the government instead 
paid every mortgagee the full amount of  
their initial mortgage loan, assuming a 
$200,000 loan average, the government 
could have purchased all bad mortgage 
debt for $720,000,000,000.18  100% of  
foreclosures from 2007 to 2008 would 
be paid.  If  only sub-prime mortgages 
were covered, the government could 
have paid all such foreclosures from 
2006 through 2008.19   
It is common for markets to rise 
into bubbles, for the bubbles to burst, and 
for industries profiting from the bubbles 
to fail.  However, it is not common 
for the burst to lead to the collapse of  
the entire global market.  In the 1980s, 
savings and loans fell at a cost of  about 
$152.9 billion with taxpayers paying 82% 
or $126 billion. In the early 2000s, the 
technology industry bubble burst.20  Still, 
none of  these industry failures caused 
the world market to crater.  
This paper is written to examine 
the potential effect of  the market 
collapse on our nation’s homeownership 
policies.  Part I reviews America’s 
historical housing and homeownership 
policies.  Part II considers the expansion 
of  homeownership opportunities 
to historically non-participating 
communities, particularly the African 
American community.  Part III reviews 
the culprits of  the economic crash 
of  2008 and explains why sub-prime 
borrowers often get blamed.   Part 
IV examines solutions to maintain 
America’s pro-homeownership policy, 
and Part V concludes that America’s 
homeownership policy should continue 
to be vigorously pursued with a goal 
of  including African Americans who 
have long been excluded by government 
policies and sanctions from building 
wealth and thereby stabilizing their 
communities.
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Part I:  The History of  America’s 
Housing Policy
The American government has 
historically attended to the housing needs 
of  citizens who are unable to purchase 
homes.  Since the 1700s, the housing 
needs of  the poor have been addressed 
through formal systems including the 
provision of  “outdoor relief,” “boarding 
out,” almshouses and asylums. As people 
began moving away from small seaport 
towns21 and farms to cities in the 1900s,22 
increased housing demand23 caused a 
20-year building boom in urban areas.24
This boom turned bust during the late 
1930s largely as a result of  the Great 
Depression when many Americans could 
afford neither to rent nor purchase a 
home.25  It was the Industrial Revolution 
that rejuvenated the development of  
American cities.26  
The late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries marked the 
beginning of  housing development 
within residential subdivisions.27  To 
assure both peaceful enjoyment of  one’s 
property and to maintain property value, 
developers and home buyers purportedly 
sought legal control mechanisms that 
would aid in protecting and preserving 
their property interests.28  Developers of  
these subdivisions relied on restrictive 
covenants, equitable servitudes, negative 
easements and zoning ordinances to 
ensure separation within residential, 
commercial, and industrial areas.29  The 
more sinister goal of  these devices was 
to divide people based on economic, 
social, and racial lines.30  Still, these new 
communities represented an expanded 
housing market driven by the growing 
need for homes. 
The federal government sought 
to address the expanding need for low-
cost homes through the Housing Division 
of  the Public Works Administration 
(PWA), which constructed public-owned 
housing units.31  Through the PWA, the 
government took control of  privately 
owned land for the public purpose of  
providing housing to those who could 
not otherwise afford it.  The seizure of  
land during this period was later found 
to be a wrongful exercise of  the federal 
government’s eminent domain power.32
As a consequence, construction under 
this program ended, but the government’s 
ability to create housing opportunities 
flourished.33  
The United States Housing 
Act of  1937 (USHA)34 was the first 
national housing program and its 
goal was “to provide ‘a decent home 
in a suitable environment for every 
American Family…’”.35  In the 1940s, 
the federal government began providing 
low-interest financing through both the 
Federal Housing (FHA) and Veterans’ 
Administrations (VA) in keeping with this 
federal housing goal.  When American 
soldiers returned home from World War 
II, the nation’s policy of  homeownership 
continued to expand.36  Homeownership 
rates increased from about 45% to 65% 
after World War II due to government 
policies that increased access to credit and 
introduced innovative lending products, 
like the thirty-year fixed mortgage to the 
middle class.37  
USHA was controversial at 
the time and was challenged as an 
unconstitutional intrusion by the 
government in the private market.38  The 
United States Supreme Court found the 
Act within Congress’ power to provide 
for the public’s general welfare.39  This 
decision would have a compelling impact 
on housing opportunities in America, as 
USHA authorized the federal government 
to pay the principal and interest on tax-
exempt bonds, enabling the construction 
of  public housing developments for low-
income individuals.40  However, USHA 
was not an equal housing program, and 
assistance within the program operated 
on a racially-segregated basis.41  
Between 1937 and 1949, middle-
income Americans began moving outside 
the central cities and into suburban areas, 
resulting in diminished homeownership 
opportunities in urban areas.   Many of  
these urban areas became infested with 
slums and public housing. Congress 
reacted to this growing problem by 
passing the United States Housing Act 
of  1949,42 which is often touted as being 
the nation’s first official housing policy.43 
The policy was designed to remedy 
housing shortages, eliminate substandard 
housing, and provide a reasonable living 
environment for every American.44
The policy had three major objectives: 
(1) to encourage private development 
in the housing market; (2) to provide 
governmental assistance to enable 
private enterprise; and (3) to fuel local 
governments in developing programs to 
help improve cities and housing.45  The 
Housing Act of  1949 authorized urban 
redevelopment and provided for the 
construction of  810,000 new housing 
units in six years.46  
This Act had a decidedly negative 
impact on African Americans because 
it  forced them to move from their 
homes as construction began, only to 
be placed on long waiting lists for public 
rental housing.47   In addition, although 
the federal government’s original plan 
was to revive urban communities, the 
government’s interest in the program, as 
well as the available funding, decreased 
rapidly.48  Consequently, many of  the 
completed units were substandard, 
meeting only basic housing necessities.49
The fact that African Americans 
were not permitted to benefit from 
government-provided low-interest loans 
only exacerbated the plan’s negative 
impact.  For example, racially disparate 
application of  the FHA/VA loan 
programs, meant to encourage national 
homeownership, magnified and enforced 
economic and racial separation.50  As a 
result, the government created a two-
tiered system of  affordable housing: the 
upper tier consisted of  FHA and VA 
home acquisition loans while the lower 
tier was comprised of  public housing 
rental programs.51  
Under this two-tier system, 
minority and low-income families were 
placed in public housing rental programs, 
while Whites and other preferred classes 
were given FHA or VA home loans 
for homeownership.52  Even African 
Americans that met the qualifying criteria 
for loans were generally unsuccessful 
because the homes they could afford 
were located in neighborhoods that 
were predominately comprised of  
minorities and thus considered risky 
investments.53  As urbanization 
continued to rise, fear, ignorance, and 
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hatred propelled political groups toward 
considering race and class as factors 
when constructing planning devices 
and promulgating new housing laws.54
Deliberate policies favoring segregation 
successfully divided classes and races.55
Even after laws prohibited segregation, 
significant racial transition within White 
neighborhoods  often caused Whites to 
vacate these once segregated white areas, 
resulting in segregated African American 
neighborhoods.56    
In 1968, the United States 
Congress committed “to meet all of  the 
nation’s housing needs and eliminate all 
of  its substandard housing.”57  Congress 
acknowledged that not only had 
Americans failed to live up to the national 
commitment, but that the burden of  that 
failure was borne primarily by the poor.58  
This new housing policy made clear that 
it was designed to address the needs 
of  all Americans, including the poor. 
The Housing Act states:  “It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of  the United 
States to promote the general welfare of  
the nation . . . to . . . remedy the unsafe 
and unsanitary housing conditions and 
the acute shortage of  safe, decent and 
sanitary dwellings for families of  low-
income . . . .”59  This national policy laid 
the foundation for the government’s 
role in providing housing and housing 
opportunities for low-income people.60  
More than one hundred years 
after the Emancipation Proclamation 
freed slaves in America, Congress 
banned racial discrimination in housing 
practices.  Title VIII of  the Civil Rights 
Act of  1968, also known as the Fair 
Housing Act (FHA),61 the Equal Credit 
Opportunities Act (ECOA), the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), 
and the Community Reinvestment Act 
(CRA), were all measures designed to 
ensure equal housing opportunities to 
all Americans. The FHA was a more 
comprehensive law addressing housing62
and prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of  race, national origin, religion, 
sex, disability, and family status in real 
estate transactions.63  Similarly, the 1974 
ECOA prohibits discriminatory lending 
practices based on sex, marital status, race, 
religion, national origin, age, and receipt 
of  public assistance.64  Discrimination 
is further prohibited in consumer credit 
transactions under the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act.65  Later, the HMDA was enacted to 
require lending institutions to publicly 
disclose loan information to ensure racial 
equality in home mortgage lending.66
Despite  all these legislative 
efforts to ensure equal housing 
opportunities,  Congress found it 
necessary to take additional steps to 
encourage financial institutions to 
meet the credit needs of  traditionally 
neglected communities by enacting 
the Community Reinvestment Act of  
1977 (CRA).67  Banks historically took 
consumer deposits but failed to provide 
access to credit, particularly for minority 
and low-income communities.  The goal 
of  the CRA was to ensure that financial 
institutions would reinvest deposits back 
into these communities.  Under CRA, 
supervisory agencies were given the 
authority to deny banks the opportunity 
to merge, relocate, open a new office or 
close a particular branch if  they failed to 
comply with CRA demands.68
In 1989, the Financial Institution 
Reform and Recovery Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA) was enacted to strengthen CRA 
enforcement by requiring publication of  
CRA ratings.  Banks were obligated to 
meet the credit needs of  the communities 
they served but were also obligated to 
disclose their performance record by 
making available the written evaluations 
prepared by regulatory agencies.69   This 
disclosure requirement gave community 
organizations the leverage to ensure 
that financial institutions were FIRREA 
compliant. 
In 1994, in an effort to 
improve both community development 
and the accessibility of  capital within 
deteriorating communities, Congress 
passed the Community Development 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 
(CDBFIA).70  This legislation established 
a “fund” that would aid in providing 
economic support to new and existing 
Community Development Financial 
Institutions (CDFIs).71  A CDFI is an 
institution whose primary purpose is to 
promote economic development, equity 
investments, and loans to persons within 
a specified target area.72  CDFIs are 
important to increasing homeownership 
because they are specialized financial 
institutions that work in communities 
or markets that traditional financial 
institutions have not adequately served.73
CDFIs include community development 
banks, credit unions, loan funds, venture 
capital funds, and micro-entrepreneurial 
loan funds. CDFIs provide numerous 
services including mortgage financing 
for first time home buyers, financing for 
needed community facilities, commercial 
loans and investments to start or expand 
small businesses, loans to rehabilitate 
rental housing, and financial services 
needed by low income households and 
local businesses.  These institutions also 
provide services to ensure that credit 
is used effectively, such as technical 
assistance to small businesses and credit 
counseling to consumers.74
The Home Ownership for 
People Everywhere (“HOPE”) programs 
of  the 1980s and 1990s added another 
dimension to the federal housing policy, 
which previously focused on rental units. 
HOPE reoriented American housing 
policy towards homeownership.75
Reaffirmed by Presidents Bill Clinton 
and George W. Bush, this expanded 
policy embodied the belief  that enhanced 
homeownership serves the public 
interest, and justifies the use of  public 
dollars to achieve this goal.76
Part II:  Expanding Homeownership 
Opportunities to African 
Americans and Other Historically 
Disenfranchised Populations
Some theorists suggest that 
the American policy of  increasing 
homeownership to poorer populations 
and expanding mortgages was the single 
biggest contributor to the destruction 
of  the global market economy.77  Due, 
in part, to America’s renewed focus on 
homeownership, the share of  Americans 
who owned homes rose from 64% in 1994 
to 69% in 2005. These new homeowners 
were largely low- and moderate-income 
families and minorities.  Over that same 
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time period, the homeownership rate in 
the lowest tenth of  the income scale rose 
4 %, the second lowest rose 4 %, and the 
rates for African Americans and Latinos 
rose 7 and 8 %, respectively.  About 
12 million new homeowners emerged, 
roughly half  of  them African Americans, 
Latinos, and others of  mixed race. By 
2005, the United States occupied the top 
rung in world homeownership rates.78
Poverty, Income and Homeownership   
A large part of  the population 
remains beyond the reach of  traditional 
finance vehicles.  Almost 20 % of  all 
children in the U.S. live in poverty.79
Poverty has a substantial impact on the 
quality of  education to which children 
have access.  Although numerous 
programs and policies exist to ensure 
that all children—regardless of  race 
or economic background—have equal 
educational opportunities, a substantial 
number of  children living in poverty 
endure inferior student services and 
substandard facilities.  These conditions 
help create a cycle of  poorly housed 
renters who contribute less overall to the 
good of  society than do better trained 
citizens.  Poor families often face barriers 
that restrict their ability to improve their 
socio-economic status.  For example, 
the ability to move to communities with 
better educational opportunities is not 
an option for many poor families.  A 
majority of  these families are renters 
and cannot afford rent or purchase 
prices in suburban or well-to-do urban 
neighborhoods.  Statistics support this 
observation.  According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau (Bureau), in 2002, about 
56% of  American families (owners 
and renter combined) could afford to 
purchase a modestly priced80 home in 
the area in which they lived.81  Among 
families that were current homeowners 
approximately 75% could afford to 
purchase a modestly priced home while 
only 10% of  those families who rented 
could afford to purchase such a home.82 
Since the late 1940s, the 
Bureau has surveyed and reported on 
the distribution of  income among U.S. 
citizens.83  According to the Bureau’s 
studies, family income inequality 
decreased by 7.4 % from 1947 to 1968,84 
But income inequality increased by 24.4 
% between 1968 and 1998.85  The income 
difference between households in the 95th 
percentile and those in the 20th percentile 
increased from approximately $96,000 in 
1994 to over $127,000 in 2000.86   
From 1999 to 2000, the median 
household income held at $42,100,87 the 
poverty rate in fell to the lowest it had 
been since 1979,88  and the number of  
poor persons fell.89 African American 
and Latino incomes rose as poverty90  
rates for these two groups fell,91 but 
their income still lagged far behind 
that of  Whites.92  Further, poverty 
rates for African American and female-
headed households reached their lowest 
recorded level in 2000.93  Nevertheless a 
1989 National Research Council study 
reported that the standard of  living for 
African Americans lagged far behind 
that of  Whites94 and showed that African 
American unemployment rates were 
more than two times that of  Whites.95  
Even in 2008, the African American 
unemployment rate was still more than 
two times that of  Whites.96  
All this demonstrates that 
while the standard of  living for African 
Americans has improved, a substantial 
number of  African American, Latino, 
and female-headed households continue 
to live in poverty at disturbing rates 
today.  While the income gap between 
African Americans and Whites decreased 
in 2006, by 2007 the gap returned and, a 
2007 Bureau report found that over 22% 
of  all African American families still 
have incomes below the official poverty 
line.97  
The Impact of  Poverty on Homeownership
Statistics show that a thriving 
home mortgage market needs to rely 
on untapped— increasingly poor and 
minority—borrowers.  In 1991, the 
Bureau reported that 57 % of  American 
families could not afford a median priced 
home in the area in which they lived.98
African Americans and Latinos made up 
three-quarters of  these families.99  Four 
years later, the Bureau reported that 80 
% of  African American and Latino non-
homeowner families, almost double that 
of  White families,100 could not afford a 
median-priced home in the area in which 
they lived.101  By 2004, Bureau reports 
indicate homeownership rates for Whites 
was 76.2 % while African Americans and 
Latinos had homeownership rates of  
49.1 and 48.7 %, respectively.102  Overall 
homeownership rates in 2009 were at 
67.6%.103 
True comparisons of  racial and 
ethnic disparity in homeownership rates 
are more difficult because the Census 
Bureau changed the way it reported race 
in 2003.104  Using current race and ethnic 
standards, however, we can compare 
2006 to 2009 rates of  homeownership. 
The homeownership rates for Whites 
(non-Latinos) were about 76 % in 2006 
and about 75 % in 2009.  For African 
Americans, the rates were about 48 % 
in 2006 and about 46 % in 2009, and 
for Latinos (of  any race), the rates were 
about 49.5 % in 2006 and 48.7 % in 
2009. 105
In 2002, the Pew Institute 
reported that the median net worth was 
$88,651 for White households, $7,932 
for Latino households, and $5,988 for 
African American households,106 and 
that home equity was the key component 
of  household wealth, accounting 
for two-thirds of  mean net worth.107
Public policy tends to support reaching 
out to these latter two ‘untapped’ 
communities of  potential homebuyers 
for a number of  reasons.  In addition to 
strengthening community development, 
homeownership is one of  the principal 
means by which low-income families 
acquire wealth.  Traditionally, home 
purchases were thought to be good 
investments because they allowed 
homeowners to build long term assets,108
while also resulting in assets that 
homeowners could borrow against in 
the short term.  Policy considerations 
also include the  recognition that 
neighborhood environment affects 
the general welfare of  the nation and 
that homeownership has the potential 
to catalyze community growth, 
development, and stabilization.109
Community stability in turn tends to 
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increase property values.110  
Moreover, racial and ethnic 
homeownership disparity has disturbing 
implications for a nation that is 
increasingly diverse, and this disparity 
played an important role in the decision 
to increase homeownership opportunities 
for these communities.111  The Bush 
White House initiative of  2000 included 
a goal to increase the number of  minority 
homeowners by at least 5.5 million by 
2010.112  The initiative also included 
an identification of  the barriers that 
many minorities faced when seeking to 
purchase a home as well as strategies to 
overcome the barriers.  One of  the most 
significant barriers to implementing this 
initiative proved to be financial.113   
Identifying the Financial Barriers114 
The White House identified 
numerous financial barriers to 
homeownership, including inability to 
make down payments, limited access 
to credit, poor credit histories, limited 
mortgage products, regulatory burdens, 
and lack of  access to financing in 
general.  The federal government 
then launched efforts to help targeted 
borrowers overcome these barriers.115 It 
was apparent that home loans were not 
unavailable per se but were unattainable 
for many Americans.  This lack of  access 
can be attributed to a number of  things, 
including racial barriers that remain 
rooted in society.  
Denying Access
“Redlining” is one method of  
denying people access to financing and 
refers to the practice of  outlining in red 
those areas on a map to which financial 
institutions are unwilling to extend 
their credit services.  These areas tend 
to include primarily minority and low-
income borrowers.  Although inequality 
and housing discrimination has existed for 
centuries in our nation,116 banks initiated 
the practice of  redlining in the 1960s117
after race riots brought inequality to the 
forefront of  national concern.118  The 
federal government began to pay more 
attention to America’s legally-sanctioned 
discriminatory housing practices. The 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is 
often hailed as an act against redlining.119 
Although redlining is no longer a 
blatant practice, lenders continued to 
issue loans on a discriminatory basis by 
using marketing strategies that targeted 
borrowers based on race and adopting 
inequitable institutional policies.120  Many 
lenders who offered prime loans neither 
marketed nor solicited applications from 
minority or low-income applicants,121
with the exception of  sub-prime 
alternatives offered in compliance with 
CRA requirements.  
One scholar has identified 
racial redlining as a barrier to African 
Americans’ ability to accumulate wealth 
because it restricts their participation 
in the marketplace as home sellers and 
buyers. Banks use racial redlining to deny 
access to credit so that a prospective buyer 
would not qualify for a home mortgage, 
in fact, “in a study conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board, [it was reported 
that] ‘banks reject African Americans 
‘for home loans 80% more often than 
equally qualified Whites.’  This rampant 
discrimination  disadvantages Blacks 
and contributes to the poverty cycle.”122
Moreover, African-Americans who reside 
within identifiably African American
neighborhoods were historically redlined 
out of  the mainstream mortgage 
market and forced to rely instead on 
sub prime loans and predatory lending 
practices. The effect of  securing loans 
through these more expensive markets 
also impacts the homebuyer’s ability 
to purchase homeowner’s insurance.123
The FHA created two housing 
markets between the early 1930s and 
the 1960s by systematically excluding 
African Americans from lower priced, 
conventional mortgages.124 The FHA 
rated loan applicants from most 
desirable “A” to least desirable “D”. 
“A” neighborhoods were principally 
or exclusively white, native-born 
professionals and “D” neighborhoods 
were not.”125 In 1950, the FHA only 
granted 5% of  conventional loans to 
non-Whites thereby limiting low-cost 
mortgages to Whites. FHA-redlined 
neighborhoods encouraged racial 
segregation and their monopoly on 
the mortgage market meant that any 
exclusion from the program constituted 
exclusion from the housing market.126  
The CRA is to some extent responsible 
for the decreased disparity between 
loans awarded to Whites and those 
awarded to minorities.127  Although there 
has been some decrease, minorities are 
increasingly and disproportionately 
serviced by sub-prime lenders.128 Even 
affluent African Americans are twice 
as likely to refinance in the sub-prime 
market as low-income Whites.129  With the 
skyrocketing rate of  immigration, home 
ownership in immigrant communities 
has risen on the priority list of  many 
lending and governmental institutions. 
As immigrants buy homes at an ever- 
increasing rate, unscrupulous lenders 
will frequently target them, because they 
often lack a sophisticated understanding 
of  the American mortgage system.  This 
is especially true for non-fluent English 
speakers who fall prey to predatory 
lenders who impose exploitative loan 
terms and conditions.130
 Sub-prime lenders tend to target 
minorities, low- to moderate-income 
borrowers, and borrowers who live in 
certain communities that are considered 
high risk.  These communities are also 
most likely to be affected by the hardships 
associated with predatory lending, such 
as high interest rates, unreasonable fee 
scales,131 loss of  home equity, and even 
social and psychological problems.132
In some cases, these lenders take 
advantage of  borrowers with excellent 
credit histories who may not realize 
their eligibility to obtain a prime market 
loan133 and direct them instead to sub-
prime loans.134  
According to current Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, 
African Americans and Latinos are still 
consistently denied credit when applying 
for home loans and when refinancing 
at rates disproportional to those of  
Whites.135  Discriminatory lending 
practices in the conventional lending 
market continue to expand the sub-
prime mortgage market.  
The road to a national policy 
of  homeownership has been a long one 
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from that time in our nation’s history 
when some were denied the opportunity 
because of  their race.  During the last 
decade, attempts were made to open 
the door of  the American dream of  
homeownership to all people.  One 
potential by-product of  the 2008 economic 
crash is the reversal of  homeownership 
encouraging policies, but such a reversal 
would ignore the underlying problems of  
the crash by placing blame on the wrong 
culprit.   Placing the sole blame upon the 
homeownership policy or minority home 
buyers would be unfair and inaccurate.
Part III:  Homeownership and the 
Economic Crash of  2008:  Is the 
sub-prime borrower to blame?
The sub-prime mortgage
The sub-prime mortgage is
traditionally described as a type of  loan 
granted to individuals who have poor 
credit score histories (often below 600) 
that disqualify them from conventional 
mortgages.136  Because sub-prime 
borrowers present a high risk for lenders, 
sub-prime mortgages charge interest 
rates above the prime lending rate.137
Borrowers with credit scores above 
650 are generally charged a significantly 
lower rate of  interest on their loans 
than are charged on sub-prime loans.138
     Lower interest rates and high capital 
liquidity encouraged lenders to grant 
sub-prime loans from 2004 to 2006. 
More importantly, lenders sought 
additional profits through these higher 
risk loans, charging interest rates above 
prime to balance against heightened 
default risks.   More than the government 
homeownership policy, it was the 
perceived potential for large profits that 
motivated lenders to increasingly give 
out sub-prime mortgage loans. 
Sub-prime mortgage lending can 
be described as predatory.139  Borrowers 
who are either financially unsophisticated 
or financially desperate for credit may 
agree to unjustified high interest rates, 
payments that they cannot afford, 
frequent refinancing arrangements, 
high and unfair prepayment penalties, 
excessively high points or origination 
fees, and high broker fees.  Predatory 
lending also involves abusive lending 
practices in which the terms of  the 
loan are inadequately correlated to the 
riskiness of  the loan.140  In essence, 
buyers least able to afford their homes 
were charged more than those who 
are better able to – the poor paid 
more for their houses than the rich. 
Moreover, statistics show that minority 
buyers who qualified for conventional 
mortgages with better terms were often 
steered toward sub-prime mortgages.141
Research has shown that approximately 
half  of  sub-prime borrowers qualify 
for conventional loans but are led to 
accept sub-prime loans instead.  These 
borrowers are unaware that they qualify 
for lower interest rates because the 
lenders withhold the information in 
order to swindle minority borrowers into 
accepting higher interest rates, insurance 
payments, and other fees associated with 
the process.142  These buyers were also 
more likely to face “creative” financing 
options that included adjustable rate 
mortgages (ARMs), interest only loans, 
and other products that induced the 
buyer into the transaction only to get 
a substantial increase in mortgage 
payments or balloon payments within a 
period of  a few years.143  These so-called 
“teaser mortgage products” provided 
short term success and often produced 
long term failure.
The interest rates tied to 
loans traditionally given to minorities 
also demonstrate the existence of  
discrimination.  African Americans 
typically pay interest rates one-third of  
a percent  higher  than Whites.  This 
amounts to approximately $11,756 over 
the life of  a thirty-year $145,000 loan, 
and is evidence of  predatory lending. 
If  poorer African American families 
are paying a higher monthly mortgage 
than wealthier White families for 
equal or poorer facilities, then African 
Americans are at a disadvantage and 
will have less disposable income than 
their White counterparts.  Additionally, 
African Americans in low-income 
communities typically live in older, 
more dilapidated housing.  This 
discrimination further serves to foster 
an African American underclass.144
A deeper look into foreclosures
In 2007, home foreclosures 
reached 2.2 million, a 75 % increase 
from the previous year.145   Many who 
lost or were at risk of  losing their homes 
to foreclosures were unexpected victims. 
For example, foreclosures in military 
towns and their surrounding towns and 
cities are outpacing the national average 
four times over.146  Working Americans 
with secure employment lost their 
homes to foreclosures because they 
were unable to make their mortgage 
payments, suggesting that much of  these 
defaults were due to the structure of  the 
mortgage—many involved adjustable 
rates frontloaded with teaser rates that 
escalated to amounts that working 
families could not manage. 
Significantly, as bad as 
the mortgage  crisis has been, an 
estimated 94% to 99% of  mortgages 
are performing.147 Moreover, it is 
estimated that more than 75% of  sub-
prime mortgages will perform.148  By 
2012, however, 13% of  all American 
residential loans are projected to end 
in foreclosure.149  This would mean 
that 87% of  mortgage loans would be 
performing, but it is the profile of  the 
13% that compels further review.
Sub-prime lending accounts 
for the greatest percentage of  home 
mortgage foreclosures.150  While sub-
prime mortgages represent only 14 % 
of  the mortgage loans, they represent 
almost 50 % of  the foreclosures.  The 
general consensus is that low-income 
and minority homeowners have suffered 
disproportionately because they have 
participated in the sub-prime lending 
market at greater rates than White and 
Asian borrowers.  In 2006, African 
American and Latino communities 
accounted for more than 53 and 46 % of  
the sub-prime home loans, respectively.151
By 2007, African Americans carried 34% 
of  high priced mortgages compared 
with 10.6% for Whites.152   According to 
an analysis of  loans reported under the 
federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
African Americans were 2.3 times more 
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likely to take out sub-prime mortgages 
and Latinos twice as likely.153   In 2007, 
59 % of  all sub-prime loans were in 
tracts that were less than 30 % minority 
and only 17% were in tracts that were 
more than 70 % minority.154  
While creditworthiness may be 
one reason for the high number of  sub-
prime loans in minority communities, 
a greater reason appears to be race.155
Despite the CRA’s intent to address 
redlining by requiring banks to make 
loans in lower income neighborhoods, 
it did not require banks to actually be 
located in those communities.  As a 
result, banks typically maintain offices 
and branches in White communities 
while lending institutions offering sub-
prime loans are strongly visibility in 
minority communities.156  This helps to 
explain why minority borrowers eligible 
for lower cost loans obtain higher cost 
products instead.  
A Wall Street Journal study found 
that as many as 61 % of  all sub-prime 
borrowers in 2006 could have qualified 
for more conventional products based 
on their credit scores.157  Various firms 
record the states and cities hardest hit 
by foreclosures,158 and most of  these 
states and cities are overwhelmingly 
White.159  In other words, while a higher 
percentage of  people of  color than of  
Whites assume sub-prime mortgages, 
most sub-prime loans overall do not 
go to people of  color.160   This suggests 
that even though sub-prime mortgages 
made to minority buyers has affected the 
overall foreclosure numbers, something 
other than sub-prime lending may be 
responsible for the national downturn.
How sub-prime mortgages fueled the economic 
crisis of  2008
Since World War II, the 
nation’s housing policy has sought to 
expand housing opportunities.  More 
recently, housing policies also aimed 
to make mortgages available to poorer 
Americans.161  In theory, this policy 
recognizes that national wealth is 
dependent on the wealth of  each of  the 
nation’s citizens, and it also sought to 
address the history of  racial and ethnic 
discrimination that affected property 
lending and insurance practices, such 
as redlining.162  The policy was steeped 
in good intention, but many argue that 
it forced lenders to abandon sound 
business practice in order to lend to the 
poor and to minorities, resulting in the 
housing bubble burst that brought the 
global economy to its knees.163
As discussed earlier, sub-prime 
mortgages are characterized as risky, 
which means lenders are more likely to 
see defaults on sub-prime loans than on 
conventional or prime loans.  However, 
in relation to the economic crisis of  2008, 
the sub-prime mortgage was merely 
an essential element in the ultimate 
collapse.  In the early 1990s, a collapse 
of  the sub-prime market may have been 
inconsequential as it accounted for less 
than 1% of  all mortgage lending.164  By 
2005, sub-prime lending grew to 20% of  
all mortgage lending.165  
Demand for sub-prime loans 
increased after the dot-com bubble burst 
in 2001. To boost confidence in the 
market, the federal government lowered 
interest rates, encouraging people to 
borrow.  For most Americans, homes 
represent their largest investment, so 
the credit market sought to attract more 
home loans.  Capital flowed into the 
hands of  borrowers who in turn bought 
more homes. Property values increased, 
but some of  these values were based on 
aggressively unreliable appraisals that 
artificially inflated housing valuation and 
increased loan amounts.  People whose 
homes were already mortgaged were 
enticed to secure second and even third 
liens against their home equity, relying 
on these escalating home valuations.  In 
many instances, borrowers ultimately 
owed more than their houses were 
worth.   
Much of  this activity was fueled 
by an unquenchable thirst for wealth. 
Mortgage brokers and sub-prime lenders 
sought out people who would borrow at 
exorbitant rates and fees.   Theoretically, 
these loans would not put brokers and 
lenders in grave jeopardy because risk 
supposedly goes down as it is spread 
out.  Instead of  the bank holding all of  
the risk, the government would share a 
significant portion of  that risk through 
FNMA, FHA, and others.  At first, this 
risk-sharing plan appeared to work well, 
and securitization emerged as a way to 
increase profit while addressing growing 
market demands.
Securitization166  
Responding to the increasing 
interest of  the non-depository mortgage 
lenders to find a source of  liquidity 
for conventional loans, government 
sponsored entities (GSE) began issuing 
mortgage-backed securities (MSB) 
that passed interest to investors.167
The investors, in turn, found these 
securities to be easily transferable on the 
market because the GSEs guaranteed 
the principal and interest income of  
the securities even if  the mortgagors 
defaulted.168  Private institutions soon 
recognized the profitability of  these 
investments and began pooling home 
mortgages but specifically excluded 
home equity loans and sub-prime 
mortgages.169   This created a market 
niche for private pooling that basically 
began in 1977 with Bank of  America and 
Salomon Brothers.170  Unfortunately, this 
securitized mortgage vehicle was based 
on a highly unreliable risk assessment 
model.171
 Beginning in the 1990s, 
mortgage financing found creative ways 
to reach otherwise unqualified borrowers. 
Numerous mortgage products aimed 
at attracting ‘untapped’ borrowers 
included balloon mortgages, adjustable 
rate mortgages, interest only loans, and 
others.  Initially, these loan products were 
made to prime borrowers who carried a 
low risk of  default.  However, extending 
securitization to higher risk sub-prime 
borrowers became increasingly attractive 
for investment banks seeking higher fees 
and greater profits.172 Wall Street analysts 
produced computer models supposedly 
demonstrating that risks associated with 
pooling sub-prime debt were comparable 
to risks of  prime backed securities.  
Initially, the models seemed 
accurate. Between 2001 and 2005, sub-
prime defaults dropped from 10 % to 
5 %.  Many borrowers, however, were 
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warding off  default by getting new 
housing equity loans to pay off  the 
original debt.  This created the illusion 
that the loans were performing and 
were therefore low risk.  In actuality, the 
borrower’s situation typically worsened, 
as new debt was generally higher than 
the original high-cost debt.  Instead 
of  avoiding default, the borrower was 
simply deferring an increased liability. 
Moreover, because securitized sub-
prime mortgages were a relatively new 
phenomenon, there was little data with 
which to test the computer models.  In 
other words, the combination of  easy 
capital and an abundance of  available 
money far exceeded the underlying goal 
of  increasing American homeownership. 
The new goal was to target as many new 
buyers as possible to fuel the unregulated 
greed that was consuming Wall and 
Main Streets. Based, in large part on 
the optimistic models, ninety percent 
of  securitized sub-prime loans received 
the highest rating available: AAA. 
Reality ultimately struck and about 50 
% of  AAA-rated sub-prime securities 
defaulted.  During this same period of  
mirage, collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO) were revived as a way to diversify 
the mortgage pool by mixing sub-prime 
mortgages with asset-backed securities 
and credit derivatives.  When the smoke 
cleared, almost 100% of  all AAA CDOs 
had at least partially defaulted.173  
CDOs and ABSs are secured by 
underlying real estate.  When the note 
defaults, the holder of  the CDO or ABS 
should be able to sell the underlying 
property to recover any financial loss. 
However, in this new market, the property 
is likely to be worth far less than the debt 
it secures.  Moreover, the housing market 
has been stalled by the collapse of  the 
credit market.  The credit market stall 
should have been temporary and should 
have been reversed with the infusion 
of  government TARP funds, but it was 
neither temporary nor reversed, thus 
exacerbating the decline of  the housing 
market.  Inaccessibility to credit has less 
to do with housing policy or sub-prime 
mortgages and more to do with another 
Wall Street invention designed to make 
more money for investors.  Coupled 
with failing sub-prime market securities, 
the failure and potential failure of  credit 
default swaps would send the global 
markets reeling.
Credit Default Swaps and Their Role in the 
Credit Collapse
American billionaire Warren 
Buffett described speculatively-bought 
derivatives as financial weapons of  mass 
destruction.174  A credit default swap 
(CDS) is a credit derivative where one 
party makes periodic payments to the 
other and gets promise of  a payoff  if  a 
third party defaults.175  The first party gets 
credit protection and is called a buyer. 
The second party gives credit protection 
and is called the seller.  The third party is 
known as the reference entity.  The CDS 
is an insurance policy written in favor of  
the insured who is not the owner of  the 
product that is actually being insured. 
An investor, also known as the buyer, 
can gamble that a company will likely 
default and purchase an insurance policy 
that pays the investor-buyer money if  
the reference entity defaults.176  
The underlying theory for the 
CDS probably comes from the 1958 
Modigliani-Miller theorem,177 which 
finds that the value of  a firm can be 
independent of  the firm’s ration of  
debt to equity,178 and that swaps and 
derivatives ensure the safety of  the 
financial system.179  However, it is a 
mathematical computerized financial 
model created by David Li that is at 
the core of  the financial collapse of  
2008.180  Li’s model, which catapulted 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem into the 
huge derivatives market, was designed 
to calculate default correlations by 
predicting risk.181  Notwithstanding Li’s 
own warnings about important flaws in 
his model, investment bankers, beginning 
with those at Banker’s Trust and J P 
Morgan Chase, relied on the model.182
An estimated $58 trillion in 
outstanding CDS liability exists.  If  this 
CDS market collapses, it will produce 
consequences far greater than sub-prime 
mortgage defaults.183  There will not 
be enough money to pay all the claims, 
which is why the federal government 
is attempting to shore up banks and 
insurance companies with cash infusion 
and why the cash is not being used to 
extend credit.  The cash infusions are 
being hoarded to pay off  the CDS 
claims of  savvy billionaire investors, not 
of  sub-prime borrowers.  These buyers 
who have cashed out (and will cash out 
in the future) by insuring products they 
didn’t even own have made out like 
bandits.  Yet, because the CDS market 
is completely unregulated,184 it will be far 
more difficult to identify these winners 
than it was to identify the hedge fund 
winners.
Selling Short (Short sales)
Out of  the CDS market grew 
“the short sale,” another tool investors 
used to make unimaginable sums of  
money.185  Unlike the traditional “‘long 
sale’” where the investor bets that the 
company in which she is investing will 
prosper, the short seller bets that the 
company will fail.186  The short sale has 
existed since the seventeenth century and 
has remained controversial throughout 
its lifetime.  Short trading is legal,187 but 
the government sought to regulate the 
practice, which one congressman called 
“the greatest evil that has been permitted 
or sanctioned by the Government,” after 
the stock market crashed in 1929.188
Until recently, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
regulated short selling.189  The regultion 
prohibited the short sale of  an exchange-
traded security in a falling market.  The 
prohibition applied to every transaction 
effected on a national securities exchange 
and to transactions in certain exchange-
traded securities affected in the over-the-
counter market.190  On the other side of  
the debate, de-regulators suggested that 
the short seller is a valuable town crier 
in the economic marketplace.  Arguing 
that the short seller does not cause the 
company to fail, but merely identifies 
which companies are struggling due to 
poor management and overvaluation, 
the SEC deregulated the industry on July 
2, 2007.  
At issue in this article is how 
significant a role short sales played in the 
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current economic crisis. Some investors 
viewed mortgage trading as a bubble that 
would eventually burst and shorted the 
companies—principally banks, insurance 
companies, and mortgage companies—
that were investing in this debt.  As 
debtors began to default and credit 
schemes began to unravel, short sellers 
profited—some in huge amounts.  If  the 
short sale represents a peculiar industry 
of  buying and selling borrowed stock, the 
credit default swap, which gives investors 
unregulated power to insure companies 
that they do not own, makes the short 
sale seem less menacing.
Credit
A weak American credit market 
substantially affects the overall health of  
international economies.  The American 
consumer uses credit to pay for homes 
and education in the U.S., but also for 
goods imported from abroad.  American 
businesses rely on credit to conduct, 
maintain, and expand operations both 
domestically and abroad.  When lenders 
fail or refuse to lend, people around the 
globe suffer.  
One of  the reasons banks are 
unwilling to lend is because they fear 
that toxic debt, otherwise described as 
potential CDSs and short sale liability, 
is yet to be fully identified or assessed. 
Banks are hoarding money in reserve to 
defray potential losses in debt.  Generally, 
a bank’s equity-to-debt ratio is about one 
dollar in equity to support every twenty 
dollars in debt.  The SEC permitted 
investment banks to have a 1:30 equity-
to-debt ratio.191  To assess the accuracy 
of  the ratio and therefore the risk, 
banks rely on rating agencies.  When 
the rating agencies incorrectly rate high 
risk ABSs, CDOs, and sub-prime MBSs 
as AAA, thereby severely discounting 
the risk, lenders are left seriously 
undercapitalized.192  The government’s 
infusion of  capital into these banks, 
while bolstering the reserves needed 
to ward off  potential liability, has not 
adequately contributed to re-opening the 
credit markets.193
In other words, if  the banks 
did not have to provide reserve funds 
for so-called toxic debt, they would be 
able to make more loans to companies, 
consumers, and home buyers.  The 
current economic catastrophe is rooted 
in the failure of  these myriad investment 
vehicles’ inability to expand the sale of  
single family homes to Americans.  That 
said, a healthy economy cannot survive 
purely on credit and consumerism.  Nor 
can opening the credit markets alone 
restore the economy.  Credit should be 
governed by sensible business principles 
that include re-opening mortgage 
markets even to higher risk borrowers.
Part IV:  Looking for Solutions
You got Wall Street 
firms, Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers.  
You got insurance 
companies like AIG.  
Merrill lost a ton of  
money on this… 
Everybody’s lost a ton 
of  money.  They’re 
supposed to be the 
smartest investors in 
the world.  And they 
did it to themselves.  
They blew themselves 
up.194 
Numerous factors contributed to 
the economic collapse of  2008.  The sub-
prime mortgage market was one factor 
but was not the only culprit.  Indeed, 
losses related to high risk mortgages are 
dwarfed by those related to derivatives 
and securitization.  According to Frank 
Partnoy, “we wouldn’t be in any trouble 
right now if  we had just had underlying 
investments in mortgages.  We wouldn’t 
be in any trouble right now.”195  In fact, 
even though foreclosure rates on sub-
prime mortgages are much higher that 
foreclosure rates on prime mortgages, 
some 80 % of  sub-prime loans are 
still performing, and sub-prime loans 
continue to enable borrowers to own 
homes, increase wealth, and convert their 
sub-prime loans to conventional ones.196
If  Partnoy is correct (and the 
numbers reflect that he is),197 it would 
be foolhardy to abandon the goal of  
increasing homeownership opportunities 
in America.  Instead, government policy 
should continue to recognize the value 
of  homeownership to individual and 
national wealth.  This would require 
the nation to continue to address the 
barriers to homeownership, particularly 
the financial barriers, in a comprehensive 
and rational way.  That said, not every 
American needs or is able to own a home. 
Financial prudence and good sense 
must work in concert with any program 
designed to expand homeownership 
opportunities.
Addressing the absence of  Credit
The government has tried to 
stimulate the financial markets and 
reinvigorate lending, but the credit 
market remains closed.  Instead, banks 
are putting money received from the 
government into reserves in anticipation 
of  CDS claims.  While estimates of  
potential CDS claims continue to rise, 
it is likely they are in the hundreds of  
billions of  dollars.  Chase Bank alone is 
involved in over 4 trillion dollars in CDS 
investments.198  At these rates, there will 
never be enough money to stimulate the 
financial markets back into lending again. 
This leaves the government as the major 
source of  loans, and there are a number 
of  government-backed programs in 
place to provide the funding necessary 
to support homeownership.  
In order to stop the market’s 
financial bleeding, regulators should put 
a halt to CDSs.  There should also be a 
time-specific requirement that all holders 
of  CDS instruments must report their 
holdings.  In this way, potential liability 
can be calculated and the proper amount 
of  reserves needed to compensate can 
be set aside.   Since CDSs terminate after 
time, the markets will also know how long 
the potential loss exists.  In the event the 
CDS continues as an investment vehicle, 
the law prohibiting regulation should be 
overturned so that the CDS market will 
be at least as transparent as the overall 
investment market.199
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Specific Financial Remedies: No need to re-
invent the wheel
Various existing government 
programs provide financial fixes through 
subsidies that fill the gap between funds 
needed to close sales and funds potential 
buyers have to purchase homes.200
These programs provide down payment 
assistance, tax credits,201 expanded funds 
to the secondary mortgage market202 and 
various financial incentives to private 
homebuilding and financing entities.203
There is significant value in these 
programs, but additional government 
money to support these programs 
where few alternatives exist could serve 
as a much needed ‘TARP’ for ordinary 
citizens.
The Land Trust
Land trusts are used to protect 
natural resources.204  While the land trust 
movement has grown tremendously 
since its inception more than one 
hundred years ago, it remains principally 
a conservation and environmental 
protection tool.205  The land trust concept 
can easily be expanded to include the goal 
of  protecting affordable housing stock 
and homeownership opportunities.206
Land trust corporations207
may acquire land in fee simple for 
the charitable or public purpose of  
providing affordable homeownership 
opportunities.208  Technically, the trust 
would acquire the land and retain 
ownership of  it,209 and the homeowner 
would purchase the house itself  but 
not the underlying land.  This option 
could be particularly helpful in gentrified 
communities where land values, property 
taxes, and insurance costs are so high 
that homeownership can become 
unaffordable.210  
Under this option, homeowners 
would pay the taxes assessed solely on 
the house value, while property taxes 
assessed on the land value would be 
exempt or paid by the trust.211 Similarly, 
homeowner insurance would be based 
on the cost of  replacing the house 
and not on the price of  the land.  The 
homeowner could acquire the land 
over time at a low purchase price (pre-
escalated or modified escalation value) 
and even share profits from the sale of  the 
property with the trust.212  The financial 
gain to the homeowner at the sale of  
the property would be based on  the 
number of  years the property would be 
held as affordable.   A homeowner could 
sell the property to another qualified 
buyer without penalty allowing the  land 
use restrictions to transfer to the new 
owner. On the other hand, a homeowner 
who sold the property to a fair market 
purchaser could share some profit from 
the sale with the trust. The amount of  
profit realized would be related to the 
number of  years the homeowner owned 
the property under the affordability 
restriction.213 Moreover, an incentive to 
participate in such a transaction could 
be to permit the initial buyer to share in 
some of  the appreciated land value as 
well as the value of  the house itself.  
The sales agreement between 
the trust and the homeowner can provide 
for an affordable housing payment 
to the trust.  Rather than securing a 
sub-prime mortgage, the qualified 
buyer would contract for a loan that 
would be affordable.  Not only might 
this affordable housing program help 
improve the buyer’s financial condition, 
but the homeowner will pay a return to 
the public upon sale.
Tax Abatement and Exemption Programs  
Property taxes are calculated 
based on the assessed value of  the 
property and are commonly described 
as ad valorem taxes.  Affordable housing 
developments are often constructed 
on land with low valuation.  Low value 
appraisals are essential for ensuring low or 
affordable sales prices.  Pre-development 
residents generally pay lower taxes 
than do residents who move in post-
development, when property values for 
the area have risen.  Affordable housing 
developments tend to address blighted 
conditions, upgrade the community, 
and generally increase the value of  new 
residences as well as existing ones.214  As 
more housing is developed and a more 
stable community is established, values 
continue to increase.  The double-edged 
sword of  development is that it could tax 
existing residents as well as newcomers 
out of  their homes.215  This is especially 
true of  development near downtown 
locations where land values may increase 
dramatically and quickly.216  
Effectively addressing the 
property tax problem is challenging. 
One option is for the owner to sell at 
higher value, enjoying the windfall of  
equity build up in the land since it was 
purchased.  This is not necessarily averse 
to the public interest of  building wealth in 
historically impoverished communities.217
However, the drawback to electing the 
windfall option is the potential reduction 
in economic and racial diversity in the 
community and the displacement and 
replacement of  longtime community 
residents.  This is commonly referred 
to as gentrification—the replacement 
of  lower income residents with higher 
income residents through increased 
property taxes and sale prices.
A second option tempers the 
first option’s market-driven approach. 
A municipality or developer can impose 
restrictive affordability covenants that 
run with land purchased under the 
affordable housing program.  Presuming 
that the program is designed to increase 
affordable housing stock and expand 
homeownership opportunities to 
historical renters, the covenant would 
be designed to retain affordability for an 
express term and could be written in a 
way to permit the homeowner to recover 
a share of  the equity that would be less 
than the windfall of  option one.  Under 
this second option, the homeowner may 
sell the property at a price higher than 
was paid based on the higher valuation 
but may keep only a percentage of  the 
profit based on the length of  time he 
or she owned the property.  This meets 
two goals: increasing homeowner wealth 
and retaining an affordable housing fund 
even if  the specific housing stock is no 
longer affordable.
A third option is tax abatement. 
Commonly used by municipalities to 
attract business enterprises, it could 
also be used to encourage economically 
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diverse communities and reduce the 
displacement of  residents who have 
no viable relocation alternatives.  Tax 
abatement and tax exemption programs 
are legislatively-established measures for 
shifting the burden of  property taxes away 
from a target taxpayer population.218  The 
general purpose of  the tax exemption 
is to encourage publicly desired 
objectives.219  A cost-benefit analysis 
should be done to determine which 
groups will be impacted positively, which 
groups will be affected negatively, and 
whether a complete or partial exemption 
is or should be available.220  Tax 
abatements are also financing tools that 
may be used to revitalize economically-
depressed areas.221  Abatements 
commonly forgive all or a portion of  
property taxes for a specified period of  
time.  Tax abatements are often used to 
attract business communities with the 
goal of  creating jobs and encouraging 
community vitality.222  It is unclear how 
beneficial such business abatements have 
actually been in the past, but as part of  a 
comprehensive redevelopment program, 
they could increase the level and speed 
of  a community’s revitalization.223
Tax Credits
Tax credit programs provide 
incentives for tax-burdened entities 
to participate in low-income housing 
programs.  The Tax Reform Act of  1986 
established the low income housing tax 
credit and was designed to increase the 
number of  affordable housing rental 
units in the United States.224  It is often 
criticized,225 but there is also a growing 
movement to expand the program to 
include low-income homeownership 
tax credits.226  Among the proposals is a 
low-income second mortgage tax credit 
that would encourage homeownership 
by lowering down payment and closing 
costs and by reducing housing costs in 
general.227
Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
 Tax increment financing (TIF) is 
a mechanism by which local government 
provides homeownership opportunities. 
TIF allows local governments to finance 
improvements, in infrastructure for 
example, in an effort to attract business 
redevelopment in a target area.228  TIF 
relies on property value increases 
and property tax revenue to pay for 
community revitalization that could 
include redeveloping or rehabilitating 
deteriorated areas of  a city, facilitating 
the construction of  low-to-moderate 
income housing, promoting economic 
development, and providing employment 
opportunities.229
Addressing Creditworthiness
Some potential buyers who 
have adequate income to pay the house 
note and costs are still not creditworthy 
under traditional lending criteria.230
Though helpful, programs designed 
to clean buyers’ credit histories are not 
designed to monitor buyers’ future 
credit habits.  A three-part program that 
allows the purchaser to buy the home 
during the pending credit “cleanup” will 
likely yield better results.  Under this 
option, the buyer would qualify for the 
program based on income and evidence 
of  financial stability.  Those with less 
than stellar credit ratings will have to 
participate in a credit counseling and 
cleaning program during the first year 
of  homeownership as a condition of  the 
mortgage subsidy or other assistance. 
Finally, the buyer will agree to a wage 
garnishment plan that hedges against the 
risk posed by the buyer’s limited credit 
worthiness.
It may also be possible to divert 
attention from the traditional house to 
a less expensive form of  housing like 
the modular housing that was popular 
in places like Levittown during the post 
war era.231  Other forms of  construction 
could also be made available, as well as 
smaller cottages and bungalows that 
support lower construction and sales 
prices.
Standard financing programs 
need to address the cost of  constructing 
homes and its effect on affordability.232
In markets where housing prices fall 
below the average, demand tends to be 
very high.233 These markets consist of  
the working poor who do not qualify for 
public housing but do not make enough 
money to purchase a home.  While 
no person should be pressured into 
homeownership, the opportunity could 
be made available for those Americans 
who desire to be homeowners.  Often, 
construction costs limit the accessibility 
of  this market in several ways.  Contractors 
who build in the affordable market 
already realize limited profit margins 
that discourage entrepreneurial interest. 
They are not equipped to reduce the 
sales prices of  homes to meet the needs 
of  this forgotten market.234  The working 
poor generally do pay for housing and its 
amenities in the form of  rent and utility 
payments, but they often do not qualify 
for homeownership opportunities at 
rates comparable to rent.  
Foreclosure
Access to credit does not always 
portend success as a homeowner.  Some 
will lose their home to foreclosure. 
There are three sources of  risk that 
commonly lead to mortgage payment 
terminations:235 interest-rate related 
refinancing, default, and moving.236  For 
various reasons, higher risk loans are 
more likely to be affected by mortgage 
payment factors.  Market conditions 
may reduce the homebuyer’s ability 
to maintain mortgage payments.  For 
example, a slow market may affect 
the owner’s ability to resell the home 
and move unless the seller is willing to 
accept a loss.  Clearly, selling at a loss 
undermines the home purchase as a tool 
for building wealth.237  On the other 
hand, high risk homeowners in a fast 
market are commonly impacted by the 
rising costs, including increased property 
taxes, associated with the house, but 
such costs can be offset by the sale of  
the property at its enhanced value.  Here, 
the homebuyer is forced from her home 
as a “victim” of  a gentrified community. 
While such displacement does not 
necessarily mean financial detriment to 
the homeowner, it could significantly 
affect the maintenance and availability 
of  affordable housing.238  Foreclosure 
then looms as a potential threat to the 
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affordable homebuyer.  
Addressing the Roots of  Barriers to 
Homeownership Comprehensively
Capital and access to capital 
significantly impact a family’s ability 
to purchase a home.  As short term 
remedies, down payment assistance, 
mortgage buy downs, and other subsidies 
are very helpful but should be employed 
as part of  a long-term plan.  Education 
is internationally recognized as the single 
most powerful tool against poverty,239
yet illiteracy in America is believed to be 
at least 20 %.240  Since the United States 
provides access to public education, it 
seems infeasible that so many Americans 
are uneducated or undereducated.242
Studies show that when poor people are 
relocated from depressed communities 
to more mainstream communities, they 
tend to develop and maintain a new 
culture supportive of  upward mobility 
and education.243  Thus, concentrated 
communities of  poor people limit 
homeownership, and any potential 
solution should address racial, cultural, 
and economic diversity as part of  its 
design.
Conclusion
There is substantial 
reason to maintain a strong policy 
of  homeownership in America. 
Homeownership is the primary means 
of  developing wealth for most American 
families.  When whole groups of  people, 
defined often by their race, are denied 
access to this source of  wealth, it sustains 
an economic division that retards 
national growth and development.  As 
the American population is increasingly 
dominated by this group of  have-nots, 
the impact of  poverty on the United 
States and world economy is clear.
For over six decades, the United 
States has promoted a policy favoring 
safe, decent, and sanitary housing for its 
citizens.  For much of  that time, however, 
homeownership was reserved for 
Whites, while significant barriers existed 
for African Americans who wanted to 
own their own homes.  These barriers 
often closed the door to homeownership 
altogether for African Americans.  In 
other cases, the cost was so high as to 
have a deleterious impact on wealth, 
even for those African Americans who 
owned homes.  During the last decade, 
the policy has shifted to encourage 
homeownership, particularly for African 
Americans.  Regardless of  whether this 
shift occurred because the nation finally 
recognized that African Americans 
were being denied an important vehicle 
to prosperity, because of  a desire for 
racial equality, or because of  investor 
greed, the shift did produce an increase 
in African American homeownership. 
At any rate, recognition of  the goal of  
homeownership is meaningless without 
an assault on the remaining barriers to 
reaching that goal.  If  the goal is to be 
achieved, solutions must be aggressively 
pursued.  
The current world economic 
state has multiplied the challenges 
America faces.  Many of  the last 
decade’s financial practices have failed 
in catastrophic ways, and recovery is 
expected to be very slow.  Nevertheless, 
the role of  the mortgage market and 
of  the sub-prime loan in this calamity 
is infinitely small, so the American 
policy of  homeownership should not 
be reversed.  We should ensure that all 
Americans will share in the economic 
recovery and that the history of  disparity 
will be reversed.  An important part 
of  that recovery is the revival of  the 
housing market and the development 
of  strategies making housing more 
affordable.  Our efforts will be maximized 
if  we pursue a comprehensive program 
that meets short-term needs but also 
addresses long-term cures. T h e 
government must employ meaningful 
regulation to help identify the extent 
of  the continuing CDS liability.  Every 
buyer, holder, broker or seller of  a CDS 
should be given a limited period of  time 
to report its existence and its potential 
liability.  Companies or individuals 
who fail to self  report within the time 
period should be subjected to specified 
penalties.  The fledgling private lending 
marketplace should be supplemented 
with direct government mortgages, 
and the government should work with 
the private marketplace to ensure that 
lending practices are sound.  Mortgage 
lending programs should be developed 
that permit higher risk borrowers to 
buy non–traditional, and affordable, 
homes under more traditional financing 
structures.  Public and private policies 
must be in place to maintain reasonable 
and realistic property valuations. 
Programs that include features like 
wage garnishment or mortgage escrow 
agreements to help ensure loan repayment 
should be considered. The costs of  
affordable housing can be reduced in 
various ways, one of  which is through 
waivers of  income generating municipal 
and regulatory fees.  Also, historically 
un- and underserved communities can 
be targeted for capital improvements, 
particularly in infrastructure.  Lower 
cost building product alternatives, such 
as prefabricated or modular homes, can 
be used.  Land banks and/or land trusts 
can also reduce the cost of  housing.  The 
sources of  low-cost loans (investments), 
such as pension funds, should be 
identified.  Mixed-use and mixed-income 
residential developments should be 
encouraged, programs that provide down 
payment assistance should be continued, 
and predatory lending should be reduced 
while shoring up fair sub-prime products. 
Finally, homeownership illiteracy should 
be reduced via, for example, continued 
education components as part of  loan 
requirements or community-based 
campaigns to inform target populations 
of  the various programs available. In the 
long term, we must bridge the income 
gap between Asian Americans, Anglo 
Americans, African Americans, and 
Latinos, especially in those situations 
where the gap can only be explained 
by race.  We must reverse the trend of  
school drop outs and public education 
failure toward a trend of  achievement 
and productivity.  Finally, we must enact 
inclusive zoning laws and eliminate the 
myth of  the inherently substandard 
African American residential 
community.
The impact of  a wealthier 
nation will be felt by all Americans.  The 
fact that government policies denied 
FALL 2010 37
access to wealth to its citizens because 
of  their race makes it important not 
community. It alters traffic patterns and 
density, increases noise, and changes the 
balance of  uses in a particular area). 
4 See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and 
Representing the Knowledge Economy: Accounting 
for Economic Reality under the Intangibles Paradigm, 
54 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006) (recognizing the 
historical measure of  wealth by tangible assets 
but suggesting that the technological age may 
increase the importance of  intangible assets); 
Jeanne Goldie Gura, Preserving Affordable 
Homeownership Opportunities in Rapidly Escalating 
Real Estate Markets, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 
& CMTY. DEV. L. 78, 79 (2001) (explaining 
that home ownership has traditionally been 
considered an integral step toward building 
wealth and achieving the American Dream; 
Michael A. Stegman, Roberto G. Quercia, & 
George McCarthy, The Center for Housing 
Policy, Housing America’s Working Families, 
1 New Century Housing Issue 1 (June 
2000) available at http://www.ccc.unc.edu/
abstracts/0600_Housing.php (last visited 
November 30, 2009).  
5 See Brian Gilmore et al., The Nightmare on 
Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for 
a New National Policy Focus on Homeownership, 
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 262, 
264-66 (2008) (tracing the history of  
homeownership among African-Americans 
since emancipation in 1865); Charles L. Nier, 
III, Perpetuation of  Segregation:  Toward a New 
Historical and Legal Interpretation of  Redlining 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 617, 618-19 (1999) (tracing the history 
of  mortgage-based discrimination in the 
housing market).
6 Id. See also Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 
2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2008) 
(listing many reasons why homeownership 
is valued in American households). Cf. 
Dearborn, supra note 77, at 40, 44, where the 
author acknowledges that research supports 
these purported benefits of  homeownership, 
however she argues “homeownership 
advocates fail to recognize that most of  the 
evidence supporting these claims comes from 
studies of  middle- to upper-income White 
populations. The premise that homeownership 
has absolute benefits has rarely been tested 
among low- to moderate- income and 
minority populations. As a result, few of  
the putative benefits of  homeownership can 
be expressly substantiated for traditionally 
underrepresented groups.”
7 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership 
Risk Beyond A Subprime Crisis: The Role Of  
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2261, 2276 (2008) (explaining that 
home ownership is key to wealth-building); 
John K. McIlwain, Show Me the Money: A 
Proposed Federal Response to Urban Sprawl, 11 
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 26, 
27 (2001) (citing home ownership as the 
American dream for millions of  Americans); 
Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New 
Millennium: Transforming Poverty in America, 16 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 
391 (2002) (explaining that most Americans 
consider home ownership the signal that they 
have reached the “economic mainstream”).
8 See Charles Lewis Nier, III, The Shadow 
Of  Credit: The Historical Origins of  Racial 
Predatory Lending and its Impact upon African 
American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA. J. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 131 (2007) (attributing 
the homeownership gap between African-
Americans and Whites to the nation’s history 
of  racial discrimination in the housing market 
and blaming lack of  available and fair credit 
as a source of  this problem). 
9 Id. at 133 n.12 (citing the 2005 report 
which conveyed President Clinton’s goal of  
increasing minority home ownership); see also
Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing “Home: A Re-Analysis 
of  Gender, Homeownership and Debtor Default 
for Feminist Legal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 423, 470-71 N. 327 (2008) (citing 
the specific agenda of  the William Clinton 
administration to expand homeownership 
opportunities to minorities); Adam Gordon, 
The Creation of  Homeownership: How New Deal 
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously 
Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and 
Out of  Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 
189, 216-220 (2005) (describing how the 
intent of  banking regulations during the 
Kennedy administration were designed, in 
part, to eliminate the segregation patterns 
fostered by the Roosevelt legislation, but 
failed to do so);  George Steven Swan, The 
Law and Economics of  Affirmative Action in 
Housing: The Diversity Impulse, 15 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006) (describing the 
exclusionary effect of  the homeownership 
regulations implemented during the Franklin 
D Roosevelt presidency). 
10 KERWIN CHARLES AND ERIK HURST, The 
Transition to Homeownership and the Black-
White Wealth Gap, in 84(2) THE REVIEW OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 281-297(MIT 
Press, 2002).  
1 Professor Marcia Johnson is a Professor 
of  Law at the Thurgood Marshall School 
of  Law and Director of  the Earl Carl 
Institute for Legal and Social Policy, Inc. 
BS and JD, University of  Florida.  Special 
acknowledgment to Professor Laurie 
Cisneros, Thurgood Marshall School of  
Law who reviewed and commented on an 
early draft of  the paper, Associate Dean L. 
Darnell Weeden, Thurgood Marshall School 
of  Law for his assistance and support; the 
Earl Carl researchers, S.K. Alexander, and to 
Dr. Luckett Johnson.
2 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2000), 
quoted in Ann M. Burkhart, The Constitutional 
Underpinnings of  Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 211, 239 n.270 (2003) (explaining that 
property ownership was a prerequisite for 
suffrage in nearly every state during the 
Revolutionary Era); see also JOHN PHILLIP
REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN
THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 128 
(1989), quoted in James Thomas Tucker, 
Tyranny of  the Judiciary:  Judicial Dilution 
of  Consent under Section 2 of  the Voting 
Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 
459 n.62 (1999) (explaining that “even in 
the most representative colonial legislatures, 
suffrage only was extended to one-sixth of  
the population. Women, children, servants, 
and those without property all were ineligible 
to vote”).  
3 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in 
America (1835), in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: 
AND TWO ESSAYS ON AMERICA 73 (Gerald 
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (“[T]he 
strength of  free nations resides in the 
townships. Town institutions are to freedom 
what primary schools are to knowledge: they 
bring it within people’s reach and give me the 
enjoyment and habit of  using it for peaceful 
ends.”); see also DONALD G. HAGMAN & JULIAN 
C. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND
LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, § 2.9 (2d 
ed. 1986); Patrick J. Skelley, Public Participation 
In Brownfield Remediation Systems: Putting 
Community Back on the (Zoning) Map, 8 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. J. 389, 395-98 (1997) (discussing 
the challenges to cleaning hazardous waste, a 
presumably positive modification of  land use, 
if  surrounding landowners are not brought 
into project as participants. Among the other 
things landowners may be concerned with 
the affect on the nature of  the surrounding 
only to retain its policy of  expanded 
homeownership opportunities, but to 
couple it with specific strategies to reach 
a fair and equitable result.  
Endnotes
THE MODERN AMERICAN38
11 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSING VACANCIES
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, ANNUAL STATISTICS: 
2007, TABLE 20:  HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY OF HOUSEHOLDER, 1994 
TO 2007, available at http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual07/
ann07t20.html [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES]. Gilmore et al., 
supra note 4, at 266-67 (highlighting Clinton’s 
housing programs’ specific targeting of  low-
income and underserved populations).
12 Matthew Nielsen and Kara Altenbaumer-
Price, The Civil, Regulatory and Criminal 
Responses to the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 14 
ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 1, 1 (2008) 
(tracing the efforts of  the SEC to search out 
those responsible for creating the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis); see also Rachel Carlton, 
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief  Act Of  2007,
45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 601, 601-03 (2008) 
(describing the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt 
Relief  Act).  
13 See Scott C. Matasar, (Commentary) Defenses 
In Subprime Litigation, ANDREWS BANK AND
LENDER LIABILITY LITIG. REP. (2008) (stating 
that the role of  the Community Reinvestment 
Act is a large part of  the mortgage and 
mortgage backed securities collapse); but 
see Richard D. Marsico, Subprime Lending, 
Predatory Lending, And The Community 
Reinvestment Act Obligations Of  Banks, 46 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 735 (2002) (discussing 
the Community Reinvestment Act and 
its antipathy toward bad debt including 
predatory and some sub-prime lending).
14 See U.S. CENSUS HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES, 
Historical Census of  Housing Tables 
Ownership Rates, available at http://www.
census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/
historic/ownrate.html (The 1970 report 
shows African American homeownership 
rates at 41.6 %, increasing by 1980 to 44.4% 
but decreasing by 1990 to 43.4%; the rates 
for Latinos were 43.7% in 1970 but by 
1980 had dropped to 43.4 % and by 1990 
to 42.4%.  By 2000 the rates for African 
Americans had increased to 46.3% and for 
Latinos had increased to 45.7% suggesting 
that it was post 1990 initiatives rather than the 
enactment of  the CRA that was responsible 
for the highest rates of  homeownership for 
this population); see also Thomas M. Shapiro, 
Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 65 (2006) (stating that in 
1995, 42.2 % of  African-American families 
owned homes, increasing to a historic high 
of  49.5 % in 2004); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. 
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF
THE NATION’S HOUSING:  2005 at 15-19, 
in Shapiro, supra note 13, at 65 (The 1995 
homeownership rate for African Americans 
was lower than the 1980 and 1990 census 
reported rates and only .6% higher than the 
1970 rate). 
15 Michael Aleo and Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure 
Fallout: The Banking Industry’s Attack on Disparate 
Impact Race Discrimination Claims under The Fair 
Housing Act and The Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2008); see 
Al Yoon, Foreclosures to Affect 6.5 Mln Loans 
by 2012-Report, REUTERS, April 22, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
bondsNews/idUSN2233380820080422 
(explaining that falling home prices and lack 
of  available credit may result in foreclosures); 
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UPDATED 
PROJECTIONS OF SUBPRIME FORECLOSURES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON HOME VALUES AND COMMUNITIES
(2008), http://www.responsiblelending.
org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/
updated-foreclosure-and-spillover-brief-8-
18.pdf  (providing statistics of  foreclosures).
16 WILLIAM C. APGAR & ALLEGRA CALDER, THE 
DUAL MORTGAGE MARKET: THE PERSISTENCE
OF DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING, 
JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD 
UNIV., Dec. 2005, http://www.jchs.harvard.
edu/publications/finance/w05-11/pdf., 
at 12-14; see Darnellena Christie Burnett, 
Justice in Housing: Predatory Lending, 15 
APR NBA Nat’l B.A. Mag. 14. 
17 See Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of  2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201, 5211 (2008) 
(establishing the Troubled Asset Relief  
Program to “restore liquidity and stability to 
the financial system of  the United States”).  
18 Press Release, Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, and Federal Housing Finance Agency 
Reports Mortgage Interest Rates (January 27, 
2009), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/
webfiles/420/FHFA_Reports_Mortgage_
Interest_ Rates.pdf  (reporting that the 
average loan amount in December 2008 
was $218,000); Mortgage Data Web.com, 
Mortgage Industry Data and Statistics: 
Average FHA Mortgage Loan Amount Surges 
Higher and Higher! (Sept. 4, 2008), available 
at  http://mortgagedataweb.blogspot.
com/2008/09/average-fha-mortgage-loan-
amount-surges.html (stating that the average 
FHA mortgage loan is reported at slightly 
lower than $200,000 around $184,282). 
19  See US  Foreclosures Rise in December; Reach 
2.2 mln in 2007, up 75 pct from 2006, FORBES,
Jan. 2008, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/
afx/2008/01/29/afx4584956.html (Realty 
Trac Foreclosure count statistics by state, 
2008 totals at 3.16 million foreclosures 
in 2006 were reported at 1.26 million for 
three years total of  6.62 million. If  half  of  
that number is attributable to sub-prime 
foreclosures that would be 3.32 million. The 
average subprime loan amount for 2006 was 
about $201,000. The average loan amount 
for subprime loans in the second half  of  
2006 was $202,295, only 1 percent higher 
than the average loan amount for subprime 
loans of  $200,167 in the first half  of  2006 as 
reported by Mortgage Bankers Association, 
7/3/07). 
20  See generally Justin Ak Amoah, Chicago 
technology riding its first wave since bubble burst, 
MEDILL REPORTS CHICAGO, April 6, 2010, 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/
chicago/news.aspx?id=83835 (referencing 
the 2002 technology bubble burst before 
discussing Chicago’s growth in the technology 
field).  
21 William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: 
Regulation of  the Poor in Colonial America, 31 
U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 41 (1996) (explaining that 
immigrants began their life in America in 
seaport towns).  
22 Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs As Exit, 
Suburbs As Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277
(2007).
23  Federal Assistance In Financing Middle-Income 
Cooperative Apartments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 
543 (1959) (By the 1900’s, a world housing 
shortage existed, chiefly because of  the 
population increase and the concentration of  
the population in urban areas. The expansion 
of  industry, a shortage of  construction 
workers, and a lack of  money for new housing 
also helped cause the housing shortage).
24 William E. Nelson and Norman R. 
Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure: 
An Analysis Of  Government Policies Promoting 
Suburban Growth And Ethnic Assimilation, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197 (1999) (referring to 
census reports of  homebuilding in Nassau 
County).    
25 See James C. Smith, The Dynamics Of  
Landlord-Tenant Law And Residential Finance: 
The Comparative Economics Of  Home Ownership, 
44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 62 (1993) 
(stating that “Economic slumps compel 
more families to rent, as some families lose 
their homes by foreclosure, and others, who 
hoped to purchase, postpone that decision. 
The lowest rate of  owner occupation 
reflected by the decennial censuses was 
forty-four percent in 1940, after the country 
had spent a decade struggling with the Great 
Depression.”); see also Nier, supra note 8 (
discussing the government’s shift from a pre-
depression laissez-faire role in housing to an 
active post-depression role).   
26 Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic 
Development, And The Free Trade Constitution, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1103 (2008) (finding 
that urbanization is the chief  agent of  
demographic and economic change in the 
United States, as it has been in all developed 
countries since the Industrial Revolution 
because of  the “externalities” that are borne 
from a diverse population of  creators and 
thinkers in a diverse industrial and now, 
technological market; and further stating 
that “the twentieth century has witnessed 
monumental shifts in Americans’ work and 
living patterns, including the great migration 
to the cities, a later (and smaller) movement 
out of  the cities into the suburbs, and the 
FALL 2010 39
development of  increasingly large and dense 
metropolitan areas. In 1860, less than twenty 
percent of  the population lived in urban 
areas; in 2000, close to eighty percent did.”). 
27 Timothy Jost, The Defeasible Fee and the Birth 
of  the Modern Residential Subdivision, 49 MO. L. 
REV. 695, 698 (1984).  
28 Id. at 701.
29 Id. at 702-06. 
30 Id. at 724-25. 
31 Michelle Adams, Separate and [Un]Equal: 
Housing Choice, Mobility, and Equalization in the 
Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. 
REV. 413, 433-35 (1996).
32 United States v. Certain Lands in City of  
Detroit, 12 F. Supp. 345, 348 (1935) (where 
the court opined that the fundamental law 
of  both the United States and the state of  
Michigan prohibits the taking of  private 
property except for public use) (cited in
Adams, supra note 32, at 434 n.77). 
33 Id. 
34 50 Stat. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (Supp. 
1939).
35 Alfred M. Clark, III., Can America Afford 
to Abandon A National Housing Policy?, 6 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
185, 185 (1997).  
36 Yale Law Journal, No Room For Singles: 
A Gap In The Housing Law, 80 YALE L.J. 
395, 420 (1970). (discussing the post war 
programs enacted to spur homeownership 
opportunities). 
37 Edward Gramlich, America’s Second Housing 
Boom 1, THE URBAN INSTITUTE (2007), http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311418_
Second_Housing_Boom.pdf. 
38 City of  Cleveland  v. United States, 323 U.S. 
329 (1945).
39 Id.; see also Housing Act of  1937, §§ 1,30, 42 
U.S.C. §§1401-1440.     
40 Deborah Kenn, Fighting The Housing Crisis 
With Underachieving Programs: The Problem With 
Section 8, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L.77, 77 n.2 (1993).
41 Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards To Gentrification: 
Explicating A Right To Protective Zoning In Low-
Income Communities Of  Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
739, 752-53 (1993) (stating that “while the 
federal homeownership assistance programs 
promoted the creation of  homogenous 
[W]hite suburbs, the federal public housing 
program for low-income families with 
children facilitated the development of  
segregated and locationally deficient [African 
American] inner city neighborhoods.  From 
the public housing program’s inception 
in 1937, tenants were assigned to projects 
on a segregated basis, with many [African 
American] projects located in slums.  When 
the program’s production goals were greatly 
expanded in the United States Housing 
Act of  1949, Congress virtually guaranteed 
that all new housing would continue to be 
constructed on a discriminatory basis when 
it rejected anti-discrimination amendments 
to the Act”). 
42 Housing Act of  1949 § 2, 42 USC § 
1441a.  
43 Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Place to Call Home? 
Affordable Housing Issues in America Toward 
A Policy Of  Heterogeneity: Overcoming A Long 
History Of  Socioeconomic Segregation In Housing, 
42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 480-81 (2007) 
(stating that “The [Housing] Act [of  1949] 
articulated a goal of  construction of  810,000 
new public housing units in six years, one 
that required twenty years to meet, in part 
because of  continuing controversies about 
the program. That same Act committed 
the United States to an ambitious goal of  
’the realization as soon as feasible of  the 
goal of  a decent home and suitable living 
environment for every American family’”); 
see also Robert F. Drinan, Untying the Noose, 
94 YALE L.J. 435, 436, n.5 (1984) (stating 
that the Housing Act of  1949 “was the first 
time the federal government set a national 
housing objective”).
44 See Judicial Review of  Displacee Relocation in 
Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L. J. 966, 968  n.12 
(1968) (providing the language from the 
Housing Act of  1949 and how it should be 
read).
45 Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National 
Land Use Policy: For the Cities Sake, 26 FORDHAM 
URB. L. J. 69, n. 120 (1998) 
46 Salsich, supra note 44, at 480.
47 Adams, supra note 32, at 438-49.
48 Id. at 439.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 436-38. 
51 See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN
HOUSING 229 (Associate Faculty Press, Inc.) 
(1955) (likening FHA’s protection of  the 
White neighborhood to the Nuremburg 
laws due to FHA’s focus on racial and 
social homogeneity in all housing projects), 
quoted in Florence Wagman Roisman, 
Teaching Important Property Concepts: Teaching 
About Inequality, Race and Property, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. 665, 678 (2002); see also  GAIL
RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: 
POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
48, 188-89 (Univ. of  Chicago Press 1996), 
cited in Roisman, supra note 52, at 673 n.28; 
GAIL RADFORD, The Federal Government 
and Housing During the Era of  the Great 
Depression, in FROM TENEMENTS TO THE
TAYLOR HOMES 102-03, 110-18 (John I. 
Bauman et al. eds. 2000), cited in Roisman, 
supra note 52, at 676 n.44.
52 Id. at 676. 
53 Id. at 670. 
54 Id.
55 See Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of  
Residential Racial Segregation in America: 
Historical Discrimination, Modern forms of  
Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND 
USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 92 (1998) (providing the 
“black ghetto” as an example of  the result of  
deliberate housing policies).  
56 Id. at 95; see also Adams, supra note 32, at 
437.
57 Elizabeth Sammann, The Reality of  Family 
Preservation under Norman v. Johnson, 42 DEPAUL
L. REV. 675,  688 (1992).
58 Id. (stating that while the number of  
substandard housing decreased after the 
1968 Act, the numbers of  affordable units 
became a much larger problem).
59 42 U.S.C. §1437.
60 Id. §§12701 (1990); 1441 (1965); 1425 
(1940) (repealed 1990).
61 Id. §§ 804-806, 3404-06.
62 See Deborah Kemp, The 1968 Fair Housing 
Act: Have its Goals been Accomplished?, 14 REAL
EST. L.J. 327, 328-332(1986) (discussing 
the broad purpose of  the Fair Housing 
Act to cure urban problems of  racially 
segregated urban ghettoes);  see also Dennis 
M. Teravainen (Note) Federal Law’s Indifference 
To Housing Discrimination Based On Sexual 
Orientation, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 
11, 22 (2002) (discussing the broad breadth 
of  the Fair Housing Act as a statutory 
tool to prohibit discrimination in housing, 
to promote integration and to eliminate 
segregated housing).  
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994 & Supp. IV 
1999); see also Kemp, supra note 63, at 329 
(identifying the exemptions from the act).
64 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1994); see Joseph 
J. Norton, Fair Lending Requirements: The 
Intervention of  a Governmental Social Agenda into 
Bank Supervision and Regulation, 49 CONSUMER
FIN. L. Q. REP 17, 21-25 (1995) (stating that the 
ECOA, the FHA, the CRA, and the HMDA 
are the main fair lending laws. Although 
they impose different requirements, these 
requirements are sometimes interconnected. 
As a whole, they are the tools the federal 
government has used in its efforts to achieve 
its objectives in the fair lending area).
65 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). 
66 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1994 & Supp. 
1999). See also Ronald K. Schuster, Lending 
Discrimination:  Is The Secondary Market Helping 
To Make The “American Dream” A Reality, 
36 GONZ. L. REV. 153, 161 (2000) (“The 
HMDA requires ‘depository institutions’ 
to submit annual reports detailing home 
purchase and home improvement loans 
they have originated or purchased during 
the covered period, as well as applications 
received for the loans... The required HMDA 
disclosures encompass not only the location 
of  the property and type of  loan, but the 
borrower’s race, ethnicity, national origin, 
gender, and income as well.”).
67 Id. at 162.
68 Id.  
69 E.L Baldinucci, The Community 
Reinvestment Act:  New Standards Provide 
THE MODERN AMERICAN40
New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 838-
39 (1996).
70 12 U.S.C. §§ 4702-4713 (1994).
71 Norton, supra note 65, at 20. 
72 David E. Runck, An Analysis Of  The 
Community Development Banking And Financial 
Institutions Act And The Problem Of  “Rational 
Redlining” Facing Low-Income Communities, 15 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 517, 531-33 (1996) 
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5)(A) (1994)).
73 Id. at 532. 
74 Jeffrey S. Lesk and Richard M. Price, 
An Introduction to the Community Development 
Bank Network, 4 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
& COMMUNITY DEV. L. 267, 269 (1995) 
(describing the Community Development 
Financial Institute Fund as having been 
created to expand the availability of  credit, 
investment capital and financial services in 
distressed urban and rural communities).  
75 See BARRY G. JACOBS, History of  Federal 
Housing and Community Development 
Law, in HDR HANDBOOK OF HOUSING AND
DEVELOPMENT LAW, §1:56 (2009) (stating 
the HOPE programs were designed to 
encourage the use of  government-owned 
or government financed housing for low-
income home ownership);  see also Danielle 
Pelfrey Duryea, Gendering The Gentrification 
Of  Public Housing: Hope VI’s Disparate Impact 
On Lowest-Income African American Women,
13 GEO. J. ON  POVERTY L. & POL’Y 567 n.1, 
(chronicling the various HOPE programs 
and showing the focus change from rental to 
homeownership).
76 Lynne Dearborn, Homeownership: The 
Problematics Of  Ideals And Realities, 16 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 40 
(2006) (explaining that some previous and still 
existing remedial actions taken by the federal 
government include insurance programs for 
those financial institutions that lend within 
low-income communities as well as the 
promotion and sponsorship by the federal 
government of  community development 
programs and financial institutions).
77 Matasar, supra note 12 (discussing the 
feasibility of  banks reliance on the Community 
Reinvestment Act and its mandates as 
defenses to subprime litigation brought by 
minority and low-income borrowers). 
78 See Jo Carrillo, In Translation For The Latino 
Market Today: Acknowledging The Rights Of  
Consumers In A Multilingual Housing Market, 
11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) 
(discussing the relative homeownership 
rates between Latinos and Whites and 
concluding that the rates for Latinos is low); 
Kenya Covington and Rodney Harrell, From 
Renting To Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives 
To Encourage Homeownership Among Renters, 
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 100-103(2007) 
(comparing homeowner rates between 
African-Americans and Whites). 
79 Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., Poverty Status 
of  People by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 
1959 to 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, 
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 52 (Aug. 2008), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/
p60-235.pdf  (showing poverty status of  
persons by age, race, and Hispanic origin 
from 1959-2007); but see NAT’L ASS’N OF
CHILD CARE RES. AND REFERRAL AGENCIES, 
SCHOOL-AGE CHILDREN 5-17 LIVING IN
POVERTY 1 (2007), www.naccrra.org/randd/
docs/School-Age_Children_in_pverty.pdf
(reporting that the number rises to about 
one-third for all school-aged children living 
in poverty).
80 Howard A. Savage, Who Could Afford to 
Buy a Home in 2002? BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
STATISTICAL BRIEF (2007), www.census.gov/
prod/2007pubs/h121-07-1.pdf  (stating 
that the 2002 number was unchanged from 
1995. According to the report, “[h]ouse 
prices were determined for areas defined 
by the nine census geographic divisions and 
by whether a house was inside or outside a 
metropolitan area or in or out of  a central 
city in a metropolitan area.  A modestly 
priced house is one priced so that twenty-
five percent of  all owner-occupied houses in 
the area in which the survey respondents live 
are below this value and seventy-five percent 
above.  A low priced house is priced so that 
ten percent of  all owner-occupied houses 
in that areas are below this value and ninety 
percent are above.”).
81 Id.
82 Id. 
83 EDWARD N. WOLFF, DOES EDUCATION
REALLY HELP? SKILL, WORK AND INEQUALITY
(Oxford Univ. P. 2006); see Daniel H. 
Weinberg, A Brief  Look at Postwar U.S. 
Income Inequality, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
191 (1996), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/p60191.html (discussing poverty and 
income trends overall, for regions, by race 
and ethnicity and by differences in age).
84 Id. 
85 See id. (finding that income inequality 
increased from 16.1 percent between 1968 
and 1994 to 22.4 percent).
86 Id. (reporting that the income of  
households within the 95th percentile was 
more than 8 times that of  those households 
in the 20th percentile.  In 1968, the household 
at the 95th percentile had 6 times the income 
of  the household at the 20th percentile).  
87 Press Brief  by Daniel H. Weinberg, Press 
Briefing on 2000 Income and Poverty 
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/income00/prs01asc.html (stating 
that the median household income held at 
$42,100 meaning that half  of  all households 
had incomes above $42,100 and half  
below).
88 Id. 
89 Id.; see also Bernadette Proctor & Joseph 
Dalaker, Poverty In The United States: 1999, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2000)  1, http://www.
census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p60-210.pdf  
(stating that in 1999, 32.3 million people 
were poor, down from 34.5 million in 1998); 
see Bernadette Proctor & Joseph Dalaker, 
Poverty In The United States: 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (2001) v, http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001pubs/p60-214.pdf   at 1 (stating 
that about 31.1 million people were poor in 
2000, 1.1 million fewer than in 1999). 
90 Id.; see also Bernadette Proctor and Joseph 
Dalaker, Poverty in the United States: 1999 
and 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (reporting 
statistics showing the level of  income).  
91 Id. (reporting the poverty rate for African 
Americans fell from 23.6 percent in 1999 
to 22.1 percent in 2000.  For Latinos, the 
poverty rate fell from 22.8 percent in 1999 to 
21.2 percent in 2000).
92 Id. (reporting in 2005 that African American 
households had the lowest median income 
at $30,134, Latino household income was 
$34,241, for non-Latino Whites income was 
$48,977 and for Asian was $57,518).
93 Id.
94 See generally A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS
AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 3-11 (Gerald David 
Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) 
(discussing the conditions of  African 
Americans relative to white America and 
determining that the disparities that exist are 
stark and long standing).
95 See Current Population Survey, Table 24,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, April 6, 2010, 
ftp://bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/
aa2003/pdf/cpsaat24.pdf  (2002 and 2003 
statistics); Current Population Survey, Table 
24, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Aug. 7, 
2009, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat24.
pdf  (showing unemployment rates by race 
from 2007 to 2008).
96 Id.
97 Poverty: 2007 Highlights, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/pover ty/pover ty07/
pov07hi.html (reporting that poverty rates 
in 2007 were statistically unchanged for 
non-Hispanic Whites (8.2 percent), Blacks 
(24.5 percent), and Asians (10.2 percent) 
from 2006. The poverty rate increased for 
Hispanics (21.5 percent in 2007, up from 
20.6 percent in 2006)); see also Household 
Income Rises, Poverty Rate Unchanged
Number of  Uninsured Down, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
gov/Press-release/www/releases/archives/
income_wealth/012528.html (reporting 
that real median income (adjusted for 
inflation) for black and non-Hispanic white 
households rose between 2006 and 2007, 
representing the first measured real increase 
in annual household income for each group 
since 1999.  Real median household income 
FALL 2010 41
remained statistically unchanged for Asians 
and Hispanics.   Among the race groups 
and Hispanics, black households had the 
lowest median income in 2007 ($33,916). 
This compares to the median of  $54,920 
for non-Hispanic white households. Asian 
households had the highest median income 
($66,103). The median income for Hispanic 
households was $38,679).
98 Howard A. Savage, Who Could Afford to 
buy a Home in 1991?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
April 6, 2010, http://www.census.gov/apsd/
statbrief/sb93_16.pdf.
99 Id.
100 Id. (showing that the rate of  White families 
not of  Latino origin that could not afford a 
home in the area in which they resided was 
forty three percent).
101 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies 
and Homeownership, Annual Statistics: 
2006, Table 20: Homeownership Rates by 
Race and Ethnicity of  Householder 1994 to 
2006  (2006), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/annual06/ann06t20.
html.http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/hvs/annual06/ann06t20.html.
102 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Reports on residential 
Vacancies and Homeownership, Table 7, 
April 6, 2010, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/qtr107/q107press.pdf.
103 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies 
and Homeownership, Historical Tables, 
Table 14, , April 6, 2010, http://www.census.
gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/
index.html.
104  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies 
and Homeownership, Annual Statistics, Table 
20, (2000), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/annual00/ann00t20.
html.  In Census 2000, homeownership 
among White householders was 7.1  percent, 
higher than the national rate of  66 percent. 
In contrast, householders who were African 
American (47.2 percent) and those who were 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 
(53.5 percent) had homeownership rates less 
than the national rate.  Latino householders 
had a 46.3 percent homeownership rate, 
compared with 73.8 percent for non-Latino 
White.  Those householders with rates higher 
than 50 percent but less than the national rate 
were American Indians and Alaska Natives 
(56.2 percent) and Asians (52.8 percent).  
105 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Housing Vacancies 
and Homeownership Rates, 1994-2005, 
Table 20:  Homeownership Rates by Race 
and Ethnicity of  Householder, 1994-2005 
(2005), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
housing/hvs/annual05/ann05t20.html.  
106 Rakesh Kochhar, The Wealth of  Latino 
Households: 1996 to 2002, PEW HISPANIC
INSTITUTE 4 (2004), http://pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/34.pdf.
107 Id. at 2; see also id. at 16 (reporting that the 
only exceptions arose in the case of  White 
households who owned homes, interest 
earning assets and unsecured liabilities at 
rates in excess of  50 percent).
108 Id.
109 See Sean Zielenbach, A Critical Analysis 
Of  Low-Income Homeownership Strategies, 13 
J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY DEV. L. 446, 
452 (2004) (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of  homeownership generally 
and states, “Both policy makers and 
practitioners often view homeownership 
as a central component of  community 
development strategies. Since owners tend to 
remain in their homes for longer than renters 
(because of  their financial investment, among 
other things), homeownership contributes to 
a neighborhood’s residential stability. That 
stability can lead to both the development 
of  greater social capital in the community 
as well as an appreciation of  local property 
values.”).    
110 Id. at 453-54. 
111 See Fox, supra note 8, at 470-71 (stating that 
“one study published by the Department of  
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
in 2005 indicated that while homeownership 
rates were currently at historically high 
levels for all sections of  the U.S. population, 
‘dramatic gaps in homeownership rates have 
been stubbornly present over the last several 
decades, and even increased somewhat 
during the decade of  the 1990s.’ This study 
identified several factors accounting for the 
homeownership gap, including not only 
race and ethnicity, but also differences due 
to income, wealth, marital status, and age 
of  household. Yet, while concerns about 
homeownership rates have triggered major 
policy initiatives under both the Clinton and 
Bush Administrations to increase access to 
homeownership, it is also important to note 
that it is not only access, but the sustainability 
of  homeownership that will have a significant 
impact on national homeownership rates 
over the medium and long term.”).  
112 Remarks by President George Bush, 
President Calls for Expanding Opportunities 
to Home Ownership, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/200
2/06/20020617-2.html
113 Id. (stating, “First, the single greatest 
barrier to first time homeownership is a 
high down payment. It is really hard for 
many, many, low income families to make 
the high down payment. And so that’s why I 
propose and urge Congress to fully fund the 
American Dream Down payment Fund. This 
will use money, taxpayers’ money to help a 
qualified, low income buyer make a down 
payment. And that’s important.  One of  the 
barriers to homeownership is the inability to 
make a down payment. And if  one of  the 
goals is to increase homeownership, it makes 
sense to help people pay that down payment. 
We believe that the amount of  money in our 
budget, fully approved by Congress, will help 
40,000 families every year realize the dream 
of  owning a home.”).
114 See Press Release, Barriers to Minority 
Homeownership, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, June 17, 2002, 
available at http://www.hud.gov/news/
releasedocs/barriers.cfm (describing the 
multiple barriers that prevent minority 
families from becoming homeowners).  
115 See Leonard S. Rubinowitz and Ismail 
Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing And 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841 
(2005) (chronicling the feral government’s 
efforts to help minorities overcome barriers 
to homeownership ).
116 David J. Garrow, The Federal Courts and 
School Desegregation in the 1970’s, 21 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 879, 881 (1988).
117 Frank Lopez, Using the Fair Housing Act 
to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 75 (1999).
118 ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN, JOINT CENTER
FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
LIKE FLEAS ON A TIGER? A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE OPEN HOUSING MOVEMENT  29-31 (2010) 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/ publications/
communitydevelopment/von_hoffman_
W98-3.pdf  , 1998 (where author shows 
that various historical events including the 
race riots of  the 1960s sparked changes in 
American civil rights including housing 
policy ).  
119 See Gilmore, supra note 4, at 635 (explaining 
that the CRA, along with the Fair Housing 
Act and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 
.were enacted to respond to the ills associated 
with redlining).  
120 Id.
121 See id. at 637 (recognizing that “the 
continuing prevalence of  redlining was 
directly related to the effects of  the policies 
and practices adopted by lenders”).
122 Andrene Smith, (Note) A Different World: 
Financial Determinants Of  Well-Being In New 
Orleans In Black And White, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 179, 189 (2007). 
123 Leland Ware, Race And Urban Space: 
Hypersegregated Housing Patterns And The Failure 
Of  School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J.
55, 67 (2002).
124 Smith, supra note 123, at 189.
125 Id. at 189-90. 
126 Id. at 190.
127 Lopez, supra note 118, at 75 n.9 (citing 
Mark Anderson, Subprime Lending to 
Minority Groups Rises, Study Finds, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 25, 1998, at B11).
128 Id. at 75. 
129 See Darnellena Christie Burnett, Justice 
in Housing: Curbing Predatory Lending, NBA 
NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG, Mar./Apr. 2001, at 
14 (explaining that high-income African-
American neighborhoods were twice as likely 
to have sub-prime mortgages as otherwise 
THE MODERN AMERICAN42
similar low-income White neighborhoods).  
130 Eric C. Bartley (Comment) And Regulation 
for All: Federally Regulating the Mortgage Banking 
Industry, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 477, 485 
(2006).    
131 Lopez, supra note 118, at 77.
132 Id. at 79 (positing that “the loss of  a 
home can be financially and psychologically 
devastating. Financially, a homeowner may 
lose all equity in his home, and ultimately 
may end up homeless.  Psychologically, 
homeowners facing the loss of  their homes 
are more likely to suffer from mental 
illnesses, commit suicide, or engage in 
criminal behavior.  Therefore, the problem of  
predatory lending in minority communities 
is a grave concern.”). 
133 Id. at 77-78. 
134 Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs. 
Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory 
Lending Under A New Theory of  Economic 
Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 211, 213 
(2003) (stating that the recent explosive 
growth in the predatory subprime market has 
“created a crisis of  epidemic proportions for 
communities of  color, elderly homeowners, 
and low-income neighborhoods [because 
of] the plague of  predatory mortgage 
lending.”).
135 FORMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLICY, DECLINING CREDIT & GROWING
DISPARITIES: KEY FINDINGS FROM HMDA 
2007 1 (2008), http://www.furmancenter.
org/files/KeyFindingsfromHMDA2007
FurmanCenterReport.pdf. 
136 Holden Lewis, What Exactly is a Subprime 
Mortgage?, BankRate.com, April 18, 2007, 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/
mortgages/20070418_subprime_mortgage_
definition_a1.asp (“There are conflicting 
accounts of  the size of  the subprime market. 
Depending on whom you talk to, it accounts 
for 20 percent of  all mortgage loans, 15 
percent or 13.5 percent.  Estimating the 
size of  the subprime market is tricky for a 
number of  reasons. For one, it’s sometimes 
hard to distinguish between a subprime 
mortgage and an Alt-A loan -- a grade of  
mortgage between prime and subprime. For 
another, there are two ways to count them: by 
the number of  loans or by total dollar value. 
Then there’s the question of  whether you’re 
talking about all loans originated in a certain 
year or all outstanding mortgages. Standard 
& Poors says subprime originations totaled 
$421 billion in 2006. The Mortgage Bankers 
Association says all originations totaled $2.5 
trillion. If  both data sources are accurate, 
that means 16.8 percent of  mortgage volume 
consisted of  subprime loans last year.  That’s 
dollar volume, not the number of  mortgages. 
Subprime mortgage balances are probably 
smaller than average, so more than 16.8 
percent of  borrowers got subprime loans. 
These statistics rely on lenders to define 
what they mean by subprime, and different 
lenders have different definitions. As a rule of  
thumb, a subprime mortgage is a home loan 
to someone with a credit score below 620.
But some lenders count loans as subprime 
even if  the borrowers have credit scores of  
660 or higher, if  the borrower makes a down 
payment of  less than 5 percent or does not 
document income or assets. Other lenders 
might count those loans as Alt-A.  There 
isn’t a definition of  subprime that everyone 
agrees on. That’s partly what makes it difficult 
to judge the size of  the subprime market.”) 
(emphasis added).
137 Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending 
Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING
L.J. 407, 408 (2007) (explaining the nature of  
a subprime mortgage).  
138 Lewis, supra note 140, (stating that an 
industry of  subprime mortgage lenders 
has sprung up to serve the vast number of  
Americans who have credit problems).
139 See Cassandra Jones Havard, To Lend or Not 
to Lend: What the CRA Ought to Say About Sub-
Prime and Predatory Lending, 7 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (explaining the predatory 
nature of  subprime mortgaging). 
140 Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to 
Subprime “HEL” Was Paved with Good 
Congressional  Intentions: Usury Deregulation and 
the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. 
REV. 473, 540-41 (2000).
141 Bartley, supra note 131, at 484 (stating that 
affluent blacks are twice as likely to refinance 
in the sub-prime market as low-income 
whites). 
142 Smith, supra note 123, at 191.
143 PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME
INSTITUTE 2008, RICARDO GUERRA AND ERIC
OCHOA V. GMAC LLC, GMAC MORTGAGE,
LLC ET. AL., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 748 
(2008). 
144 Smith, supra note 123, at 180.
145 Allison D. Matthews, To Stop a Predator: 
Is a Complete Ban on For-Profit Foreclosure 
Rescue Operations the Best Way to Prevent Equity 
Stripping?, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 477, 
478 n.4 (2008).
146 Kathleen M. Howley, Foreclosures in Military 
Towns Surge at Four Times US Rate, BLOOMBERG.
COM, May 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601109&refer=h
ome&sid=awj2TMDLnwsU (referencing 
RealtyTrac, Inc., research).   
147 See 60 Minutes, A Look at Wall Street’s 
Shadow Market (CBS News broadcast 
October 5, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/
10/05/60minutes/main4502454.shtml?tag=
contentMain;contentBody). Howley, supra 
note 150 (the rate of  affected mortgage loans 
was 1% in 2007, up from .58% in 2006).  See, 
e.g., CBS Evening News, American Dream 
Slipping Away, (CBS television broadcast 
Mar. 6, 2008) (media report stating that up to 
6% of  homeowners are months away from 
foreclosure).
148 Tashman, supra note 141, at 411 (stating 
that one out of  five sub-prime mortgages 
will go into foreclosure); see Aleo, supra note 
14, at 16-17 (“Not surprisingly, borrowers 
default on subprime loans at far higher rates 
than typical loans and lead to foreclosure far 
too often. In 2008, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association (MBA) found that the rates of  
delinquency, foreclosure initiations, and 
loans in the process of  foreclosure continue 
at record levels. In the first quarter of  2008, 
seasonally adjusted delinquency rates were 
3.71% for prime loans and 18.79% for 
subprime loans, while in 2007 the delinquency 
rates were 2.58% for prime loans and 13.77% 
for subprime loans. Foreclosures follow 
similar trends; the foreclosure inventory rate 
in 2008 is 1.22% for prime loans and 10.74% 
for subprime loans, as compared to 0.54% 
and 5.10% in the first quarter of  2007. 
Alarmingly, “while subprime . . . [adjustable 
rate mortgages] represent[ed] only 6 % of  
all loans outstanding,” they accounted for a 
whopping 39 % of  foreclosures. Fixed rate 
mortgage foreclosures for subprime loans 
are six times higher than prime loans, while 
mortgage foreclosures for adjustable rate 
mortgages are over four times more likely for 
subprime than for prime loans. Unfortunately, 
the situation continues to worsen. Two million 
adjustable-rate mortgages will reset to higher 
interest rates in 2008 alone, and these loans 
will continue to adjust in 2009 and beyond.” 
Homeowner vacancy rates grew from 1.5 
percent in the first quarter of  1995 to 2.8 
percent in the second quarter 2008, including 
a climb from 1.5 percent to 2.8 percent from 
1995 to 2005 and a 2.0 percent to 2.8 percent 
climb from 2005 to 2008.);  see also ROBERT
R. CALLIS AND LINDA B. CAVANAUGH, CENSUS
BUREAU REPORTS ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES
AND HOMEOWNERSHIP, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
NEWS (2009), http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/hvs/qtr209/files/q209press.
pdf  (the latest census report on residential 
vacancies shows that the homeowner 
vacancy rate for the second quarter of  2008 
was statistically insignificant when compared 
to the homeowner vacancy rates for the prior 
quarter and the entire 2007).
149 See Al Yoon, Foreclosures to affect 6.5 million 
by 2012, REUTERS, April 22, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/bondsNewws/
idUSN2233380820080422 (“Falling home 
prices have made an increasing number 
of  U.S. homeowners more vulnerable to 
default”).
150 Mansfield, supra note 144, at 553-54 
(“[S]ubprime loans still generally default 
earlier than non-subprime home equity 
loans, and high interest rate loans-- most of  
which are subprime--end up in foreclosure at 
FALL 2010 43
a higher rate than non-subprime loans.” Also 
stating that by 1999 subprime mortgage loans 
had very high delinquency rates, especially 
when one looks at more serious delinquencies 
and foreclosures.); see also Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Speech at the Columbia Business 
School’s 32nd Annual Dinner (May 5, 
2008) (transcript available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
Bernanke20080505a.htm) (May 5, 2008) 
(“The sharpest increases have been among 
subprime mortgages, particularly those with 
adjustable interest rates:  About one quarter 
of  subprime adjustable-rate mortgages 
are currently 90 days or more delinquent 
or in foreclosure. Delinquency rates also 
have increased in the prime and near-prime 
segments of  the mortgage market, although 
not nearly so much as in the subprime 
sector.”).
151 See NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE POL’Y INST., 
2007 HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT
DATA 1 (2008), http://www.nul.org/sites/
default/files/2007%20HMDA%20Data.pdf  
(reporting the race-based disparity in higher 
priced lending markets).  
152 Id. 
153 Vikas Bajaj & Ford Fessenden, What’s 
Behind the Race Gap?, THE NATION, November 
4, 2007, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/11/04/weekinreview/
04bajaj.html. 
154 NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 155, at 
2.
155 See ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECONOMIC
POLICY INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES
ARE NEARLY DOUBLE FOR LATINOS AND
AFRICAN AMERICANS (June 11, 2008) 
http://www.epi.org/economic_snapshots/
entry/webfeatures_snapshots_20080611/ 
(stating that “[r]ecent studies suggest that 
creditworthiness—alone or in combination 
with factors other than race—cannot account 
for race based subprime disparities. When 
researchers from the Federal Reserve and the 
Wharton School of  Business conducted an 
analysis that took into account the percent 
of  adults in a neighborhood who were a very 
high credit risk, they still found a positive 
relationship between the prevalence of  
subprime loans and the share of  minorities 
in a neighborhood.”); see also Aleo, supra
note 14, at 20 (stating that “[a]ccording 
to the CRL study, the racial disparity in 
subprime lending has not been strictly based 
on borrowers’ income-levels or risk-related 
credit factors.  The study breaks down its 
data by LTV, FICO credit score range, and 
race. In the highest-risk borrower category-
-featuring an LTV of  above 90% and FICO 
score below 620--African Americans were 
only 6% more likely than white borrowers to 
receive a subprime loan for a home purchase 
and 5% more likely to receive a subprime 
loan for refinancing. For borrowers with the 
best credit histories and thus the lowest risk 
categories-- LTV below 80% and FICO score 
of  above 680--African Americans were 65% 
more likely to receive subprime loans than 
their similarly situated white counterparts 
for a home purchase and 124% more likely 
when refinancing. Beyond the clear racial 
disparities in lending, the increased disparity 
in refinancing is particularly unsettling as 
minorities who refinance with subprime 
loans are at risk of  losing the equity that 
they have invested in their homes, often 
comprising their life savings.”).  
156 See Bajaj, supra note 157 (stating that 
the biggest home lenders in minority 
neighborhoods are subprime lenders).
157 See NAT’L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 
155, at 2 (citing Rick Brooks and Ruth 
Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even 
Very Creditworthy, WALL ST. J., December 
3, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119662974358911035. html).
158 See REALTYTRAC, AS SOME TOP METRO
FORECLOSURE ACTIVITY RATES DECREASE, 
NEW FORECLOSURE HOT SPOTS EMERGE
IN Q3 2009, (Oct.28, 2009) http://www.
realtytrac.com/contentmanagement/
pressrelease.aspx?channelid=9&itemid=773
3 (showing the top cities hit by foreclosures); 
see also Nick Timiraos, Move Over Merced: 
Foreclosures Intensify in New Crop of  
Western Cities, http://blogs.wsj.com/
developments/2009/10/28/move-over-
merced-foreclosures-intensify-in-new-crop-
of-western-cities/. (Oct. 28, 2009, 12:53 
PM ET) (“foreclosure activity increased 
most sharply in several mid-size Western 
markets”).
159 See State and County Quick Facts, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/index.html (citing to the index page: 
select state and city to view demographics).
160 Austin, supra note 159; see also WILHELMINA 
A. LEIGH AND DANIELLE HUFF, JOINT CENTER 
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP: 
THE SUBPRIME LENDING EXPERIENCE 1995-
2007 6 (2007), http://www.scribd.com/
doc/24189487/African-Americans-and-
Homeownership-The-Subprime-Lending-
Experience-1995-to-2007-November-2007-
Brief-2 (reporting on the disparity in incidence 
of  subprime mortgages among African 
American and Latino populations showing 
that large percentages of  minorities who 
receive mortgage and home improvement 
loans get subprime loans).
161 ROBERTA K. MCINERNEY, PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME INSTITUTE 2008, RECENT 
FDIC SPEECHES, TESTIMONY 311 (2008) 
(reporting on the  FDIC announcement that 
it will sponsor a Forum aimed at encouraging 
Mortgage Lending for Low- and Moderate-
Income (LMI) Households on July 8, 
2008). “The purpose of  the LMI Mortgage 
Forum is to explore a framework for LMI 
mortgage lending in the future, including 
identifying market and regulatory incentives 
for encouraging responsible LMI mortgage 
lending. The Census Bureau reports that 
the national homeownership rate was about 
68 percent as of  the first quarter 2008. 
However, the homeownership rate is only 
about 51 percent for those households with 
below median incomes. Moreover, data 
from the Federal Reserve’s 2004 Survey 
of  Consumer Finances, the latest income 
stratification information available, show 
that for households with incomes in the 
bottom fifth of  all earners, homeownership 
rates are far lower - about 40 percent.  ‘I 
remain deeply concerned that disruptions 
in mortgage credit availability and in the 
secondary market will make it even more 
difficult for households of  modest means 
to realize the benefits of  owning their own 
homes,’ said FDIC Chairman Sheila C 
Bair. ‘Particularly in this environment of  
tightening lending standards, government 
must remain focused on the right incentives 
to promote responsible and sustainable 
mortgage lending. I look forward to a wide-
ranging and constructive dialogue on the 
issues facing LMI borrowers and identifying 
recommendations on strategies that will 
benefit consumers, lenders, investors, and 
the economy.’”).
162  Gilmore et al., supra note 4, at 266 (stating 
“ Former President Bill Clinton attempted 
to address homeownership during his time 
in office through a homeownership policy 
initiative. At the time of  drafting the initiative 
later labeled Urban Policy Brief  #2, the 
homeownership rate for White Americans 
was approximately 70% while the rate for 
African Americans was 43%.  By any measure, 
this was a significant gap between the races 
with respect to homeownership.  It existed 
well after most of  the nation’s segregation 
laws had been repealed, which suggests 
that the difference in homeownership 
rates between whites and blacks was a 
complex issue that lacked an easy solution. 
The Clinton initiative, while directed at all 
Americans, did have a positive effect on the 
homeownership rates of  African Americans 
and Latinos. One study from the Brookings 
Institution shaped the homeownership
landscape during the Clinton years, and 
provided evidence that homeownership rates 
among African Americans and Latinos were 
improving significantly: Over the past decade, 
the gap between rates of  homeownership
has narrowed, due in part to an increasing 
number of  mortgage loans to low-income, 
minority households. According to a recent 
report from the Brookings Institution, 
mortgage lending increased by 98 percent 
for African American homebuyers and by 
125 percent for Hispanic homebuyers during 
THE MODERN AMERICAN44
the 1990s. Rising rates of  homeownership
among minorities represent a positive step 
toward closing the wealth gap between 
whites and other groups.”).
163 See Aleo, supra note 14, at 11 (“Villain 
Phil writing on behalf  of  the editors at the 
National Review, in a more measured tone, 
claimed that “bankers cannot blame CRA 
entirely; they made a lot of  bad bets on rising 
home prices. But the CRA did influence 
lending standards across the banking industry, 
even in those institutions that are not strictly 
liable to its jurisdiction. The subprime 
debacle is in no trivial part the result of  
lending decisions in which political extortion 
trumped businesses’ normal bottom-line 
concerns.” The conservative critiques of  
the CRA were met with stern rebukes 
from liberal commentators. The President 
of  the National Urban League called on 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson “to refute 
statements by conservative politicians and 
pundits that subprime mortgages provided 
to minorities led to the financial crisis and 
a $700 billion federal rescue of  Wall Street,” 
calling such allegations a “big lie.” Daniel 
Gross responded, “Let me get this straight. 
Investment banks and insurance companies 
run by centimillionaires blow up, and it’s 
the fault of  Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and 
poor minorities?” Gross blamed the crisis on 
“stupid, reckless lending, of  which Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac and the subprime 
lenders were an integral part.” As he saw 
it, “Investment banks created a demand for 
subprime loans because they saw it as a new 
asset class that they could dominate. They 
made subprime loans for the same reason 
they made other loans: They could get paid 
for making the loans, for turning them into 
securities, and for trading them--frequently 
using borrowed capital.”).
164 Leigh, supra note 164, at 3.   
165 Id.
166 See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-
Cost Sweetener For Lemons, 74 WASH U L Q 
1061, 1062 (1996) (stating that securitization 
has existed since the 1970s). Kathleen C. 
Engel & Patricia A.  McCoy, Turning A 
Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of  Predatory 
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2046-
47 (2007) (explaining that securitization is a 
method of  bundling a group of  loans that 
are sliced into pieces called tranches.  Each 
slice is rated by the rating agencies.  Tranches 
are securities that are backed by a pool of  
cash-producing assets).  
167 Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory 
Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 
2198 (2007) (describing GSE as including 
Federal National Mortgage Association 
(FNMA, commonly referred to as Fannie 
Mae), Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA commonly referred 
to as Ginnie Mae), and Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (commonly referred 
to as Freddie Mac)).  
168 Id. at 2199.
169 Id. at 2200.
170 Id.  
171 Nomi Prins, The Risk Fallacy, FORTUNE, 
Oct. 27, 2008, available at http://money.
cnn.com/2008/10/27/ magazines/fortune/
riskfallacy_prins.fortune/index.htm.
172 Thomas O. Porter, II, The Federal Reserve’s 
Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of  the Federal 
Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 483, 486-89 (2009) (where author 
generally contextualizes the housing collapse 
by chronicling the dual role of  the market to 
make money and to do by exercising some 
prudence).   
173 Id.  
174 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, 
Jr., The Promise and Perils of  Credit Derivatives, 
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 n.1 (2007) 
(citing Warren Buffett, Letter to Berkshire 
Hathaway Shareholders, and explaining that 
derivative are either highly praised or darkly 
critiqued by commentators).
175 Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of  Private 
Ordering and the Financial Crisis of  2008, 5 N. 
Y. U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 583 (2009).
176 Id. (“[T]he default swap transfers the risk 
of  default of  a reference entity . . . from one 
party to another. The buyer of  the default 
swap makes periodic payments to the seller 
of  the contract. In the event of  a default 
by the reference entity bond, the seller of  
the swap is obliged to stand in the shoes of  
the reference entity and make payment of  
the notional principal to the buyer of  the 
swap.”).
177 See José Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: 
Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit 
Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 506 (2009) (in 
1990, three U.S. Economists shared the 
Nobel prize for their work on the theory 
of  financial economics; Merton Miller, 
Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe); see 
also Americans Win Nobel for Economics, 
BBCNEWS, Oct. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/business/7045067.stm (noting 
that the theory the three 2007 prize winners 
developed “allows us to distinguish situations 
in which markets work well from those in 
which they do not.”).
178 See Merton Miller & Franco Modigliani, 
Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of  Capital, 
53 AM. ECON. REV. 433 (1963). Merton Miller 
and Franco Modigliani, The Cost of  Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of  
Investment, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) 
(The theorem is called the capital structure 
irrelevance principle because it holds that, in 
the absence of  taxes, bankruptcy costs, and 
asymmetric information and in an efficient 
market, the value of  a company is unaffected 
by how that company is financed.  The theory 
finds that whether the company is financed 
by equity or debt is irrelevant as is its policy 
of  profit distribution.).    
179 See MERTON H. MILLER, UNIV. OF
CHICAGO GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 
DO WE REALLY NEED MORE REGULATION
OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES? 10 available 
at https://www.chicagogsb.edu/faculty/
selectedpapers/sp75.pdf  (stating that a 
bank’s swaps and derivates book is managed 
to control interest-rate risk).
180 See Mark Whitehouse, How a Formula Ignited 
Market that Burned Some Big Investors, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 12, 2005, available at http://math.
bu.edu/people/murad/MarkWhitehouseSli
cesofRisk.txt (noting that the model “helped 
to estimate what return investors in certain 
credit derivates should demand, how much 
they have at risk and what strategies they 
should employ to minimize that risk.”).
181 Robert Block & Nir Kossovsky, IP Transfer 
And Pricing Considerations For Financial 
Service Firms, PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT., Feb. 
2006 , at 1 (“A credit default swap (“CDS”) is 
a credit derivative that provides a buyer (often 
the owner of  underlying bonds) protection 
against specific risks. Common risks include 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, debt restructuring, 
acceleration or repudiation. Building blocks 
of  the product include complex risk pooling 
techniques and risk correlation calculations. 
The cornerstone insight is said to be the 
application of  the Gaussian Copula to 
correlation calculations, but each major 
player in the market refines this method with 
its own proprietary systems.”).
182 Id. (“[S]pecialists now believe that CDS 
markets process new market information 
more efficiently than bond markets and thus 
set superior pricing signals. Impending credit 
downgrades will be reflected in CDS price 
movements before they are reflected in the 
underlying assets. It is the industry consensus 
that innovation leadership in CDS products 
and proprietary modeling is squarely centered 
in London.”).  
183 INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS
AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 37 
(2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf  (explaining 
the difficulty of  developing a clear picture of  
which institutions ultimately hold the credit 
risk transferred and quantifying the amount 
of  risk transferred). 
184 Commodity Futures Modernization Act 
of  2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000) (passed by the House and Senate 
without debate and signed by President 
William Clinton less than a week later); see 
Andrew M. Kulpa, Minimal Deterrence: 
The Market Impact, Legal Fallout, and 
Impending Regulation of  Credit Default 
Swaps, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 293, 297  (2009) 
(“The CFMA specifically prevents state and 
local laws from regulating gaming contracts 
FALL 2010 45
and bucket shops in the context of  CDS 
agreements.” “[C]ongress also expressly 
excluded CDS agreements from regulation 
under the Securities Act of  1933  and the 
Securities Exchange Act of  1934. This was 
another specific carve out by the CFMA 
that actually expanded the definition of  a 
“security” under the 1933 and 1934 Acts but 
explicitly excluded CDS agreements.”). 
185 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2007) (The short 
sale refers to “any sale of  a security which 
the seller does not own or any sale which is 
consummated by the delivery of  a security 
borrowed by, or for the account of, the 
seller.”).  
186 James W. Christian, Robert Shapiro & 
John-Paul Whalen, Naked Short Selling: How 
Exposed are Investors?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 
1033,1041-42 (2006) (describing a traditional 
short sale).  
187 SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444, 457 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Occupational Urgent Care 
Health Sys. v. Sutro & Co., 711 F. Supp. 1016, 
1025 (E.D. Cal. 1989). 
188 Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry 
Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis 
of  the Uptick Rule and its Role in View of  the 
October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL
L. REV. 799, 799 (1989).
189 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1) (2000).
190 David C. Worley, The Regulation of  Short 
Sales: The Long and Short of  it, 55 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1255, 1256 (1990).
191 Michael Sloan, Investment Bank Regulation 
and the Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 52, 59 (2008) (comparing the standard 
equity to debt ratios with the SEC allowed 
for investment banks);
Bethany McLean, Ratings Agencies Under Fire, 
CNN MONEY.COM, Aug. 21, 2007, http://
money.cnn.com/2007/08/20/magazines/
fortune/ratings_agencies.fortune/index.
htm (attributing the boom to out-of-date 
regulations, lax federal oversight, and the 
complicity of  the three rating agencies).  See, 
e.g., Credit Rating Agencies Come Under 
Fire, FOX BUSINESS, Oct. 22, 2008, http://
www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/
credit-rating-agencies-come/# (stating that 
“inflated rating awarded to securities backed 
subprime loans led investors to buy them 
in enormous numbers. But now, most of  
these securities have been downgraded and 
the market for them has largely evaporated, 
contributing to the current crisis.”).
192 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of  2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(creating the Troubled Assets Relief  Program 
(TARP) and signed into law by President 
George W. Bush on October 3, 2008).    
201  Professor Frank Partnoy, University of  
San Diego College of  Law, former derivatives 
broker and corporate securities attorney 
and Steve Kroft Oct. 5, 2008, 60 Minutes, 
A Look At Wall Street’s Shadow Market, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/
10/05/60minutes/main4502454_page4.
shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
193 See 60 Minutes, supra note 151 (discussing 
the failures in judgment and otherwise that 
led to the collapse of  the world financial 
markets).
194 Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, 
The Law and Economics of  Subprime Lending, 80 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009).  
195 See Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus 
Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear 
Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 
1508 (1998) (labeling Partnoy’s positions on 
derivatives as foolhardy). 
196 See Bank Credit Default Swaps (CDS), 
IBANKNET, Notional Amounts, www.
ibanknet.com/scripts/callreports/fiList.
aspx?type=bankcds (reporting that Chase 
is burdened with a $1 billion dollar CDS 
exposure in the failure of  the Chicago 
Tribune).
197 Government Widens Support for Home 
Loans, Credit (PBS television broadcast 
Nov. 25, 2008) (transcript available at http://
www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-
dec08/fedrole_25.html) (reporting that 
the $800 billion federal funds are aimed at 
jump-starting mortgage lending, continuing 
housing correction, and increasing consumer 
spending by buying up $600 billion in debt). 
198 See Kulpa, supra note 192, at 297 (referring 
to the law prohibiting regulation of  CDSs).
199 See, e.g., Abby Cooper, Note, $1 Per Lot for 
Affordable Housing in Detroit: Non-Monetary 
Benefits Can Constitute Fair Value in the Sale 
of  City-Owned Surplus Property to Community 
Development Corporations, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 
1191, 1220 (2002) (providing a proposal for 
addressing housing affordability by using a 
Detroit, Michigan case model).
200 Dan Nnamdi Mbulu, Affordable Housing: 
How Effective are Existing Federal Laws in 
Addressing the Housing Needs of  Lower Income 
Families, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 387, 410 (2000) (explaining the LIHTC 
program).  
201 Clark, supra note 36, at 186-87.  
202 Id.
203 Jean Hocker, Land Trusts: Key Elements in the 
Struggle Against Sprawl, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 244, 244 (2001).  
204 Id. at 245.
205 Jeanne Goldie Gura, Preserving Affordable 
Homeownership Opportunities in Rapidly Escalating 
Real Estate Markets, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 
& CMTY. DEV. L. 78, 83(2001).  
206 Hocker, supra note 212, at 246-47 (noting 
land trusts are commonly private non-profit 
corporations but can also be established as 
public non-profit corporations). 
207 Gura, supra note 214, at 83; see Itzchak E. 
Kornfeld, Conserving Natural Resources and Open 
Spaces: A Primer on Individual Giving Options, 23 
ENVTL. L. 185, 206-07 (1993) (stating that 
a land trust may be organized to preserve 
“unique natural lands and the diversity of  
wildlife” in fee simple).
208  Duncan M. Greene, Dynamic Conservation 
Easements: Facing the Problem of  Perpetuity in 
Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 
886-87 (2005).  
209 Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly, 
CLTS: A Growing Trend in Affordable Home 
Ownership, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. 
DEV. L. 367, 377 (2008) (discussing for 
example, retaining housing affordability by 
minimizing exposure to property tax increases 
by virtue of  the ground lease. The author 
states “A CLT maintains the affordability of  
the housing on its land through its ground 
lease.”).   
210 Benjamin W. Lund, Payment of  Taxes and 
Available Exceptions, NATIONAL BUSINESS
INSTITUTE, 02V7511 NBI-CLE 167 (2004).  
211 See Curtin, supra note 218, at 377 (noting 
that A CLT can balance the competing goals 
of  affordability and wealth building in its 
resale formula).
212 See generally id. (stating the different 
resale formulas one can use, which favors 
affordability).
213 John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, 
Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification 
and the K.O. of  Impoverished Urban Dwellers 
of  Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 464 (2003) 
(providing examples of  development that 
has had a profound impact on the valuation 
of  existing homes. “Traditional working 
class communities close to the city center 
(for example, Lake View, Wicker Park) are 
experiencing rapid gentrification.  Census 
tracts which have had a high percentage of  
vacant housing, high poverty rates, and high 
percentages of  black or Hispanic households, 
experienced higher home appreciation than 
other locations in the 1990s. ‘New, expensive 
housing is being built’ and ‘concentrations of  
poverty [are] going farther west, southwest 
and to the inner ring of  suburbs.’” And 
concluding that when viewed through the 
lenses of  race, class, space and time, the 
benefits of  gentrification appear to outweigh 
the costs as increased values results in 
pushing out lower income people).  
214 Lawrence K. Kolodney, Eviction Free Zones: The 
Economics of  Legal Bricolage in the Fight Against 
Displacement, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 507, 512 
(1991) (“[A]s a neighborhood gentrifies, real 
estate speculation may increase the value of  
all units, thereby driving up property taxes, 
a cost likely to be passed on to existing 
tenants.”).  
215 Powell, supra note 222, at 447.  
216 J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 
46 HOW. L.J. 405, 426 (2003) (“Low-income 
homeowners can be more easily protected 
against being forced to sell prematurely 
by devices that do not distort the basic 
functioning of  the market. Such homeowners 
THE MODERN AMERICAN46
may both be harassed by rising costs and 
enjoy the benefit of  a rapidly appreciating 
asset—their home. To some extent, their 
problem is not poverty, but the illiquidity of  
assets.”).  
217 Melvyn R. Durchslag, Property Tax 
Abatement for Low Income Housing:  An Idea 
Whose Time May Never Arrive, 30 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 367, 377 (1993) (citing Stanley S. Surrey, 
Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing 
Government Policy: A Comparison with 
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. 
L. REV. 705 (1970)).  
218 David Burke, The Stop Tax-Exempt Arena 
Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEGIS 149, 150 (1997) 
(noting that “[i]n 1968, Congress restricted 
the tax subsidy to capital facilities which 
benefit the general public.”).  
219 Id. (reporting that partial tax exemptions 
would include fixed dollar exemptions that 
would exempt a specific amount of  the value 
of  a residence from taxation.  An example is 
an exemption for the first $20,000 of  value. 
Such an exemption grants proportionately 
more relief  to property assessed at a lower 
value while encouraging residency by higher 
income families to the area.  Another form 
of  this exemption is a percentage–based 
exemption where a percentage of  the 
property value is exempt from taxation).
220 Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New 
Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program and the Flaws 
of  Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757,
766 (2008) (finding that “tax abatements 
encourage housing production by ‘providing 
a declining exemption on the new value that 
is created’ by the development.”).
221 Id.
222 See Durchslag, supra note 226, at 373-74 
(challenging the success of  tax abatement 
programs for housing redevelopment because 
it lacks economic incentive and explaining 
that encouraging adequate investment in the 
affordable housing industry is a problem on 
both the private and public levels, because of  
the low profit margins).
223 See David Philip Cohen, Improving the Supply 
of  Affordable Housing: The Role of  the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 J.L. & POL’Y 537, 
537 (1998) (recognizing that the purpose 
of  the Tax Reform Act was to enable the 
development of  affordable housing).  
224 See, e.g., Megan J. Ballard, Profiting from 
Poverty: The Competition Between For-Profit and 
Non-Profit Developers for Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 211, 212 (2003) 
(arguing in effect that the Tax Reform Act 
creates an unfair advantage to for-profit 
entities to benefit from government subsidy 
to the detriment of  nonprofit entities).  
225 See Allison D. Christians, Breaking the 
Subsidy Cycle: A Proposal for Affordable Housing, 
32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 131, 147 (1999) 
(stating that the purpose of  the tax credit is 
to “encourage the development of  affordable 
housing.”). Kenya Covington & Rodney 
Harrell, supra note 79, at 108 (2007); see also
Peter W. Salsich Jr., Expanding the Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit: Raising the Cap and Targeting 
Homeownership, 9 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & 
CMTY. DEV. L. 28, 28 (1999) (“[E]xpansion 
of  the LIHTC is the main hope for increasing 
rental and homeownership opportunities for 
low-income families.”).  
226 Salsich, supra note 234, at 30.
227 George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s 
Right for California Redevelopment Law, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1001 (2001).  
228 Gary P. Winter, Tax Increment Financing: A 
Potential Redevelopment Financing Mechanism For 
New York Municipalities, 18 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 
655, 658 (1991).   
229 Fred Galves, The Discriminatory Impact of  
Traditional Lending Criteria: An Economic and 
Moral Critique, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467, 
1475-76 (1999).
230 Christians, supra note 234, at 136.
231 Id. at 136-37. 
232 Id. at 136.  
233 JOE MATTEY & NANCY WALLACE, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, HOUSING
PRICES AND THE INSTABILITY OF MORTGAGE
PREPAYMENT MODELS: EVIDENCE FROM
CALIFORNIA  1 (1998), http://www.sf.frb.
org/ econrsrch/workingp/wp98-05.pdf.
234 Id. 
235 William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred 
Years of  Ineptitude: The Need For Mortgage Rules 
Consonant with the Economic and Physiological 
Dynamics of  the Home Sale Loan Transaction,
70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1156 (1984); see also
Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property 
Values Entrenched in Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1051, 1059 (1998) (considering the 
effect of  segregation on the marketability of  
property in African American neighborhoods 
and its effect on wealth building.)  
236 See Christians, supra note 234, at 139.  
237 Steven R. Berg, Observations from a Legal 
Services Lawyer, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 67, 68 (1993).
238 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, STATE & COUNTY ESTIMATES OF
LOW LITERACY, http://nces.ed.gov/naal/
estimates/Approach.aspx 1 (2003) (finding 
that 14 percent of  American adults scored 
“below basic” literacy, meaning that they 
could not perform simple, everyday tasks 
that required reading or writing. The report 
projected that an estimated 30 million 
American adults possessed no more than 
the most rudimentary literacy skills); see 
Pierre Thomas, Jack Date, Clayton Sandell 
& Theresa Cook, Living in the Shadows: 
Illiteracy in America, ABC NEWS, Feb. 
25, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/
LegalCenter/story?id=4336421&page=1 
(reporting that one 2008 study found that 
7 million Americans are illiterate, 27 million 
are unable to read well enough to complete a 
job application and 30 million cannot read a 
simple sentence).  
239 James A. Gross, A Human Rights Perspective 
on U.S. Education: Only Some Children Matter, 
50 CATH. U. L. REV. 919, 920-21 (2001), 
(citing ELI GINZBERG & DOUGLAS BRAY, THE
UNEDUCATED 12 (1953)). Mildred Wigfall 
Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational 
Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483, 496 (1998) 
(stating that “[f]ocusing on illiteracy as mere 
access to education arguably is not only 
simplistic, it is misleading. Minimal education 
– i.e., mere access – passes constitutional 
muster as enough to combat illiteracy. 
However, minimal education is not enough 
in today’s world. Instead, contemporary 
societal effort must assure all children of  an 
adequate education; the effort must be to 
provide the resources necessary to achieve 
functional literacy.”).
240 See Greg J. Duncan & Anita Zuberi, 
Mobility Lessons from Gautreaux and Moving to 
Opportunity, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 110, 111-
112 (2006) (comparing the dramatic results 
of  the early Gautreaux family studies with 
less attractive later results and discussing 
various reasons for the different results).   
FALL 2010 47
FUTILE ARGUMENTS:
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS AND THE SUPREME COURT BAR
By: Heron Greenesmith 1
I. Introduction
 I am a third year law student, 
gearing up to face a bleak legal job 
market, a bleaker economy, and almost 
two hundred thousand dollars in student 
debt.2  I entered law school from the 
Peace Corps with a clear goal: to be an 
advocate for gender and sexual minorities 
through public policy, legislative drafting, 
or appellate litigation.3  Now to make 
that dream come true.  Passion? Check. 
Knowledge? Check.  Partnership in a 
D.C. law firm specializing in appellate 
and Supreme Court litigation?  Not yet.  
 Last semester, my penultimate, 
I took a seminar on the Supreme Court 
taught by long time Supreme Court 
journalist Stephen Wermiel.  The course 
broadly covered several controversial 
aspects of  the Supreme Court, one of  
which was the rise of  the professional, 
specialized Supreme Court bar.  Our 
class discussions led me to wonder 
how appellate attorney Paul Smith, an 
appellate attorney at Jenner and Block, 
got the privilege of  arguing Lawrence v. 
Texas4 in the Supreme Court instead of  
the lawyers at Lambda Legal.  Mr. Smith 
seemed to be a very kind, passionate 
individual when he visited our class, but 
Mitchell Katine, along with Lambda 
Legal lawyers Ruth Harlow and Suzanne 
Goldberg, had carried the case from 
trial.  I was sure that there was a story 
behind Mr. Smith getting to argue in the 
Supreme Court rather than Mr. Katine, 
Ms. Harlow, or Ms. Goldberg, and I 
wanted to hear it.  Would the theme of  
the story be the rise of  the Supreme 
Court bar: D.C.’s repeat players who have 
over ten arguments under each of  their 
belts and whose names Supreme Court 
buffs whisper in reverence?
 The elite Supreme Court 
bar rises as another hurdle, another 
inequity standing between me (and by 
proxy all passionate advocates) and 
the chance to argue a case before the 
Supreme Court.  As a future public 
interest lawyer, it is hard to describe my 
feelings: a mixture of  jealousy, respect, 
frustration, resignation.  As an advocate 
for a particular community, I know that I 
do not want to work in general appellate 
litigation, waiting around for the case of  
my dreams to come to me.  I am also 
aware that dozens of  years often pass 
before appellate litigators and successful 
advocates are offered the chance to argue 
in the Supreme Court.  I hope to spend 
those years of  my life as Ruth Harlow and 
Suzanne Goldberg from Lambda Legal 
spent theirs, working on a cause about 
which they were passionate, creating 
legal strategies, building reputations, 
writing, researching, arguing, being cool. 
But if  after all that, Paul Smith was given 
the opportunity to argue Lawrence v. 
Texas in the Supreme Court instead of  
Ruth Harlow, what chance have I?  This 
paper explores the impact that the elite 
Supreme Court bar may have on the 
chance that non-specialized lawyers will 
be given the opportunity to advocate for 
their clients and causes in the Supreme 
Court.  
II. The Supreme Court Bar
 The current consensus in the 
literature and among Supreme Court 
litigators themselves is that hiring 
specialized appellate counsel is generally 
a good thing.  Michelle Lore wrote an 
excellent article for The Minnesota Lawyer
in 2007, detailing all the reasons a trial 
lawyer should hand off  an appeal to 
an appellate specialist.5  Among other 
advantages, she points out the specialized 
skill set, familiarity with appellate judges, 
and the objectivity that new appellate 
counsel can bring to a case.6  She also 
notes the prestige that attaches to 
specialized counsel, recognizing that 
clients view appellate work as “a distinct 
service.”7
 These clients may be correct in 
their view.  According to Kevin McGuire 
and Joseph Swanson, specialized 
appellate counsel achieve much higher 
rates of  being granted certiorari (also 
known as “cert,” or review on appeal) 
in the Supreme Court and possibly 
reach higher rates of  winning cases.  In 
his article, Repeat Players, Mr. McGuire 
examined the lawyers in all Supreme 
Court cases between 1977 to 1982 to 
determine that “lawyers who litigate 
in the high court more frequently than 
their opponents will prevail substantially 
more often.”8  Kevin McGuire proposes 
that the more an attorney appears before 
the Court, the higher the likelihood of  
his9 success.10    Joseph Swanson takes 
a micro look at the certiorari process by 
examining three particular members of  
the Supreme Court bar in three particular 
cases, but arrives at a conclusion 
similar to Mr. McGuire’s: “One can 
only conclude that hiring experienced 
Supreme Court counsel to petition the 
Justices for review may improve one’s 
chances considerably.”11   
 One consequence of  the rise 
of  the elite Supreme Court bar is that 
judges may expect something different, 
if  not better, of  the parties appearing 
before them than they have in the 
past.  According to Jennifer S. Carroll, 
appellate judges expect a different level 
of  legal argumentation than trial judges.12
The “emotional pleas” considered the 
norm at the trial level, she says, would be 
“inappropriate at the appellate level.”13
In fact, she argues that “[a]pellate practice 
has evolved into a specialized area of  the 
law, and justifiably so.  The fundamentals 
of  appellate advocacy—writing a simple 
persuasive brief, making an effective oral 
argument, and having a command of  the 
appellate procedure—necessarily reflect 
effort, skill, and at the highest level, 
art.”14
 Even the Supreme Court agrees. 
The American Bar Association Journal
interviewed15 Justice Antonin Scalia 
and Bryan A. Garner about their co-
authored book Making Your Case: The Art 
of  Persuading Judges.16  The book instructs 
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appellate lawyers of  at all levels on how 
best to write briefs, argue cases, and, 
ultimately, convince judges.  When the 
Journal asked Justice Scalia his thoughts 
on the rise of  the Supreme Court bar, 
the Justice said: 
I think that there are a 
significantly larger number 
of  lawyers who appear 
at least once a term and 
sometimes several times a 
term than when I first came 
on the court . . . . I think I 
can say that those who do it 
with great frequency and are 
paid a lot of  money to do 
it because they are good at 
it are obviously going to be 
better—other things being 
equal—than a novice.17
 A litigator approaching her first 
argument in the Supreme Court may 
rightfully worry that this presumed level 
of  competence creates an ethical duty 
to hire specialized appellate counsel. 
Christine Macey compares the benefits 
of  increased chances of  being granted 
certiorari, more effective oral arguments, 
and the affordability of  appellate 
specialists to the “novice lawyer’s” 
obligations to educate her client and 
provide competent representation.18
Ms. Macey concludes that “although 
statistics show that experience matters 
at the High Court,” inexperienced 
attorneys may fulfill their ethical duties by 
comprehensively educating their clients 
and preparing adequately for trial.19
Moot courts, Supreme Court clinics, 
brief  writing assistance, and online and 
print resources (including those co-
authored by Justices themselves) are 
all resources attorneys may use to help 
them prepare.20  
Ms. Macey also discusses reasons 
that attorneys may prefer to not pass on 
their cases to appellate attorneys.
“A lawyer may want to keep [a] 
case for legitimate reasons, such as 
client trust or superior knowledge 
of  the facts. Alternatively, a 
lawyer may wish to keep [a] case 
for self-interested reasons.  A 
Supreme Court argument is a 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity 
for most attorneys.  It could 
lead to television or newspaper 
coverage, as well as future 
business.  Supreme Court 
advocacy is associated with 
prestige. . . . Legal fees may also 
motivate to keep the case to 
herself.”21 
Some of  these reasons may also be related 
to a lawyer’s connection with and passion 
for the particular cause implicated in the 
case.  The lawyers involved in Lawrence 
v. Texas exemplify the way in which the 
rise of  the Supreme Court bar can affect 
who argues which cases.  To explore 
the rise of  the Supreme Court bar, and 
specifically the role of  Lawrence v. Texas
and impact litigation, in the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
movement, I interviewed Paul Smith and 
Mitchell Katine and corresponded briefly 
with Suzanne Goldberg over email.  
III. Interview with Mitchell Katine 
 Mitchell Katine is a founding 
partner at Katine and Nechman, LLP., 
a general practice firm in Houston, 
Texas that advertises its connection to 
the LGBT community.  The main goal 
of  my interview was to pinpoint Mr. 
Katine’s role in Lawrence and his feelings 
about his role and the oral arguments.22  
 Mr. Katine provided some 
context by describing the time preceding 
the case and how he and Lambda Legal 
got involved.  He graduated from law 
school in 1985, a year before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,23
upholding the constitutionality of  the 
Georgia law that criminalized homosexual 
sodomy.  When Mr. Katine started 
practicing law in Houston, he was one of  
few openly gay lawyers in a state hostile 
to the gay community.  When LGBT 
people called him with problems related 
to their sexual orientation, there was not 
much he could legally do since Texas 
had a statute criminalizing sodomy.  Mr. 
Katine instead focused his practice on 
fighting HIV/AIDS, particularly since 
the Americans with Disabilities Act was 
being refined to prevent discrimination 
on the basis of  HIV status.  Mr. Katine 
developed his reputation as an activist 
through his work with HIV/AIDS, and it 
is through this work that he met Suzanne 
Goldberg of  Lambda Legal. 
 Soon after John Lawrence and 
Tyrone Garner were arrested, their case 
was “leaked” to gay and lesbian activists 
who knew Mr. Katine through his 
work with the HIV/AIDS community. 
Mr. Katine agreed to help with the 
initial criminal hearings.  At the time, 
he specialized in employment law, real 
estate, and HIV discrimination but had 
never handled a criminal or constitutional 
law case.  Still, he realized that this was a 
crucial case and that he did not have the 
knowledge or experience to handle it.  He 
contacted Suzanne Goldberg at Lambda 
Legal for assistance and asked about the 
possibility of  Lambda’s involvement. 
Fortuitously enough, Lambda was 
meeting that day to talk about new cases, 
so Ms. Goldberg asked him to fax her 
the papers.
 Ms. Goldberg agreed to help. 
She first explained how the relationship 
between Lambda and Mr. Katine would 
function: because none of  Lambda’s 
constitutional lawyers were licensed in 
Texas, Mr. Katine would play the crucial 
role of  local counsel.  At a fundamental 
level, Mr. Katine was lead counsel and 
Lambda constituted co-counsel.  Mr. 
Katine handled the local lawyers, the 
media, and the defendants, Lawrence and 
Garner.  When the case landed on front 
pages around the country, many lawyers 
wanted to be involved.  Lambda, Mr. 
Katine, and these other lawyers worked 
together.  Lambda would call Mr. Katine 
with local procedural questions, he would 
call one of  these lawyers who knew 
criminal law or local procedure to ask 
them the question, and then Mr. Katine 
would forward the answer to Lambda so 
that it could properly draft the response 
or brief  and proceed with the case. 
 Mr. Katine often found himself  
in awe of  the brilliant lawyers at Lambda, 
and, even though he always considered 
Lawrence his case, Mr Katine says he has 
never thought that he could or should 
have handled that case by himself.  He 
was not qualified to, but he appreciated 
Lambda’s inclusion of  him throughout 
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the case.  Mr. Katine understood that his 
role was local while Lambda’s role was 
more national, and he believes that he 
never behaved in a way that showed he 
felt threatened or wanted to challenge 
Lambda’s leadership, even though 
Lambda pretty much took over the case 
immediately.24  
 I asked Mr. Katine about Paul 
Smith.  Mr. Katine’s first thought was 
that Mr. Smith was a gracious, kind 
person, and he knows that Mr. Smith 
appreciated him.25  Lambda made the 
decision to have Mr. Smith argue the 
case because of  his experience—he 
knew the Court, and the Court knew 
that he was an openly gay lawyer—but 
Mr. Katine hopes that people who 
are in more influential positions can 
emulate Mr. Smith’s appreciation of  
the people on the ground.  Mr. Smith 
could have said “this is my case to get 
to the Supreme Court” and could have 
mishandled it, but he did not do that. 
Mr. Katine hopes that lawyers will keep 
their feet on the ground and recognize 
that their reputation depends upon their 
relationships with other lawyers who 
do not have the opportunity to argue 
the cases on which they work.  Mitchell 
Katine, Paul Smith, and Lambda Legal 
continue to help each other when they 
can, and those ties benefit everyone.  
IV. Interview with Paul Smith
 I asked for Paul Smith’s opinion, 
as a repeat player, on being asked to 
argue Lawrence after so many lawyers had 
worked so hard to bring the case to the 
Supreme Court.26  Mr. Smith emphasized 
that Jenner and Block did not take over 
this case.  First, Lambda made the 
decision to take on specialized counsel 
when Lawrence reached the Supreme 
Court.  Mr. Smith acknowledged that 
Lambda’s decision was probably partly 
based on the elite Supreme Court bar’s 
25-year effort to emphasize the need for 
specialized counsel and partly based on 
the significance of  this case.  Lambda 
was worried about it even being safe to 
bring Lawrence to the Court in the first 
place since the Court did (and does) 
not have a record of  being pro-LGBT 
rights. Lambda chose Jenner because of  
its connections and because of  the large 
number of  LGBT lawyers working at the 
firm.  Mr. Smith was not the sole reason 
that Jenner was retained as counsel.  
 A second example Mr. Smith 
used to demonstrate that Jenner and 
Block did not take over the case was that 
Ruth Harlow wrote half  of  the brief  
and helped enormously in getting amici 
to sign on.  Going into oral arguments, 
it was actually still assumed that Ms. 
Harlow would speak to the Court. 
When the Supreme Court granted 
cert, the question of  who would argue 
finally arose, and Ms. Harlow decided 
not to make her rookie Supreme Court 
argument in this case.  She had to talk 
Lambda into agreeing with her.  The 
compromise was that she and Lambda 
would get as much billing in the case as 
Jenner and Block—Ms. Harlow would 
stand with Mr. Smith in all conferences 
and give as many quotes as he would. 
She does not have any regrets about 
this decision, and Mr. Smith has tried to 
repay Lambda for allowing him to do the 
arguments by securing recognition for 
Lambda’s efforts and serving as co-chair 
on its board of  directors.  
 I asked Mr. Smith about the 
accuracy of  Mr. Katine’s assumption 
that Lambda hired Mr. Smith because 
he is gay and because the Court knew 
at the time that he is gay.  Mr. Smith 
said that the Court was not then aware 
of  his sexual orientation.  It was more 
important that the LGBT community 
knew he was gay and wanted someone 
from the community to do the arguments. 
In contrast, during the arguments in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, Laurence Tribe 
made a slightly distasteful comment 
about the “embarrassing details” of  
homosexuality.27   The statement may 
have been a deliberate acknowledgement 
of  the Justices’ discomfort with 
homosexuality, but it did not sit well 
with those in the LGBT community for 
whom he was advocating.  Lambda was 
aware that the LGBT community would 
not want a repeat of  that situation.  As a 
gay man, Mr. Smith felt the direct import 
of  the case, but he also says that he 
would feel the same even if  he were not 
gay.
 Mr. Smith believes that the rise 
of  the elite Supreme Court bar has largely 
helped more than hindered advocacy 
groups.  The quality of  oral arguments 
has improved substantially since he was a 
clerk at the Court in 1980, partly because 
of  the rise of  this specialized bar, but 
also because of  mooting sessions, better 
preparation, and the Supreme Court 
Clinic at Georgetown University, for 
example.  Mr. Smith thinks that specialists 
are necessary, and are especially valuable 
because they are able to put a case in the 
context of  the Court’s jurisprudence.  
 Still, Mr. Smith thinks that Ms. 
Harlow could have won the argument 
as well.  Mr. Smith and Lambda felt 
they won the case as soon as the Court 
granted cert, and he could not think of  
any particular element of  his argument 
that won it for him.  It was less about 
convincing the Court and more about a 
presence.  There was a “sense of  history 
in the room.”  
 Mr. Smith also notes that there 
was a deliberate effort to keep Mr. 
Katine involved, and Mr. Katine did 
receive a lot of  credit in Houston for 
the case.  There are always lawyers who 
litigate cases before appellate lawyers 
argue them.  Attorneys at all stages of  
the litigation have to get used to it. There 
is a certain awkwardness that comes 
from adding lawyers to cases at the last 
minute, but new and old attorneys must 
be integrated. 
V. Suzanne Goldberg and 
Ruth Harlow
I asked for Ms. Goldberg’s 
view of  Mr. Katine’s role in the 
litigation, as well as her own feelings 
about the Supreme Court arguments.28  
Ms. Goldberg agreed with Mr. Katine 
that his role relative to Lambda’s was 
very delineated.  Mr. Katine was local 
liaison, and Lambda contributed the 
constitutional and LGBT law expertise. 
Ms. Goldberg found it “terrific to have 
Mitchell as a colleague on the case as he 
provided important insight into the local 
environment as well as many colleagues 
through his law firm who had criminal 
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law and related expertise that was very 
useful for the litigation.”  Ms. Goldberg 
does not regret leaving Lambda in the 
midst of  Lawrence.  Indeed, she is “very, 
very happy with the ultimate outcome.” 
Regarding her feelings about the decision 
to let Paul Smith give the oral arguments, 
as opposed to Ruth Harlow or herself, 
she recognizes that “[t]he decision was 
made by Lambda’s lawyers . . . on the 
view that Paul Smith would be the ideal 
advocate for the issues raised by the case, 
and he did a terrific job!”
VI.  Analysis
 The interviews reveal a 
contradiction.  Mr. Smith, Mr. Katine, 
and Ms. Goldberg all agree that Lambda’s 
decision to hire Jenner and Block, and 
Paul Smith in particular, was strategic. 
At the same time, Mr. Smith concedes 
that the case appeared to be won when 
the Court granted cert and that Ms. 
Harlow could probably have argued the 
case without fear of  losing.  Ms. Harlow 
may have had many reasons for choosing 
not to argue Lawrence, but what are the 
longer-term impacts of  having Mr. Smith 
argue the case?  Several implications 
come to mind. 
 First, a favorable Supreme Court 
ruling in such a high-profile case as 
Lawrence solidifies Paul Smith’s excellent 
reputation as a member of  the Supreme 
Court bar and lifts Jenner and Block’s 
reputation as a whole.  Second, Lawrence
only serves to further convince novice 
lawyers, advocacy groups, and clients that 
it might be risky to enter the Supreme 
Court without specialized counsel.  As 
Mr. Smith said, “There had been a 25-
year conscious effort made on the part 
of  the ‘Supreme Court bar’ to convince 
people that they needed special counsel. 
Lambda’s decision was particularly 
natural because of  the importance of  
this case.”    
 Finally, Lawrence, and other cases 
like it, may scare novice lawyers29 from 
ever arguing in the Supreme Court at all, 
especially if  they do not work at firms 
that specialize in Supreme Court practice. 
“Refusing to allow first-time advocates 
to argue before the Court,” warns Ms. 
Macey, “would be counterproductive in 
the long run; even the most experienced 
Supreme Court advocates had a first 
Supreme Court case.”30
 So, is the rise of  the Supreme 
Court bar good or bad for appellate 
advocates?  Does it help win cases or does 
the hype exceed the value and prevent 
the truly passionate from arguing cases? 
Is the Supreme Court itself  cultivating 
the growth of  the specialized bar to the 
detriment of  the advocate?  
 Ruth Harlow is not Kevin 
McGuire’s “typical Supreme Court 
lawyer.”  Paul Smith, perhaps aside from 
his sexuality, is.  Mr. Smith’s qualifications 
to argue Lawrence arise from his appellate 
work at Jenner and Block.  Ms. Harlow’s 
qualifications arise from being the 
legal director of  an organization with 
incredibly extensive appellate work on 
the exact issue that was argued in the 
Court.  So was Paul Smith’s comparatively 
narrow skill-set worth the decision to 
have him argue the case?  If  so, how do 
advocates like Ms. Harlow ever reach 
the Supreme Court?  Litigation strategy 
certainly must take into consideration 
the abilities and experience of  the 
attorneys involved, but it must also take 
into consideration the needs and desires 
of  the interest group.  The Lawrence
team made considerable sacrifices to 
ensure that the LGBT movement was 
best served by the outcome of  the case, 
and their decisions were informed by 
the presence and importance of  the elite 
Supreme Court bar.  
 One may extend the analogy 
in Lawrence by arguing that Supreme 
Court specialists should control impact 
litigation from the trial level upward. 
Although most appellate lawyers are 
not also trial lawyers, a few exceptions 
exist.  Indeed, two such lawyers recently 
brought an action in a Federal District 
Court, challenging California’s ban on 
same-sex marriage.  
VII. Looking forward to 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger31
The litigation strategy of  the 
LGBT movement recently came under 
close scrutiny when veteran appellate 
lawyers David Boies and Ted Olson 
decided to initiate a federal suit against 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger.  
 Litigation strategy involves 
calculation and compromise.  Mr. Katine, 
Ms. Goldberg, Ms. Harlow, and Lambda 
Legal all made sacrifices by deciding to 
ask Mr. Smith to argue Lawrence v. Texas
to the Supreme Court.  Mr. Boies and 
Mr. Olson, by bringing the case at the 
trial level, are effectively preempting 
those difficult decisions.  Because they 
are accomplished appellate lawyers 
who have argued multiple cases in the 
Supreme Court, they have the luxury of  
being able to follow the case through 
every step of  the appeals process.  But 
many prominent LGBT groups fear that 
Mr. Boies and Mr. Olson do not value 
the needs and desires of  the LGBT 
community as much as the Lawrence team 
took such pains to.  When Mr. Boies and 
Mr. Olson first filed the challenge to 
“Proposition 8,” these groups protested 
the move, worrying that a potential loss 
in the Supreme Court would prove more 
detrimental to LGBT rights than no 
ruling at all.  
[N]ot everyone is thrilled with 
the decision of  Boies and Olson 
to pretty much go it alone right 
now on a federal suit -- and 
that includes the ACLU, the 
National Center for Lesbian 
Rights and Lambda Legal. The 
Boies-Olson team has been 
jostling with attorneys of  these 
and other groups that have 
been pursuing LGBT rights 
litigation for many years, on a 
piecemeal basis in the states. 
They wonder how committed 
the two are to the victory and 
note that Boies and Olson 
have next to nothing to lose -
- except some bragging rights -
- if  they fail. Gays and lesbians, 
however, have everything to 
lose if  the Supreme Court rules 
against marriage equality.32
After their initial reluctance, the American 
Civil Liberties Union, the National 
Center for Lesbian Rights, and Lambda 
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Legal all filed to intervene in the case. Mr. 
Boies and Mr. Olson refused to let them 
intervene, and the judge agreed.  Chad 
Griffin, the president of  the American 
Foundation for Equal Rights (“AFER”),33 
wrote a letter to the groups detailing 
the decision to prevent them from 
intervening: “You have unrelentingly 
and unequivocally acted to undermine 
this case even before it was filed. In light 
of  this, it is inconceivable that you would 
zealously and effectively litigate this case 
if  you were successful in intervening. 
Therefore, we will vigorously oppose 
any motion to intervene.”34  This overt 
decision to shut-out the participation of  
the major LGBT groups was a strong 
statement that AFER believes that it can 
win the case through the strength of  its 
lawyers and legal argument, not through 
the strength of  coalition or movement 
building.  
 Perhaps AFER’s decision 
was based purely on Mr. Olson’s and 
Mr. Boies’ success as members of  the 
Supreme Court bar.  Or perhaps it 
was an informed, accurate decision, 
calculated to bring the lawyers’ skills 
and influence to a case likely to face 
both liberal and conservative judges. 
But no matter what the outcome of  
the case, AFER’s independent work 
may undermine the litigation strategies 
that the LGBT groups have spent so 
much time cultivating.   By reinforcing 
the importance of  the Supreme Court 
bar in impact litigation, Perry could 
unnecessarily deter inexperienced 
lawyers, such as Ruth Harlow, from 
risking their inaugural arguments on a 
case of  such importance. 
 Perhaps it is not a surprise that 
Mr. Boies and Mr. Olson embody Kevin 
McGuire’s “typical Supreme Court 
lawyer.”  As this type of  lawyer continues 
to be successful in the Supreme Court 
in a wide variety of  cases, clients will 
continue to turn towards the specialized 
bar.  What does that say to an ever 
diversifying pool of  upcoming lawyers? 
What does it say to the lawyers who are 
not that “typical” lawyer?  Is it a signal to 
give up hope of  arguing in front of  our 
nation’s highest court?  What does it say 
to advocacy groups?  Is it a sign that the 
groups need lawyers like Mr. Boies, Mr. 
Olson, and Mr. Smith in order to win? 
Or is it a signal that the system needs to 
change?
VIII. Conclusion
 Creating a successful strategy for 
impact litigation requires considerable 
sacrifice and selfless assessment of  all 
factors.  As the relative importance 
of  the Supreme Court bar grows, 
advocacy groups will continue to rely 
on outside counsel to argue in front of  
the Supreme Court.  Lawrence v. Texas
and Perry v. Schwarzenegger represent two 
manifestations of  this reliance.   In 
Lawrence, Lambda made the difficult 
decision to ask Paul Smith, someone 
invested in the LGBT community as well 
as experienced in the Court, to make the 
arguments.   In Perry, the elite lawyers 
have had control of  the case from 
the beginning.   In our conversation, 
Mr. Katine expressed his hope “that 
through [the] interview, people who are 
in the more influential positions can 
emulate Paul Smith by appreciating the 
people on the ground.”  In Lawrence, 
this appreciation was shown through 
including Mr. Katine in all levels of  the 
litigation and in the decisions to give 
Lambda equal booking with Mr. Smith 
at the Supreme Court level.  By bringing 
a case themselves and by preventing the 
advocacy groups from signing on, the 
lawyers at the American Foundation for 
Equal Rights are precluding collaboration 
and appreciation.  
 The outcome Perry and its 
subsequent impact on LGBT advocacy 
groups remain to be seen.  I sincerely 
hope that Perry v. Schwarzenegger does not 
herald an era in which elite lawyers gain 
control of  advocacy groups’ litigation 
strategies.  As always in impact litigation, 
a balance must be struck between the 
individual clients’ needs, the needs of  the 
movement, the needs of  the advocacy 
organizations, and the needs of  the 
lawyers.  I hope that the balance is found 
and maintained.  
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BOOK REVIEW & ESSAY:
LET’S GET FREE
By: Camille Jones 1
INTRODUCTION
Paul Butler’s recent book, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop 
Theory of  Justice,2 is a powerful exploration into the conditions 
surrounding today’s criminal justice system.  Butler, a law 
professor, former prosecutor, and black man who has 
personally encountered the criminal system, offers a unique 
perspective about American crime and punishment.  He has 
seen the good, the bad, and the ugly of  the criminal system, 
and he provides valuable insight into its flaws. Let’s Get Free
is inspired by the burgeoning hip hop political movement—a 
movement fed by hip hop music’s criminal justice critiques and 
reality-driven perspectives on the legal system as a whole. The 
book provides a refreshing narrative that critically explores 
America’s obsession with extreme punishments for its most 
disadvantaged people.   
A RUN-IN WITH INJUSTICE
Butler begins by explaining his personal encounter with 
the criminal system which resulted from an escalated dispute 
with a neighbor.  He found himself  an accused criminal after 
a volatile neighbor, who claimed to have legal ownership over 
his parking space, called the police during a heated argument. 
This experience demonstrates why Butler is the ideal person to 
de-construct the state of  the so-called criminal justice system 
because he has personally witnessed multiple sides of  the 
system. He has represented the State when attempting to prove 
a person’s guilt and he has also had his own freedom imperiled 
by the State. Combining Butler’s explanation of  how he carried 
himself  at trial as a black prosecutor with his description of  
how he felt in the police cruiser as another anonymous (alleged) 
black criminal, creates a fascinating tension and contributes to 
the nuanced tone that is carried throughout the book.
Let’s Get Free is essentially divided into two sections. 
The first part contains his interpretation of  some of  the major 
issues within the criminal justice system.  In the second part, 
he offers recommendations on how to fix these problems. 
Butler discusses several important issues, including mass 
incarceration, harsh criminalization of  drug offenders, juror 
and prosecutor ethics, controversies surrounding government 
informants or “snitches,” and finally the influence of  hip-hop 
on society’s impression of  convicts.  Butler then explores the 
ways in which the criminal system can become more productive 
and contribute to a safer country.  
One major issue Butler examines is the effect of  mass 
incarceration on society. America’s “lock em up” mentality 
has put 7.3 million Americans on probation, in jail, in prison, 
or on parole as of  2008.3 Incarceration is such a pervasive 
phenomenon that there is mass overcrowding in prisons, which 
leads to more traumatized, formerly incarcerated people once 
they are released.4 The “lock ‘em up” mentality thrusts people 
who commit non-violent crimes into prison, leaves them with 
fewer options once released, and thus increases the likelihood 
of  recidivism. This is just one of  Butler’s many examples of  
how the current system is counter-productive.
Another major issue Butler discusses is the impact of  
draconian drug laws on marginalized communities. He argues 
that non-violent drug penalties are disproportionate to the 
crimes committed and that they do not achieve the goals for 
which they were created.  This chapter, generally speaking, 
debunks myths about the criminalization of  certain drugs. 
Particularly, he argues for less harsh penalties for non-violent 
drug offenses involving personal drug use. Although this 
line of  argument is familiar to criminal justice advocates, its 
importance to a hip-hop theory of  justice is indispensible, and 
strikes at the heart of  the contradictions within our criminal 
system.  
The book’s final chapters examine certain groups’ 
influence on America’s justice outlook. Butler looks at a wide 
range of  actors from government informants, sometimes called 
“snitches,” to celebrities.  Butler discusses the impact of  these 
actors on trials, sentencing, and the overall opinion society 
forms of  people who serve time. Butler’s contribution, perhaps, 
is the hip-hop theory of  justice, which is a critical legal analysis 
of  how hip hop’s critiques of  the criminal justice system are 
instructive for society at-large.  Butler delves into how rappers 
have supported those currently in jail and challenged the view 
that those who have been to jail are “bad” people. This analysis 
explores how the justice system could change in the future 
based on an evolved perception of  criminals and how they 
should be treated by society once released to the outside.
The second part of  Let’s Get Free offers solutions to the 
book’s critiques. Butler discusses how alternative sentencing 
would help rehabilitate people within the criminal system and 
ultimately, create safer communities. He examines the use of  
monitoring technology for certain non-violent convicts to 
allow them to return to their homes and communities. Such a 
reform would reduce recidivism for certain crimes, especially 
non-violent drug crimes.  Most significantly, however, Butler 
proposes seven specific ways in which justice can better be 
served within the United States from cradle to crave: reducing 
the amount of  lead ingested by poor communities, paying 
students to complete high school, ending racial profiling, 
sending convicts to their communities rather than jail for certain 
crimes, imposing punishments that are more proportional to 
crimes (especially non-violent crimes), encouraging citizens’ 
involvement in local justice reform, and reducing the prison 
population by half  a million people. Butler contends that if  
these changes are made in the United States, they will ultimately 
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lead to a safer and more productive society.
CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
Jury nullification, for which Butler is a long-time 
advocate, is one issue that warrants discussion in greater detail. 
Jury nullification provides citizens with the opportunity to tell 
a prosecutor and the federal government that they are opposed 
to  criminal statute with which the defendant is charged. 
Motivations vary from a person’s disapproval of  the particular 
law at issue to a disagreement with the punishment that will 
be handed down to the defendant.  Butler argues that jury 
nullification should be exercised in cases involving non-violent 
drug crimes because the punishment does not serve any of  
the parties involved.  While the State is successful at locking 
up more drug users, society does not benefit more people 
from going to jail.  Incapacitation does not prevent recidivism. 
However, if  the defendant were acquitted despite the evidence 
Butler suggests that it is likely that the experience of  being on 
trial would be enough to keep them from committing the same 
crime again.  In this way, jury nullifcation may be an effective 
recidivism deterrent. However, for jurors to exercise their right 
to jury nullification they must be aware of  it.
Many people view jury duty as a nuisance that forces 
them to be away from work, loved ones, or other things that 
they feel are more important. However, many of  these people 
do not realize the power that they possess when serving on a 
jury. Even though lawyers argue to the best of  their ability to 
prove a person’s guilt or non-guilt, in the end, the power lies in 
the hands of  the jury. Each juror must examine the evidence 
and instructions provided on one hand. On the other, each 
juror also reserves the constitutional right to decide acquit 
despite the evidence.  This is the essence of  jury nullification. 
Jury nullification is:
Jury nullification is rooted in the Sixth Amendment 
right for an accused person to be judged by a jury of  peers6  and 
has a long history in America.  It was supported by many of  
the Founding Fathers as falling within their democratic vision 
of  justice, though in recent times it has reached somewhat of  
an impasse.7 John Adams stated that “it is not only his (juror’s) 
right, but his duty . . . to find the verdict according to his own 
best understanding, judgment and conscience, though in direct 
opposition to the direction of  the court.”8  However, this right 
is not always communicated to citizens.  Although courts have 
ruled that jury nullification is allowed, judges do not have to 
tell juries about it.9
 General verdict standards support jury nullification, 
this is because jurors are not required to explain how a verdict 
was reached, and they can decide guilt based on any reason. 10
Jury nullification is strongly polarizing, with a small number who 
see both its pros and cons.11   Supporters view jury nullification 
as a safety valve—a way in which citizens may express their 
opinion about a law particularly if  they feel estranged from 
the law-making process.12  Critics see it as a means by which a 
jury takes on the role of  the judge and legislature.13  Although 
Butler promotes increased use of  jury nullification, his position 
best falls into this middle category. Those in this category 
see jury nullification as a practice that should be used only in 
extreme situations and recognize that it can create efficiency 
and justice problems within a fundamentally fair system if  
used too often.14 Butler, therefore, supports jury nullification 
in very limited circumstances.
Butler supports jury nullification in criminal cases that 
involve non-violent drug offenses because neither the State nor 
defendant benefit from mass incarceration. John Jay, the first 
Chief  Justice of  the Supreme Court, found great importance in 
the public’s right to judge laws. In Georgia v. Brailsford, he wrote, 
“juries have the right to take upon themselves to judge both 
the law as well as the facts.”15  If  society agrees with Butler’s 
opinion that non-violent drug crimes do not deserve jail time, 
then jury nullification would be in direct agreement with both 
John Adams and John Jay who are influential figures in the 
formation of  the American legal system. 
Jury nullification has met court opposition throughout 
history. A number of  rulings have upheld the jury’s right to 
nullify a decision. However, none of  these rulings obligate 
courts to instruct jurors about nullification.  In an 1895 
Supreme Court case, Sparf  v. United States, the Court held that 
judges are not required to inform jurors of  their de facto right 
of  juror nullification, although jurors’ inherent right to judge 
the law remains undisturbed.16 This standard was recently 
upheld in United States v. Moylan (1971)17 and United States v. 
Dougherty (1972).18  In Moylan, the Court clearly states its belief  
that a jury may acquit despite evidence proving guilt:
contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must 
exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict 
in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the 
minds of  the jurors to find the basis upon which 
they judge. If  the jury feels that the law under 
which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that 
exigent circumstances justified the actions of  the 
accused, or for any reason which appeals to their 
logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, 
and the courts must abide by that decision.19
a jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of  
the evidence or refusal to apply the law either 
because the jury wants to send a message about 
some social issue that is larger than the case itself  
or because the result dictated by law to the jury’s 
sense of  justice, morality, or fairness.5
 Butler argues that citizens should exercise this 
constitutional right more often. The greatest obstacle to jury 
nullification is that the public is generally unaware of  it. In 
some situations, juries exercise this power without being aware 
that they have actually done so.  Popular television shows 
have given this issue visibility with story lines centered on an 
underdog who wins a case purely because the jury reached a 
decision outside the scope of  the legal definition of  the alleged 
crime. Though viewers cheer for the underdog, they remain 
unaware of  the power that they hold to do exactly what they 
are seeing—they have to right to choose not to convict despite 
the evidence if  they disagree with the law.
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed 
power of  the jury to acquit, even if  its verdict 
is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and 
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contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must 
exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict 
in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the 
minds of  the jurors to find the basis upon which 
they judge. If  the jury feels that the law under 
which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that 
exigent circumstances justified the actions of  the 
accused, or for any reason which appeals to their 
logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, 
and the courts must abide by that decision.19
CONCLUSION
An educated citizenry is an integral part of  a successful 
democracy and legal system.  Defendants need to be aware of  
their rights. However, jurors must also be aware of  their right 
to determine the validity of  the law and the manner in which it 
is applied.  Jury nullification is one example of  how an educated 
citizenry may stand in opposition to the government and send 
a message to law-makers that the people do not support the 
current laws.  By accessing information about jury nullification, 
individuals put themselves in powerful positions. This is very 
important in minority communities because it delivers the 
message to law-makers that laws that are unfairly applied to 
certain racial or class groups will not be tolerated.  In a letter 
to Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson said, “I consider trial by 
jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a 
Government can be held to the principles of  its constitution.”22
Jury nullification is a perfect example of  how people can hold 
law-makers to the Constitution.
Let’s Get Free is a thought-provoking book that forces 
the reader to examine controversial, and sometimes little-
known issues in the criminal system. Jury nullification is only 
one issue that is examined in Butler’s book but it is among the 
more eye opening ones. Let’s Get Free should be read by any 
person involved in the criminal system. Regardless of  whether 
or not the reader agrees with Butler’s positions, Let’s Get Free
will force readers to critically examine the system’s current state. 
This book provides vital information for people as informed 
citizens, too. To hold the legislature accountable for protecting 
the Peoples’ constitutional rights, the People must know what 
their rights are in the first place.
1 Camille Jones is a second-year student at American University 
Washington College of  Law.
2 PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE (2009).
3 Office of  Justice, Bureau of  Justice Statistics, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (last visited April 7, 2010).
4 COMM’N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS,  PUBLIC
HEARING ON OVERCROWDING IN PRISONS (2005) available at http://
www.prisoncommission.org/statements/haney_craig.pdf  (citing 
written testimony of  Craig Haney, Professor of  Psychology at 
California University Santa Cruz). 
5 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
6 Case Comment, Jury Nullification – Federal Court Dismisses Juror 
Refusing to Apply Law as Instructed: United States v. Luisi, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 990, 996 (2009).
7 Id.
8 John Adams’ Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771) re-printed in THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS at 2, 3, 255 (Charles Francis Adams ed., AMS Press 
1971) (1850). 
9 Sparf  v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
10 Richard Myers, Requiring a Jury Vote of  Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 137, 165 (2009).
11 Id. 
12 Id.
13 Id. 
14 Myers, supra note 9, at 165.
15 3 U.S. 1, 4 (1794).
16 156 U.S. at 51.
17 417 F. 2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969)..
18 473 F. 2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
19 Moylan, 417 F. 2d at 1006.  
20 See BUTLER, supra note 2 at 65-66.
21 Fully Informed Jury Association, A One Hour/Week Project 
to Preserve Liberty, fija.org/download/116/ (last visited March 
13, 2010) (documenting instances when jurors were denied jury 
nullification materials). 
22 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789) 
available at http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1520.
htm.
Endnotes
We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed 
power of  the jury to acquit, even if  its verdict 
is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and 
Today, jury nullification is also an issue that polarizes 
judges. Some judges have elected to explicitly instruct juries 
that they may convict if  the evidence supports that decision, 
not that they must convict.20  However, in other instances, 
judges have refused to include information that informs jurors 
about jury nullification.21  While the rhetoric seems minimal, it 
delivers a very different call to action for jurors. Judges should 
at least more clearly inform jurors about their constitutional 
right to nullify.
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The “Elite Factory” is a self-reflective political critique of  the legal profession’s inability to create genuine access to 
the greater public with legal needs. This critique argues that the insular school-to-practice pipeline reinforces elitist 
values that rationalize unequal access, and that these values are systemically embedded in legal education and existing 
delivery models.
The American Bar Association reports that the average amount borrowed for a private law school education increased 
from $83,181 in 2005 to $91,506 in 2008. Some of  the Modern American Executive Board members will spend up 
to $177,000 for a three-year Juris Doctor degree. This type of  debt proves debilitating to most students, and forces 
graduates to make tremendously hard personal choices about their professional lives.
Law is a $300 billion per year industry. Although 45 million Americans qualify for civil legal aid, there are only 4,000 
lawyers in this field. Among the population that qualifies for legal aid, half  will have a legal need each year, which goes 
largely unmet. An estimated 90% of  lawyers serve 10% of  the total population. This means that lawyers are available 
but because of  the profession’s service delivery structure, America’s most well-off  are saturated with legal access, 
while most of  us strain to afford an attorney if  we can do so at all.
Why? There are a number of  reasons, including wealth inequities that allow a small number of  people to finance legal 
education without monstrous debt, an education funnel effect which reserves admissions to America’s best educated, 
a homogenous legal community, perverse economic incentives based on a skewed delivery system, and systemic class 
and racial inequality that perpetuate self-important rationalizations about why the system is the way it is.
How do we transform the elite factory system? Is this professional model sustainable for a twenty-first century 
environment that demands transparency, accountability, fairness, and justice? Should we turn away from legal solutions 
altogether? 
As a follow-up to our successful spring 2010 symposium, TMA is seeking short essays (12 single-spaced pages or 
fewer) and legal commentary about the ways in which lawyers are creating access and dismantling barriers to access. 
We invite creative and non-traditional pieces from practitioners, scholars, and students who are critically thinking and 
addressing this issue.
TMA will accept papers on a rolling-basis with a September 15, 2010. Submissions should be single-spaced in 
Garamond font typeface with one-inch margins and endnote citations. 
Only e-mail submissions will be accepted at tma@wcl.american.edu.
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CONFLATING HEALTH CARE REFORM WITH TORT REFORM
By: Steven M. Pavsner 1
The recent health care reform act encourages the States to develop 
alternatives to the traditional tort system for health claims to control health 
costs. Many alternatives have already been tried in the States, but none 
have succeeded, except in impairing access to the courts to redress medical 
negligence, particularly among disadvantaged groups. 
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the 
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” into law.2 
Turning aside years of  effort to blame rising health care costs 
on “lawsuit abuse” and to impose federal restrictions on state-
law tort claims as the solution, the Act instead calls on the 
States to seek alternatives to the traditional tort system for 
health care claims. This commentary looks at alternatives the 
States already have tried. It finds that none these alternatives 
have achieved their stated objectives, and all of  them have had 
a disparate impact on the most vulnerable among us.  
Specifically, the Act encourages the States to “develop 
and test alternatives to the existing civil litigation system as 
a way of  improving patient safety, reducing medical errors, 
encouraging the efficient resolution of  disputes, increasing 
the availability of  prompt and fair resolution of  disputes, 
and improving access to liability insurance, while preserving an 
individual’s right to seek redress in court….”3  Toward that end, the 
Act authorizes the Secretary of  the Department of  Health and 
Human Services to award “demonstration grants” to States 
“for the development, implementation, and evaluation of  
alternatives to current tort litigation for resolving disputes over 
injuries allegedly caused by health care providers or health care 
organizations.”4  
The nexus between health care and tort reform is the 
alleged relationship between health care costs and a supposed 
increase in the incidence or size of  health claim verdicts.  The 
presumed mechanism for health care cost reduction (thus 
limiting medical negligence lawsuits) is the lowering medical 
liability damage payments. This would 
supposedly allow insurers to lower 
medical liability insurance premiums, 
which would reduce physicians’ costs of  
doing business, and allow them to reduce 
their service fees.  
Unfortunately overlooked is the 
fact that no convincing evidence exists 
to support the alleged relationship between health care costs 
and health care claims. Studies can be found to support the 
relationship, but the better-reasoned and methodologically 
superior studies are to the contrary.  In the “crisis” atmosphere 
created by tort reform proponents, it is easier to decry outsize 
verdicts than to review the studies. But anecdotal reports of  
outsize verdicts are irrelevant, in part because they are so rare 
and in part because they are rarely paid.  The traditional tort 
system has numerous safeguards against outlying verdicts, 
including remittitur, new trial, and appeal, which are commonly 
invoked to reduce outsize awards to appropriate levels.  It is 
therefore not surprising that numerous studies have shown 
that neither the incidence of  medical negligence suits, nor the 
size of  plaintiffs’ verdicts, has significantly increased during 
the “insurance crisis,” much less at the pace with which liability 
premiums have risen.  
Nor have premiums decreased in States that have 
adopted “tort reform,” as compared to States that have not. 
To the contrary, insurers in States with tort reform have raised 
rates higher and faster than insurers in States without tort 
reform. The simple reason is that factors other than medical 
negligence verdicts drive premiums. Numerous studies 
demonstrate that liability insurance premiums are driven by 
insurers’ returns on the premium dollars they invest in the 
market, not by losses on the premium dollars they pay in 
claims.  But it’s easier for insurers to blame “litigious plaintiffs” 
and “greedy lawyers” than their own portfolio managers.   And 
why not take the easy path?  If  some members of  the public 
believe that their doctors are being driven out of  business by 
“lawsuit abuse,” they will carry that bias into the jury room 
and return defendants’ verdicts.  If  some legislators rely on the 
misinformation and enact limits on medical negligence claims, 
the insurance industry wins again.  
More than half  the States have experimented with 
a wide variety of  alternatives to the traditional tort system, 
relying on the presumed relationship between health costs and 
health claims. Existing alternatives include changes to when 
claimants may sue, hoops they must jump through before they 
may sue, what they may recover when they sue, from whom 
they may recover if  they win their suit, and what they pay for 
the chance to sue.    
Restrictions on when health claims may be brought 
include shortening limitations in general, limiting the “discovery 
rule,” or requiring minors’ claims to 
be brought before they reach majority. 
Hurdles to filing in court include 
requiring prior notice to the defendant, 
submission of  the claim to mediation or 
arbitration before filing, or preparation 
of  certificates and reports from doctors 
willing to testify against their peers as a 
precondition to filing in court.  
Once in court, some States restrict the amount of  
forensic work expert witnesses may perform, but the most 
popular alternatives to traditional tort law are limits on the 
amount or type of  damages that the injured party can recover. 
These include a cap on all damages, or a cap on non-economic 
damages (sometimes indexed to inflation or time and sometimes 
not), a bar to punitive damages (usually by raising the standard 
of  proof  to “actual malice”), requiring that amounts awarded 
The nexus between health care and 
tort reform is the alleged relation-
ship between heath care costs and a 
supposed increase in the incidence or 
size of  health claim verdicts.
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for future damages be paid out over time as the future damages 
are incurred, and precluding proof  of  economic losses paid 
by a collateral source, such as a health insurance policy.  Juries 
generally are not told of  these limits, which are imposed in 
post-trial proceedings and can decimate the amount the jury 
intended the victim to receive.  States also have experimented 
with abolition of  the common law concept of  joint and several 
liability, and have instead required juries to apportion damages 
according to fault.  In such States, when substantial fault is 
assigned to an impecunious or under-insured defendant, the 
injured party recovers less than the full jury-awarded damages. 
Other changes have been made to the traditional tort 
system that affect an injured party’s ability to bring a lawsuit 
in the first place, such as the reduction of  the contingent 
fee claimants’ counsel may charge for their services or the 
requirement that the injured party to pay defense fees if  the 
suit is lost.  Reducing plaintiff ’s counsel’s fees reduces access 
to the courts because as the reward for winning decreases, 
willingness to incur the risk of  loss also decreases, especially in 
health claims cases, which are particularly expensive and time-
consuming to pursue.  The abrogation of  the “American Rule,” 
which does not require losing plaintiffs 
to pay defendants’ attorneys’ fees, in 
favor of  “offer of  judgment” rules, 
which impose the winner’s attorneys’ 
fees on the loser, deter plaintiffs from 
filing  meritorious claims and raise the stakes much higher for 
prospective plaintiffs.   Insurers are far more able to bear this 
risk than individual plaintiffs, for whom loss of  the claim can 
mean financial ruin.     
Of  course, many States employ different combinations 
of  these individual strategies to create their own unique variety 
of  “tort reform,” so there is no shortage of  “alternatives to 
current tort litigation for resolving disputes over injuries 
allegedly caused by health care providers or health care 
organizations.”  What is lacking, and what the demonstration 
projects authorized by the Act should focus on finding, is any 
alternative to the traditional tort system that reduces liability 
insurance premiums while preserving an individual’s access to 
the courts and spreading the burden of  tort reform equally 
among all litigants.  
None of  the many changes enacted in the States have 
reduced liability insurance premiums, except at the cost of  
also impairing the individual’s right to seek redress in court. 
This is particularly true of  children, seniors, racial and ethnic 
minorities, the economically underprivileged, and women. 
These already disadvantaged groups are disproportionately 
impacted by tort reform for a number of  reasons, including 
their lower earnings and the nature of  the injuries they suffer. 
Lost earnings can be a significant component of  a 
claimant’s economic damages, and under virtually all of  the 
existing changes they are fully compensated.  Victims whose 
losses do not include earnings, or include them at a lesser level, 
may be equally compensated by juries, but their awards will 
have a greater non-economic component, which will then be 
reduced to the cap level.  As a result, groups with no earnings, 
such as seniors, or historically lower earnings, such as racial and 
ethnic minorities and women, receive less of  their jury awards 
than others.  The disparity is only exacerbated by reliance on 
historical race- and gender-based statistics to measure the 
loss.     
The nature of  the injuries suffered by these same groups 
also contributes to the disproportionate impact of  tort reform 
upon them.  Injuries resulting from obstetric or gynecologic 
care are common in medical negligence litigation, but the 
resulting verdicts for undiagnosed breast cancer or infertility 
or other peculiarly “female” damages are often expressed in 
larger non-economic than economic awards, and thus are not 
fully recovered in “cap” States.  The same is true of  a child 
who has to go through life scarred or maimed or of  a senior 
who is abused in a nursing home.  Infertility, disfigurement, 
scarring, blindness, burns, loss of  a limb and chronic pain are 
some of  the many devastating injuries that cause enormous 
pain and suffering are properly recognized by an award of  
non-economic damages, and thus are not fully compensated 
under most tort reform regimes.  Indeed, in many such 
cases, the prospect of  receiving a lower 
percentage of  a reduced award obtained 
in a more expensive process has led 
victims and their attorneys to conclude 
that otherwise meritorious claims are not 
economically viable.  Wherever the economic component of  
the loss is relatively small, but the non-economic component 
is great, current tort reform measures heap injustice on top of  
injury.  
When victims are not fairly compensated, and 
vulnerable groups are disproportionately impacted, the whole 
system of  justice suffers.  A vibrant tort system is a founding 
principle of  our democracy, a deterrent to negligence, and 
an early warning of  recurring problems in our society.  The 
traditional tort system has its flaws, but, to paraphrase Winston 
Churchill, it’s far better than any of  the alternatives yet 
devised.  
Endnotes
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By: Cheryl Chado 
S. 1102: “Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations 
Act of  2009”
 The Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations 
Act of  2009 (“DPBO”) provides that federal employees and 
their domestic partners will be entitled to the same benefits 
and obligations as married federal employees and their 
spouses, regardless of  the gender of  the parties.1  The Act 
defines a domestic partner as “an adult unmarried person 
living with another adult unmarried person of  the same sex in 
a committed, intimate relationship,” and requires employees 
to file a certificate of  eligibility as to their relationship.2  
Through this Act, domestic partners will be able to receive 
health insurance, retirement and disability benefits and plans, 
emergency and medical leave, and any other benefit provided 
by the federal government to any employee.3
 The DPBO reflects the sentiments of  many 
Americans who support the inclusion of  same sex couples 
in health insurance coverage benefits.4  This opinion is also 
felt by over fifty percent of  Fortune 500 companies who also 
provide benefits to domestic partners of  their employees.5  
As Joe Solmonese, president of  the Human Rights Campaign, 
said, “This legislation would allow the federal government to 
keep pace with other top employers.”6  By allowing the same 
benefits as private employers, the federal government will be 
able to continue to have “access to the top talent on the same 
basis as the nation’s leading corporations.”7
 However, not everyone is a fan of  the Act’s goals.  
The Family Research Council points out the increased cost 
to taxpayers, estimating nearly a billion dollars required for 
funding.8  
 Further, critics in favor of  lesbian and gay equality 
point out the Act’s failure to address “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” 
by excluding military service members from those federal 
employees eligible for coverage.9
 Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) introduced the 
Act in the Senate on May 20, 2009 with twenty-seven co-
sponsors.  The Act was discussed in a hearing of  the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
on October 15, 2009. It was ordered to be reported with 
an amendment in the nature of  a substitute favorably in 
December, 2009.  Representative Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) 
introduces H.R. 2517 in the House on May 20, 2009 with 
one hundred and forty co-sponsors.  As of  January 29, 2010, 
the Act was placed on the Union Calendar, No. 239, in the 
House.
H.Res. 194: “Supporting the Goals of  International 
Women’s Day”
 International Women’s Day (“IWD”) is a day of  
global celebration that falls on March 8 of  every year.  The 
first Women’s Day was first celebrated in 1911 in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland, and was attended by 
more than one million people advocating for women’s rights 
and an end to employment discrimination.10  IWD has greatly 
expanded in prominence over the past century. It is now 
recognized as an official holiday in approximately fifteen 
countries.11
 International Women’s Day has achieved the same 
popularity and status as Mother’s Day in a number of  
countries,12 but it has not yet reached that level of  recognition 
in the United States.  Representative Janice Schakowsky (D-
IL) and forty-six co-sponsors have introduced this Resolution 
to the House in an effort to support IWD, citing staggering 
statistics of  gender disparity across the world.13  The 
Resolution explains that, although there are now many more 
women in powerful leadership positions across the world, 
“women still face political and economic obstacles, struggles 
for basic rights, face the threat of  discrimination, and are 
targets of  violence all over the world.”14  Other disparities 
include the fact that women account for a majority of  people 
affected by poverty, illiteracy, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence 
and abuse.15
 This Resolution is a solid effort by the House of  
Representatives not only to support and recognize the 
goals of  International Women’s Day but also to “issue a 
proclamation calling upon the people of  the United States 
to observe International Women’s Day with appropriate 
programs and activities.”16
S. 752: “Fair Election Now Act”
 The Fair Election Now Act outlines a public funding 
system for Senate elections and establishes provisions for 
contribution requirements and joint fundraising committees.17 
The Act would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of  1971 (FECA) by creating a Fair Elections Fund and 
a Fair Elections Oversight Board.18  The Act would set 
additional requirements for campaign financing, including 
a public debate requirement, political advertising vouchers, 
and the prohibition of  joint fundraising committees outside 
of  the candidate’s official committee.19  Essentially, the Act 
would “allow federal candidates to choose to run for office 
without relying on large contributions, big money bundlers, 
or donations from lobbyists.”20  Candidates would then “be 
freed from the constant fundraising” and better able to focus 
on what their communities want.21
 Supporters of  the Act have described it as promoting 
“a Congress that is more responsive to the voters, less 
busy chasing dollars and less reliant on special interests.”22  
Commentators have also said that publicly financed political 
campaigns “are the answer,” and that they will open doors 
for a greater number of  candidates and allow for “more 
competitive races and … campaigns focusing on the concerns 
of  individual voters, not special interests.”23
 The Fair Election Now Act was introduced by 
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) on March 31, 2009 and 
referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.24  
An act of  the same name was introduced in the House by 
Representative John Larson (D-CT) on the same day and was 
discussed in the House Energy and Commerce Committee in 
July 2009.25
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”
 The National Defense Authorization Act of  1994 
contains a section entitled, “Policy concerning homosexuality 
in the Armed Forces.”26  The “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 
policy, as it is more commonly known, has been the widely 
discussed subject of  debate since its enactment.  The Act 
begins by stating that there is no constitutional right to serve 
in the military, and it is up to the discretion of  Congress 
to determine who may or may not serve.27  The Act briefly 
discusses the requirements for members to achieve success 
as a military unit, including “high morale, good order and 
discipline, and unit cohesion.”28  The Act further states that, 
since the “presence … in the armed forces of  persons who 
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual 
acts would create an unacceptable risk,” those individuals 
must be excluded from the military service.29
 Since the Act was passed, numerous retired generals 
and military personnel have come forward to argue that 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” should be repealed.30  Senator Carl 
Levin (D-MI), chair of  the Armed Services Committee, has 
said that this issue is not a priority for many lawmakers.31  
The argument has also been made that, with troops fighting 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps now is not the time to 
reintroduce this highly controversial debate.32  Representative 
Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) has supported the repeal for the past 
few years and has sponsored legislation in the House, but also 
acknowledges that a change of  this nature will inevitably take 
time.33
 Senator Roland Burris (D-IL) has compared “Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell” to racial integration of  the military under 
President Truman’s administration, saying, “At one time … 
members of  my race couldn’t even serve in the military.  And 
we moved to this point where they’re some of  the best and 
brightest that we’ve had … We must have everyone who is 
capable, willing and able to volunteer to defend this country 
… regardless [of] their sexual orientation.”34  Echoing Senator 
Burris’ statements, Representative Tauscher has described 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” as “the last big piece of  civil rights 
legislation left.”35
 In February, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
announced that the Pentagon would be undertaking a year-
long study to assess the attitudes of  military service members 
and potential consequences of  repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell.”36  Anticipated factors of  analysis include the effects on 
unit cohesion and service member bonding, as well as other 
issues such as military communities and family housing.37  
Gates said, “We will enter this examination with no 
preconceived views but a recognition that this will represent a 
fundamental change in personnel policy…”38
 Indeed, a repeal of  “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” would 
represent a fundamental change.  While progress has not 
been made as swiftly as some may have hoped, there is a large 
contingent of  supportive lawmakers and military personnel 
who hope to resolve this issue soon. 
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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
By: Cheryl Chado 
S. 1102: “Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations 
Act of  2009”
 The Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations 
Act of  2009 (“DPBO”) provides that federal employees and 
their domestic partners will be entitled to the same benefits 
and obligations as married federal employees and their 
spouses, regardless of  the gender of  the parties.1  The Act 
defines a domestic partner as “an adult unmarried person 
living with another adult unmarried person of  the same sex in 
a committed, intimate relationship,” and requires employees 
to file a certificate of  eligibility as to their relationship.2  
Through this Act, domestic partners will be able to receive 
health insurance, retirement and disability benefits and plans, 
emergency and medical leave, and any other benefit provided 
by the federal government to any employee.3
 The DPBO reflects the sentiments of  many 
Americans who support the inclusion of  same sex couples 
in health insurance coverage benefits.4  This opinion is also 
felt by over fifty percent of  Fortune 500 companies who also 
provide benefits to domestic partners of  their employees.5  
As Joe Solmonese, president of  the Human Rights Campaign, 
said, “This legislation would allow the federal government to 
keep pace with other top employers.”6  By allowing the same 
benefits as private employers, the federal government will be 
able to continue to have “access to the top talent on the same 
basis as the nation’s leading corporations.”7
 However, not everyone is a fan of  the Act’s goals.  
The Family Research Council points out the increased cost 
to taxpayers, estimating nearly a billion dollars required for 
funding.8  
 Further, critics in favor of  lesbian and gay equality 
point out the Act’s failure to address “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” 
by excluding military service members from those federal 
employees eligible for coverage.9
 Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) introduced the 
Act in the Senate on May 20, 2009 with twenty-seven co-
sponsors.  The Act was discussed in a hearing of  the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
on October 15, 2009. It was ordered to be reported with 
an amendment in the nature of  a substitute favorably in 
December, 2009.  Representative Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) 
introduces H.R. 2517 in the House on May 20, 2009 with 
one hundred and forty co-sponsors.  As of  January 29, 2010, 
the Act was placed on the Union Calendar, No. 239, in the 
House.
H.Res. 194: “Supporting the Goals of  International 
Women’s Day”
 International Women’s Day (“IWD”) is a day of  
global celebration that falls on March 8 of  every year.  The 
first Women’s Day was first celebrated in 1911 in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland, and was attended by 
more than one million people advocating for women’s rights 
and an end to employment discrimination.10  IWD has greatly 
expanded in prominence over the past century. It is now 
recognized as an official holiday in approximately fifteen 
countries.11
 International Women’s Day has achieved the same 
popularity and status as Mother’s Day in a number of  
countries,12 but it has not yet reached that level of  recognition 
in the United States.  Representative Janice Schakowsky (D-
IL) and forty-six co-sponsors have introduced this Resolution 
to the House in an effort to support IWD, citing staggering 
statistics of  gender disparity across the world.13  The 
Resolution explains that, although there are now many more 
women in powerful leadership positions across the world, 
“women still face political and economic obstacles, struggles 
for basic rights, face the threat of  discrimination, and are 
targets of  violence all over the world.”14  Other disparities 
include the fact that women account for a majority of  people 
affected by poverty, illiteracy, HIV/AIDS, domestic violence 
and abuse.15
 This Resolution is a solid effort by the House of  
Representatives not only to support and recognize the 
goals of  International Women’s Day but also to “issue a 
proclamation calling upon the people of  the United States 
to observe International Women’s Day with appropriate 
programs and activities.”16
S. 752: “Fair Election Now Act”
 The Fair Election Now Act outlines a public funding 
system for Senate elections and establishes provisions for 
contribution requirements and joint fundraising committees.17 
The Act would amend the Federal Election Campaign Act 
of  1971 (FECA) by creating a Fair Elections Fund and 
a Fair Elections Oversight Board.18  The Act would set 
additional requirements for campaign financing, including 
a public debate requirement, political advertising vouchers, 
and the prohibition of  joint fundraising committees outside 
of  the candidate’s official committee.19  Essentially, the Act 
would “allow federal candidates to choose to run for office 
without relying on large contributions, big money bundlers, 
or donations from lobbyists.”20  Candidates would then “be 
freed from the constant fundraising” and better able to focus 
on what their communities want.21
 Supporters of  the Act have described it as promoting 
“a Congress that is more responsive to the voters, less 
busy chasing dollars and less reliant on special interests.”22  
Commentators have also said that publicly financed political 
campaigns “are the answer,” and that they will open doors 
for a greater number of  candidates and allow for “more 
competitive races and … campaigns focusing on the concerns 
of  individual voters, not special interests.”23
 The Fair Election Now Act was introduced by 
Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) on March 31, 2009 and 
referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.24  
An act of  the same name was introduced in the House by 
Representative John Larson (D-CT) on the same day and was 
discussed in the House Energy and Commerce Committee in 
July 2009.25
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”
 The National Defense Authorization Act of  1994 
contains a section entitled, “Policy concerning homosexuality 
in the Armed Forces.”26  The “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 
policy, as it is more commonly known, has been the widely 
discussed subject of  debate since its enactment.  The Act 
begins by stating that there is no constitutional right to serve 
in the military, and it is up to the discretion of  Congress 
to determine who may or may not serve.27  The Act briefly 
discusses the requirements for members to achieve success 
as a military unit, including “high morale, good order and 
discipline, and unit cohesion.”28  The Act further states that, 
since the “presence … in the armed forces of  persons who 
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual 
acts would create an unacceptable risk,” those individuals 
must be excluded from the military service.29
 Since the Act was passed, numerous retired generals 
and military personnel have come forward to argue that 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” should be repealed.30  Senator Carl 
Levin (D-MI), chair of  the Armed Services Committee, has 
said that this issue is not a priority for many lawmakers.31  
The argument has also been made that, with troops fighting 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps now is not the time to 
reintroduce this highly controversial debate.32  Representative 
Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) has supported the repeal for the past 
few years and has sponsored legislation in the House, but also 
acknowledges that a change of  this nature will inevitably take 
time.33
 Senator Roland Burris (D-IL) has compared “Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell” to racial integration of  the military under 
President Truman’s administration, saying, “At one time … 
members of  my race couldn’t even serve in the military.  And 
we moved to this point where they’re some of  the best and 
brightest that we’ve had … We must have everyone who is 
capable, willing and able to volunteer to defend this country 
… regardless [of] their sexual orientation.”34  Echoing Senator 
Burris’ statements, Representative Tauscher has described 
“Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” as “the last big piece of  civil rights 
legislation left.”35
 In February, 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
announced that the Pentagon would be undertaking a year-
long study to assess the attitudes of  military service members 
and potential consequences of  repealing “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell.”36  Anticipated factors of  analysis include the effects on 
unit cohesion and service member bonding, as well as other 
issues such as military communities and family housing.37  
Gates said, “We will enter this examination with no 
preconceived views but a recognition that this will represent a 
fundamental change in personnel policy…”38
 Indeed, a repeal of  “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” would 
represent a fundamental change.  While progress has not 
been made as swiftly as some may have hoped, there is a large 
contingent of  supportive lawmakers and military personnel 
who hope to resolve this issue soon. 
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